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INTRODUCTION

People all over the world have always sharedmusic with friends. Sharing a
passion, discovering a new genre or a new performer by serendipity or word of
mouth, and spreading the word further - these have long been sources of joy
for individuals, and essential parts of the formation and propagation of culture.
On the other hand, people have not always shared music with fitiends all over
the world. The development of peer-to-peer (P2P) applications - Napster and
its ilk was a technological revolution, a significant innovation that
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt the exciting possibilities of
networked technology and networked people in a context in which, in
accordance with Moore's Law,I processor speed and memory are becoming
rapidly less expensive.
That this revolutionary technology created upheaval in copyright law is
well-known. That P2P technology has also raised important questions for
antitrust law and antitrust regulators - by shaking up the industry and
accelerating coordination in an already concentrated industry - however, is less
well known and less well examined in the literature.
Questions arising at the intersection of copyright and antitrust must now be
addressed. The Antitrust Division of the DOJ has launched an investigation of
leading players in the recording industry (the "big five labels"), their industr
association, and their new joint ventures for licensing music on the web.European authorities are also publicly monitoring the industry.3 Regardless of
the outcome of these particular investigations, the issues are not likely to go
away. Even Napster has gotten into the act, diverting judicial attention from its
own copyright infringement to the industry practices which made legitimate

1 See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits,
ELECTRONIcs, Apr. 19, 1965, available at http://www.intel.com/research/silicon/
mooreslaw.htm (last visited May 11, 2002). Moore, co-predicted that the number of
transistors per integrated circuit - and thus the processing power - would double every
couple of years. "Moore's Law," as it has become known, proved remarkably prescient, and
is still frequently referenced. See Moore's Law, Overview, at www.intel.com/research/
silicon/mooreslaw.htm (last visited May 11, 2002) (explaining the "Law").
2 See Matt Richtel, U.S. lnquin, Is Under Way on Online Music Business, N.Y. TIMES,

Oct. 16, 2001, at C2.
3 See Veronica Garcia-Robles, European Union Considers Banning Internet Music
Services Pressplav and Musicnet, EUROPEMEDIA.NET, at http://www.europemedia.net/

shownews.asp?ArticlelD=6072 (Oct. 15, 2001).
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online music distribution so difficult. 4 But what should antitrust regulators be
doing here?
This article argues that there is a potential role for antitrust authorities in this
context. These institutions have particular strengths that are worth exploring.
Given the strengthening of the "property rights" of copyright owners in this
context, and given the possibly detrimental results of this strengthening for
consumer welfare, there may be a role for antitrust regulators in imposing
some controls. Matters historically viewed as issues of pure copyright policy
may best also be seen as basic questions of consumer welfare and a legitimate
concern for antitrust regulators. Where, as we will argue, a highly nuanced
response to the particular problems of this industry is required, the "one size
fits all" approach of copyright law should be supplemented by the more factintensive and fact-sensitive approach of antitrust.
In this paper, then, we seek to ask a number of questions.
First, what should be the broad principles guiding copyright and competition
policy in the context of the recording industry online? In short, what are the
key concerns or values that we want preserved in relation to the distribution of
music online? We will outline the background to the present investigations
and existing law in Part I and argue in Part I that these concerns can be
encapsulated in two broad areas: (1) the preservation of some scope for private
and personal use and (2) the encouragement and growth of a diverse sector for
the distribution of copyrighted works online. We also argue that, at least at
present, the proper balance has not been achieved in either area. The
particularprinciples we identify as important for promoting competition in the
music industry include maximizing (1) content availability, (2) distribution
technology, (3) fair individual use of content, and (4) the welfare of all
stakeholders, as well as minimizing technologies of control that invade users'
privacy or unduly restrict use of content. Of course, regulators do not have
free reign to pursue these principles. Current law and market structure
constrain them. Our next question then moves from the realm of the ideal to
the real: What should be the minimum terms of settlement? In Part I, we
propose three key concessions from the recording industry, including the
4 See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1102-13 (N.D. Cal.

2002) (considering the conduct of the recording industry in the context of Napster's
allegations of copyright misuse and ordering the plaintiffs to provide further discovery in
that regard). The doctrine of copyright misuse is closely related to, though not co-extensive
with, antitrust law. See id.
5 See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets?: An
Inquiry into Antitrust, IntellectualProperty, and BroadbandRegulation as Applied to 'The
New Economy,' 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 41, 62 (2001) ("[A]ny harm from excessive IP
protection is amplified [in the new economy]. For this reason, those who value effective
competition must take seriously the task of understanding and evaluating the actual
allocative and consumer welfare results of the IP system. This is imperative because, unlike
antitrust, IP is anything but supple. Its 'one size fits all' rules leave courts painfully little
discretion to weigh costs and benefits before applying them.").
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agreement 1) not to sue small and limited forms of digital music file sharing
(known as virtual private networks), 2) to include consumer groups on industry
standard-setting bodies, and 3) to disclose and limit digital rights management
techniques.
Second, we ask: How can we evaluate the means possible to achieve these
ends? We contend that proposed reforms should be evaluated along axes of
plausibility and comprehensiveness. As we will argue, those proposals which
are most comprehensive - that is, the proposals most likely to achieve our
stated aims in full - are also least plausible in the current institutional and legal
environment. This motivates us to look for more realistically achievable, albeit
less comprehensive goals. In other words, we would like to explore not just
principle, but also issues of what, pragmatically, can be done in light of
existing institutions and path dependence as well as principle.
Third, we ask: What institutions are available that can plausibly promulgate
and effectively apply regulations to achieve these ends? It is here in Part III
that we tum to the antitrust authorities as potential promulgators of regulations
embodying our preferred outcomes. We will argue that, in the context of these
technological developments, in the area of copyright law, neither the
legislature, nor the courts, are going to strike the right balance. We therefore
look to regulatory agencies, and in particular, the antitrust agencies, which are
less likely in this context to be subject to "capture" by copyright interests. In
Part IV, we outline the relative competencies and liabilities of Congress, the
courts, and a range of administrative agencies in applying such regulation. We
conclude by endorsing an expanded role for administrative agencies and a
more restricted one for the courts.
The reader will appreciate that this is a highly controversial area. There are
few areas of antitrust policy which are currently less contentious than the
proper relationship between antitrust and intellectual property law. Even if
both sets of doctrine have a common goal - the promotion of innovation - they
tend to use different techniques for achieving that end. Given the problems we
will point out with copyright policy-making institutions, however, the
relationship and the possible role of antitrust regulators are worth exploring.
Even if the reader rejects these speculations regarding the possible role of
antitrust regulators, this paper reaches further in its scope. We set out a
number of policy goals that we consider plausible and that could be pursued by
other means - legislation, or other action by administrative agencies such as
the Library of Congress. Moreover, we consider in detail the weaknesses and
strengths of existing copyright institutions - considerations relevant for any
proposals of reform in this difficult area.
As music distribution becomes digitized, the relative costs of
communication, reproduction, and use of works will be fundamentally altered.
Owners and consumers of copyrighted works must reach a new equilibrium of
rights and obligations. Governmental regulators can play a key role in the new
environment. If they are guided by the right principles, antitrust law and
institutions can both advance and enhance online music distribution.
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I. BACKGROUND
The Internet has radically expanded the methods for finding and
experiencing music. The development of Peer-to-Peer ("P2P") technology has
made public distribution of music to the world as easy as sharing music with a
friend. In response, copyright owners have directed resources at both "law"
and "code" - litigation and developing technologies that enable ever-tighter
control over their works. Such digital rights management ("DRM"), backed by
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 6 has the potential to change the face of
copyright law. Copyright owners who can dictate the terms of use of
copyrighted works can prevent even uses that would be legal under extant
copyright law, 7 particularly under such well-known doctrines as fair use.
Both P2P technology and DRM have profoundly affected the prospects for
online music distribution. In the past two years, the revolutionary changes
affecting the music industry have moved from specialized publications .like
Billboard and Rolling Stone to the covers of Time and Newsweek.8 To put

these developments in perspective, it is necessary to review 1) the new
technology, 2) the key institutions generating and implementing copyright
policy, and 3) the relevant law. This introduction gives a brief history of the
latest developments in online music distribution, and discusses the key players
and institutions that will shape its future. The aim is not to provide a detailed
exposition of the law, which may be found elsewhere, 9 but rather, to present an
overall picture of recent legal and factual developments, and to place those
developments in their institutional context.
A.

The Nature and Significance of the Technology
1.

A Brief Recent History of Unauthorized Online Music Distribution,
and its Threat to Copyright Owners' Interests
Digital technology has made the reproduction and dissemination of
copyrighted works infinitely easier and almost costless. Each digital copy is
identical, and is therefore capable of generating infinite further reproductions.
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1122 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).
7 See Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, FairUse InfrastructureforRights Management,
6

15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).
8 See Eileen Fitzpatrick, Napster Ruling May Affect Other Sites, BILLBOARD, Aug. 5,
2000; Napster's Boy Wonder: The Most Dangerous Man in the Music Biz, ROLLING STONE,
Jul. 6-20, 2000; Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60; Steven Levy, The Noisy War
over Napster,NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2000, at 46.
9 See generally Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.VLA J. L. & ARTs 1 (2000); Joseph A. Sifferd, The Peer-to-PeerRevolution: A PostNapster Analysis ofthe Rapidly DevelopingFile-SharingTechnology, 4 VAND.J. ENT. L &
PRAC. 93 (2002); see also Fred Von Lohmann, Peer to Peer File Sharing and Copyright
Law After Napster, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION available at http://www.eff.org/
IP/P2P/Napster/20010309_p2p.execsum.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
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Once networked, everyone is a potential "publisher" - not only to a few
friends, but to millions. Music, in particular, has borne the brunt of early
developments. While digital music existed even in the very early days of the
Internet, the real breakthrough came with compression technology, notably
MP3,' 0 which makes digitized songs into smaller, easily transferable files,
notably free of any restrictive copy-management technology. In conjunction
with readily available "ripping" software that converts CDs to MP3 digital
files, compression technology has effectively removed the "box" 1 from sound
recordings.
MP3 files were not always easy to find. Internet entrepreneurs, however,
saw opportunities to provide easy access to such files. Digital music
companies of various sorts, some funded with venture capital, sprang up to
seize these opportunities. A major shake-out has ensued, in which many of
these companies have since disappeared or been acquired. 2 The past three
years have brought dynamic technological developments - and ensuing
litigation.
Chief among the technological developments has been P2P technology, the
sheer scale of which has brought conflicts over online distribution of music to
a crisis point. P2P file-sharing represents a challenge to copyright law because
it allows users to search for and retrieve files from the hard drives of other
users in a network. "Nodes" (usually personal computers) at the edges of the
network have significant autonomy, potentially rendering centralized servers
superfluous. 13
File-sharing threatens copyright interests by removing
bottlenecks that have been the locus of copyright control over works, and by

10 "MP3" is shorthand for "MPEG-1 layer-3."
MP3,

at

See Jocelyn Dabeau, An Introduction to

http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic Affairs/coursepages/tfisher/music/MP3.

html (last visited May 16, 2002). MPEG stands for the Moving Pictures Experts Group, a
working group directed by the International Standards Organization and the International
Electro-Technical Commission. See id. A three-minute song that requiring about 32
megabytes in original form can be compressed to about three megabytes without a
noticeable reduction in sound quality. See id. MP3 is the presently dominant but not the
only form of compression technology. Matthew Graven & Carol Mangis, Music by MP3,
PC MAGAZINE, May 8, 2001 (describing "wma" and "aac" files).
1 Or the bottle, to use John Perry Barlow's famous metaphor. See John Perry Barlow,
Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of the Mind on the Global Net, at
http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/JohnPerry-Barlow/HTML/idea-economy-article.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
12MP3.com, for example, was acquired by Vivendi-Universal. See Bertelsmann In Deal
To BioMusic Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001; Napster, having been supported by loans

from Bertelsmann, filed for Chapter II bankruptcy protection in June 2002. See Upheaval
at Bertelsmann May End Plans for Acquisition of Napster, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002. The
developer of Aimster (later Madster) also filed for bankruptcy. See In re Deep, 279 B.R.
653, 656 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (outlining the circumstances the Chapter 13 petition of Aimster
founder Johnny Deep).
13

See generally PEER-TO-PEER:

HARNESSING THE BENEFITS OF A DISRUPTIVE

TECHNOLOGY (Andy Oram, ed., O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. 2001).
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massively increasing the efficiency and scale of "viral distribution." 14 P2P
also blurs the differences between the kinds of public distribution traditionally
controlled by copyright owners, and private uses including "sharing music"
with friends. A number of different P2P file-sharing models have developed.
In early 1999, Shawn Fanning developed the software that became
Napster. 15 Napster represented a technological revolution. Napster's
"MusicShare" software exponentially increased both the files available and the
convenience of searching for MP3 files, by opening access to users' hard
drives and creating a centralized database, updated in real time, of the files thus
made available by users connected to the network at any given time. 16 In the
Napster system, filenames of files that individual users were willing to share
were uploaded to Napster servers. This central list of filenames was then
searched by other users. When a user chose a file, the Napster server conveyed
the Intemet Protocol (IP) address of the sharing user to the requesting user.
Thus while the file transfer was peer-to-peer, the system depended on
centralized searching. The technology gained popularity, and users rapidly
formed a network of millions sharing music files - the vast majority
copyrighted.
In December 1999, the record companies filed suit, alleging contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement on a massive scale. 17 A long period of
litigation has ensued, which continues at the time of writing. At first instance,
the trial judge found that the copyright owners had shown they were likely to
"Viral Distribution" refers to the phenomenon where files can be rapidly replicated,
and each replica in turn can be rapidly replicated, allowing redistribution by each recipient
of a copy. On the analogy with viral propagation, See generally Margaret Jane Radin,
Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 INn. L. J. 1125, 1132 (1999); Universal
City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331-32 (2000).
15 See Warren Cohen, Napster is Rocking the Music Industry: The Popular Web Site has
Powerful Enemies, US NEws & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL
7717576; Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L.
REv. 473,484-89 (2002).
16 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001)
(describing the Napster system in its present and pre-injunction incarnation). Subsequently,
the Napster system has undergone a number of changes, including the introduction of
different filters, and, most recently, the testing of a subscription model. See Jon Healey,
Napster Launches New Version; Internet: Trial Subscription Service Will Pay For Music
But Have FarFewerSongs to Download, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at B3-5; see also Peter
Honigsberg, supra note 15, at 489 (noting that a subscription service was trialled in January
2002). These trials have been overtaken by Napster's subsequent filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. See Upheaval at Bertelsmann May End Plansfor Acquisition of
Napster,N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002. In all these incarnations, however, including the trial
subscription model, the basic system remains the same, with file-swapping occurring
between computers, using a centralized database.
17See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(explaining facts taken from judgment of the District Court). The music publishers joined in
January 2000. See id.
14
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succeed in demonstrating contributory infringement and vicarious liability, and
that Napster's defenses were likely to fail.
On this basis, District Judge Patel
granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the copyright owners.
This
decision was largely upheld by the Ninth Circuit in February 2001, although
the injunction was remanded to the district court for modification to recognize
possible limits on Napster's liability. 2 The preliminary injunction, the Ninth
Circuit held, must require copyright owners to take some of the burden by
identifying specific infringing files and notifying these to Napster.2 1 A
modified injunction was accordingly entered by the district court on March 5,
2001.22 After three months of monitoring Napster's compliance with the
injunction, the district court found that Napster was not in satisfactory
compliance with the modified injunction, and in July 2001 ordered Napster to
disable its file transferring service until certain conditions were met.
The
modified form of the injunction, and the shut down order, were both upheld by
the Ninth Circuit in March 2002. 24 Napster has not re-commenced its free filesharing service; it is now part-owned by Bertelsmann, and has attempted to "go
legitimate" - focusing on the development
of a subscription model, and
25
obtaining some licenses to include works.
Meanwhile, in March 2000, an AOL subsidiary posted a beta version of an
open-source file-sharing program. 26 Though the program was taken down
within hours,2 7 downloads made during that.•brief
28 period were the source of the
Gnutella open-source file-sharing application.
Like Napster, Gnutella is a
peer-to-peer system; unlike Napster, Gnutella does not rely on a centralized
database of files available. 2 9 In the Gnutella model, individual users send out

"S See id. at 912, 916-20, 922-25 (discussing Napster's fair use, contributory
infringement, vicarious infringement, and waiver defenses as well as defenses premised on
Son' Corp. of America v. Universal CiQy Studios, hIc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000).
'9 See id. at 927.

20 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1027-1028 (9th Cir. 2001).
21 See id. at 1027.
22 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
23A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (outlining
the history since March 2001).
24 Id.
25 Matt Richtel,

If Bertelsmann Wed Napster,It Could Sue Itself, and More, N.Y.

TIMES,

Apr. 22, 2002, at C1.
26 See D. Ian Hopper, Open Source Napster-like Product Disappears After Release,

CNN.coM, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/ptech/03/15/gnutella (Mar. 15, 2000).
27 See Christopher Jones, Open Source 'Napster' Shut Down, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0, I 282,34978,00.html (Mar. 15, 2000).
28 What is Gnutella?, GNUTELLA.COM, at http://www.gnutella.com/news/4210 (Dec. 3,
2001).
29 See id.
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queries "broadcast" or viral fashion. 30 Each computer sends the query to other
logged in users it is connected with, then each computer receiving such a query
does the same. 3 1 A host of particular applications offered access to the
Gnutella network, including LimeWire and BearShare. 32 By late 2000, it was
estimated that Napster had tens of millions of users, 33 and the Gnutella
network was comprised of thousands of "peers" at any given time. 34 Gnutella
has its problems, however: Viral queries consume large amounts of35
bandwidth,
and non-sharing "free riders" have a negative impact on the system.
The technology continues to evolve at an extremely rapid pace. In the wake
of the Napster litigation, more efficient distributed systems have developed. A
number of services use the very popular FastTrack software, including
MusicCity.com (now known as StreamCast Networks, Inc.), KaZaA, and
Grokster (collectively, the "FastTrack providers"). 36
Like Napster, the
FastTrack user interface is simple and intuitive, and provides users who have
downloaded the software, and who connect to the network, with the ability to
search for and download files - in this case music files, but also audio-visual
and graphics files. Unlike Napster's MusicShare, however, the FastTrack
providers neither compile nor control any single centralized database of
available files. 37 Instead, the system is to some extent 'self-organizing.' Users
connect to "SuperNodes" -computers of other users - and those SuperNodes
compile an index of digital data made available for download by users.3 8 The
FastTrack providers, moreover, claim only to make and distribute software,

30 See

id.

31 See id.
32

See generally Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2001; Scott Rosenberg, Revenge of the File Sharing Masses, SALON.COM, at
http://dir.salon.com/tech/col/rose/2001/07/20/napster-diaspora/index.html (July 20, 2001)
(last visited September 2, 2002).
33 See Amy Harmon, Napster Users Mourn End ofFreeMusic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000
(noting that in 18 months, Napster had acquired 38 million users).
34 Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, FreeRiding on Gnutella, 5(1) FIRST MONDAY,
Oct. 2000, available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_lO/adar/index.html (last visited
May 5, 2002) (discussing experimental results showing over 30,000 users at any given
time).
35 Eytan Adar and Bemardo A. Huberman, FreeRiding on Gnutella, 5(1) FIRsT MONDAY
(Oct. 2000), available at http://firstmonday.orglissues/issue5_ 0/adar/index.html (last
visited May 5, 2002).
36 See Rosenberg, supra note 32; see also the description of FastTrack in Honigsberg,
supra note 15, at 476, n. 16.
37
see id.
38 KaZaA BV's Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief, MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Case No. CV 01-08541 SWB (RNBx) (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 2, 2002), availableat http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/ (last visited
May 22, 2002).
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and to play no role in file-trading by users of the software. 39 The degree of
control that Napster was able to exercise over its users and network was a key
holding in the Ninth Circuit decision; 40 a service with less control over its
users may be less likely to be held vicariously liable for their copyright
infringement. This distinction received some support from a Netherlands
Appellate Court holding that KaZaA developers were not liable for copyright
infringement that occurs when people use the software. 4 1 However, twentyeight of the world's largest entertainment companies (including movie studios
and record companies) in a suit filed against the various FastTrack providers in
October 2001 allege that the software developers have sufficient control over
the •• network 42 to be liable for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement. The United States' case remains to be heard later in 2002.
The final P2P development of significance was the "virtual private network"
format: a different kind of peer-to-peer application embodied in the application
Madster, formerly known as Aimster. This application, rather than creating a
world-wide file-sharing network open to all comers, instead created what we
might call a "virtual private network" by allowing users of AOL's AIM instant
messaging service to share files among those on their "buddy lists." The
system is more "private" in the sense that only "invited" users can view an
individual's files, although it can still create a virtual private network of up to
160 people at once. 44 Madster, too, is the subject of copyright litigation and
the legal case
remains outstanding. Its developer, Johnny Deep, has filed for
45
bankruptcy.
Other non-P2P developments in music distribution and business on the
Internet also sprang up during this same 1999 to 2002 period. Most significant

39

Jasper Koning, KaZaA Plays on Despite Threat of Fines, CNET NEws, at

http://news.com.com/2102-1023-277300.html (Dec. 20, 2001).

40 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting

that Napster had the "the right and ability to supervise its users' conduct).
41

Brad

King,

The

KaZaA

Ruling:

What

It

Means,

WIRED

NEWS,

at

http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,51457,00.html (Apr. 2, 2002).
42 Complaint, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, Case No. CV 0108541
SWB (RNBx),
1, (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-vGrokster/ (last visited May 31, 2002).

43 After a dispute between the developer Johnny Deep and AOL (who run the AIM
Messenger Service), the domain name "aimster.com" (inter alia) was transferred after a
decision under ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. The decision, dated May 14,
2001, is online at the Arbitrator's website. See National Arbitration Forum, America
Online, Inc. v. John Deep dlb/a Buddy USA, Inc., at http://www.arbitrationforum.com/domains/decisions/96795.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
44 See P. J. Huffstutter, File-Swapping Aimster Offers Promise, Peril, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2000.
45See Brian Garrity, Sites + Sounds, BILLBOARD, Apr. 6, 2002, at 60 (discussing the
filing of a Chapter II action in an U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Albany, N.Y. by Aimster
founder Johnny Deep on behalf of his companies AbovePeer and Buddy USA).
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among these was My.MP3.com, a service which allowed consumers to listen to
streamed audio of music after proving they had a physical copy of the CD by
inserting it into their CD-ROM Drive. In order to provide this service,
My.MP3.com stored unauthorized reproductions of all the songs for their
centralized database; the service was successfully sued by the record
companies for infringement of copyright by reproduction. The court re ected
My.MP3.com's reliance on users alleged 'fair use' rights to 'space shift.'
In short, especially since 1999, music has been widely distributed without
copyright owners' authorization and certainly against their wishes, most
spectacularly via P2P technology. No doubt, after publication of this article,
there will be numerous further developments. Copyright owners have
aggressively litigated against such outbreaks of viral distribution. Although
there have been few suits against individual users47 -this is not an attractive
option for record companies -- commercial P2P systems have been devastated
by the litigation. The litigation, has driven internet entrepreneurs away from
the field and deterred investment from venture capitalists. 49 Nevertheless, it
does not appear to be stopping the underlying
file-trading,
peak.5 gmwhich may be 50%
at Napster's

greater than the trading that occurred
For the present, we can divide music distribution online into four rough
categories. First, there is the inevitable "underground" distribution that is,
most likely, largely uncontrollable. Second and third we have the two
extremes to which file-sharing technologies have been driven as a result of the
litigation against Napster and its brethren. One direction is toward less legally
46

See UMG Recordings, Inc v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In

another high-profile case around the same time, RealNetworks obtained a preliminary
injunction against Streambox, which developed software allowing recording of streamed
music online. See RealNetworks, Inc v Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1889 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2000). Both cases are considered in some detail in Jane Ginsburg, Copyright
Use andExcuse on the Internet, 24 CoLuM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1, 2-5, 22-29 (2000).
47 Cf Janelle Brown, The Gnutella Paradox, SALON.COM, at http://www.salon.com/
tech/feature/2000/09/29/gnutellaparadox (Sept. 29, 2000) (highlighting Gene Kan, who
likens Gnutella to a "communications protocol" and argues that the idea of suing Gnutella is
like "suing English") . Kan's anaology is an exaggeration, as it might be possible instead to
bring suit against the better known (and more user friendly) portals; rendering the system
deeply user-unfriendly is likely to achieve many of the same ends for content owners.
48 But see GigaMedia,EMI to Form Online Music Venture, CHINA POST, May 15, 2001
(describing recent Taiwanese raids on students' computers in relation to file-sharing). In the
United States, an Oregon student become the first individual convicted in 1999. See Joseph
A. Sifferd, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis of the Rapidly
Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 93, 97-98 (2002)
(describing the case).
49 Brian Garrity, Victory Eludes Legal Fight over File Swapping, BILLBOARD, Apr. 13,
2002 (noting that "[m]ost investment in peer-to-peer technology has dried up during the past
18 months, partly as a result of the threat of litigation.").
5o ld. (noting that P2P music trading has risen as much as 18 million monthly unique
users).
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vulnerable systems such as those outlined above. The other is toward the
development of closed systems operating under industry approval and license,
such as eMusic. The latter seek to replicate the benefits of file-sharing - such
as sharing of interests with other users - while maintaining control over the
copyrighted works available, for example, by only allowing the sharing of files
listed on a central database. 5 1 Finally, we have the copyright owners' own,
tentative steps towards online distribution. We turn to those developments
now.
2.

Music Distribution Online: The Authorized Biography

Copyright owner-sanctioned -digital distribution has been rather slower to
emerge than its unauthorized relatives. 52 In the wake of the Napster court
decisions and the shut-down of the service which had demonstrated enormous
demand for the convenience and efficiency of music distribution through
digital mechanisms, the recording industry felt the pressure - from the public
and some members of Congress - to provide some kind of authorized
alternative.
On April 3, 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee under the Chairmanship
of Senator Orrin Hatch held a hearing, Online Entertainment: Coming Soon to
a DigitalDevice Near You. 53 In the days leading up to the hearing several new
initiatives were announced, including plans for MTV to provide licensed
digital music downloads for purchase by consumers. 54 RealNetworks, AOL
Time Warner, Bertelsmann AG, and the EMI Group announced "MusicNet,"
an online subscription music service formed as a joint venture of the three
labels and RealNetworks. 55 The other two of the "big five" recording studios,

51 An example is Wippit, which is based on a flat-fee subscription model which claims to
take "the best aspects of peer-to-peer thinking" and add in clearing house accounting in the
style of performing rights associations, to provide revenue for music companies and artists.
See WIPPET.COM, at http://www.wippit.co.uk (last visited June 4, 2002). Performing rights
associations have long assured compensation to creators unable to control the use of their
works-such as composers and lyricists. See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY
SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 232 (Watson-Guptill, 7th ed. 1995) (1964).
52 See generally Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing
Before the Senate Conn. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2 (2000); Brian Garrity, Victor,
Eludes Legal Fight over File Swapping, BILLBOARD, Apr. 13, 2002 (quoting one source as

suggesting that "[h]aving labels administer stuff like this is like having it administered by
the registry of motor vehicles.").
53 See Statement of the Hon. Orrin Hatch, in Online Entertainment: Coming Soon to a
DigitalDevice Near You: HearingBefore the Senate Connn. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=198 (last visited September
2, 2002).

54 See Brad King, MTV Gets Down with Downloads, WIRED NEWs, at
http://www.wired.com/ news/mp3/0,1285,42839,00.html (Apr. 4, 2001).
5- See Frank Saxe, MusicNet Proposal Raises Questions of Fairness, BILLBOARD, Apr.
14, 2001; Richard Henderson & Juliana Koranteng, The State of Play, BILLBOARD, Apr. 14,
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Sony Music Entertainment and Universal Music Group, had already
announced "Duet," since re-named "Pressplay" - an equally held joint
venture. 56 The music industry demonstrated some of the technology at a
House Committee Hearing on May 17, 2001, 57 and the two services were
launched in December 2001.58 The two entities differ in form: MusicNet is
apparently set up to license the labels' music to distributors (so far including
RealNetworks' RealOne Music and AOL), 59 whereas Pressplay appears to be
more "centralized" - though there are links from various affiliate websites, a
prospective user is always apparently directed to a site at Pressplay. Rights
granted by the two services also differ. Pressplay at this stage allows users to
"bum" some files on to CDs. The breakdown
of the subscription plans
61
currently available on Pressplay is as follows:
Basic Plan

Silver Plan

Gold Plan

Number of
streams/month

300

500

750

1000

Downloads/

30

50

75

100

month
CD burns

0

10

15

20

$9.95

$14.95

$19.95

$24.95

Platinum Plan

allowed

Price per month

2001; MUSiCNET.COM, at http://www.musicnet.com (last visited May 31, 2002).
56 See About Us, PRESSPLAY.COM, at http://www.pressplay.com/aboutus.html

(last visited

May 31, 2002). EMI announced that it would license music to Pressplay. See Penelope
Patsuris, Other Labels Must Follow EMI's Lead, FORBES.COM, Oct. 2, 2001, at
http://www.forbes.com/2001/10/02/1002emi.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
57 See Music MajorsForcedto Play a Different Tune, NEw MEDIA AGE, Apr. 12, 2001.
58 Pressplay was launched on December 19, 2001. See Technology Briefing Internet:
PressplayTo Start Today, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001. MusicNet was launched with
RealOne Music on December 4, 2001; Jon Healey, Digital Living Room; Music
Subscription Services Singing Different Tunes, L.A. TIMES, Dec, 13, 2001.
59 See id.
60 This has been the experience of the writers. The Uniform Resource Locator ("URL",
or World Wide Web address) to which one is directed from the affiliate sites is a Pressplay
URL, rather than an MSN or other URL (depending on the affiliates). Affiliates are listed
on pressplay's homepage. See Pressplay,at www.pressplay.com (last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
61 See Steve McCannell, A Pressplay Test Drive, O'REILLY OPENP2P.CoM, at
http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2002/03/07/pressplay.html (Mar. 5, 2002) (offering an
analysis of the features and constraints of the Pressplay subscription service). Note that the
charges and capabilities on Pressplay have changed over time as the record labels Seek to
make the service more attractive. Current information is available from the Pressplay Web
site. See Pressplay, The Service, at http://www.pressplay.com/theservice.html (last visited
Sept. 2, 2002).
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Some notable constraints of the Pressplay system are that: 1) once a user
ends his or her subscription, access to all of the tracks that the user has
downloaded from Pressplay is lost; if one resubscribes to Pressplay within six
months, one can regain access to one's downloaded collection, but only if the
same user name and password is used; 2) if one doesn't use up his or her
downloads/streams/bums in one month, they do not carry over to6 2the next
month; and 3) a user has to be connected to the Internet to bum a CD.
Because each service initially reflected the converged effort and investment
of only half the industry, MusicNet and Pressplay were as competitors able to
offer consumers only a limited catalog of content. The inconvenience of
having to subscribe to both services to attain a full universe of mainstream
content led analysts to remark that before the services could compete with free
63
services they would have to offer music from all five big distributors.
Apparently, the labels have taken this message to heart: 64 Pressplay recently
announced developments that it is close to securing licensing rights from its
competitors Bertelsmann and AOL Time Warner. 65 Having already secured the
licensing rights from Sony, Universal, EMI Group Plc, and ten independent
labels, if the developments proceed as predicted, Pressplay
66 would then have
access to the recorded music of all five major distributors.

62 See id.
63

See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 32. The problems are still being experienced. See Jon
Healey, Online Music Catalogs Lacking, L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 2002. Rosenberg notes:
[T]he major record labels still can't give music fans something they've been getting
from pirate services for more than three years: a comprehensive catalog of songs ....
Pressplay's lineup, like that of every other authorized service, has gaping holes ....
Some of those holes could be filled by signing more deals with major record labels-Pressplay has Universal, Sony and EMI in its fold, but not Warner Music Group or
BMG...
Id.
64 According to a late-January, 2002 study by the media analysts at investment bank
ABN-AMRO in London, the five major labels have spent a collective SI.976 billion on
developing digital-music services, including investments in such services as MusicNet and
rival Pressplay and acquisitions of such existing companies as Myplay and MP3.com. See
Matthew Benz, Solutions Prove Elusive As Investment Disappointments And Retail
Setbacks Rise, BILLBOARD, Apr. 6, 2002, at 1. Yet, recent studies suggest that consumers
have not and will not be warming up to these services in sufficient numbers to ensure
profitability anytime soon. See id. Also in mid-January, digital-media consultancy Jupiter
Media Metrix lowered its projection for digital-music revenue by 2006 - whether from
subscriptions or downloads - from S1.9 billion to $1.6 billion. See id.
65 See Josh Fineman, Pressplay Close to Agreements with 2 Music Companies, CEO says,
BLOOMBERG NEws, Apr. 26, 2002; In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1105-06 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting evidence that the MusicNet "joint venture
anticipate[d] obtaining licenses from the other two major labels (Sony and Universal) to
distribute their catalogs of copyrighted music").
66 See Fineman, supra note 65.
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3.

Is there something wrong with this picture? Non-copyright legal
developments
To summarize thus far, the record companies, who own copyright in a vast
majority of sound recordings, have actively litigated against developers of P2P
and related technology in an effort to prevent unauthorized music distribution.
They have succeeded in shutting down Napster for the present and in making
technological innovation in this area contingent on their permission. Further,
these same companies have formed two joint ventures for the purpose of
exploiting their libraries of content within the online music distribution market.
As the discussion of Pressplay and MusicNet indicates, the recording
companies may need to coordinate licensing in order to create an online
distribution system attractive to consumers. Mergers and coordination
certainly increase efficiency, especially in areas where transaction costs are
high. However, they also may create market power-defined as "the ability of
a firm (or a group of firms acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive
level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is
unprofitable and must be rescinded." 67 Between them, the "big five" recording
companies
control some 85% of the recorded music market in the United
68
States. Even prior to the current developments, the record companies were
not strangers to antitrust allegations. In May, 2000, the FTC found that the
companies had overcharged consumers
approximately five hundred million
69
dollars over the previous four years.
The new music ventures (Pressplay and Musicnet) have essentially
"merged" the "big five" into two for purposes of online distribution. These
67 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv.
L. REv. 937 (1981); see also DOJ & FTC, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,

availableat http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
6
8This figure is taken from the material of the Federal Trade Commission,. See, e.g.,
Complaint, In re Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., No. C-3971, Aug. 30, 2000, availableat
http:/www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/sonycomp.htm) (last visited Sept. 2, 2002). This complaint
led to a consent agreement. See Decision and Order, In re Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.,
No. C-3971, Aug. 30, 2000, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/O9/sony.do.htrn (last
visited Sept. 2, 2002). The figure was also used in the Napster litigation. See In re Napster,
Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (recording the same
figure, based on the declaration of Roger Noll, Morris N. Doyle Professor of Public Policy,

Stanford University).
Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution ofNapster, 36 U.S.F. L. REv 473,
477-78 (2002); see also Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky, and Commissioners Sheila
F. Anthony, Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary, In re Time
Warner,
Inc.,
File
No.
971-0070,
May
10,
2000,
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/cdstatement.htm (last visited May 31, 2002). The companies
settled with the United States, and a consent agreement was entered. See Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining
Competition
in
CD
Music
Market
(May
10,
2000),
available at
http://www.fte.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm (last visited May 31, 200).
69
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developments have sparked inquiries from antitrust authorities. In October,
2001, news leaked out that the DOJ had issued civil investigative demands
(CIDs) to the record companies and their trade group. This followed a June
announcement by the European Commission
of a competition (i.e., antitrust)
71
investigation into Pressplay and MusicNet.
Adding to the controversy, Napster has argued that the record companies
engaged in copyright misuse by imposing restrictive licensing terms in order to
thwart competition and leverage copyright ownership into control of related
markets. In February 2002, Judge Patel ordered the record companies to give
discovery on the issue of copyright misuse, thus permitting Napster to gather
evidence from some 600,000 to 800,000pages of documents from the record
companies to substantiate its claims.
In the context of the limited
information before her, the Judge commented:
The current record on the licensing practices of these joint ventures is
negligible. However, even a nalf must realize that in forming and
operating a joint venture, plaintiffs' representatives must necessarily meet
and discuss pricing and licensing, raising the specter of possible antitrust
violations. These joint ventures bear the indicia of entities designed to
allow the plaintiffs to use their copyrights and extensive market-power to
dominate the market for digital music distribution. . . . Even on the
undeveloped record73before the court, these joint ventures look bad, sound
bad and smell bad.
B.

CopyrightLaw And DigitalMusic Distribution:The Institutions

The section above outlined presents disputes over online music distribution.
We turn now to the parties and institutions capable of solving them.
70

Kelly Donohue, MusicNet & Pressplay: To Trust or Antitrust?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH.

REv. 0039; Gerry May, Specter of Copyright Abuse Haunts Music Industr's Move into
Online Music, 2001 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 111201; Jane Black, Online Music:
Cranking
Up
the
Antitrust
Volume,
BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE,
at

http://www.businessweek.comfbwdaily/dnflash/oct2001/nf20011026_0654.htm (Oct. 26,
2001).
71
BBC News, EU Threat Over Download Sites, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/entertainment/newmedia/newsid_1600000/1600064.stm
(Oct. 15, 2001).

72 li re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105-06 (N.D. Cal.
2002). The 600,000 to 800,000 pages are identical to the documents submitted by the
record labels to the DOJ for antitrust investigation. The discovery request will cover any
additional documents requested by the DOJ. See Brenda Sandburg, Napster and Record
Labels Still Slugging It Out, THE RECORDER, Mar. 27, 2002, at 2 (describing the
disagreement between Napster and the record labels over the material available to Napster
and the timing of discovery) Napster also requested documents involving settlement
negotiations between any of the plaintiffs and Napster, as well as documents submitted to
the DOJ regarding the labels' negotiations with third parties. See id.
73 i re Napste, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
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74
Cooperation among many different stakeholders and institutions will be vital.
No one institution or solution is going to provide a sufficient response.
Instead, as we explore further in Parts I and IV, a constellation of institutions
must achieve ongoing balance and adjustment.

1.Who are the stakeholders?
A range of different stakeholders have participated in the various Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearings that have been held during 2000-2002 re arding
the distribution of music and other forms of copyrighted content online:
"
Owners of copyright in sound recordings (content owners), including
the major labels (EMI, Time Warner etc), represented by the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA), as well as Independent labels;
* Owners of copyright in musical works represented by the National
Music Publishers Association;

*

Performing Artists;

"

Traditional Music retailers and new Digital Music Companies (such as

MP3.com);
*

"Present day" Napster, which also needs licenses and at76one Senate

*

Consumer

Committee hearing proposed a compulsory license scheme;
Electronics

Companies

and

Computer

Hardware

Manufacturers;
*

Technology developers involved in Digital Rights Management (DRM)
(e.g., InterTrust Technologies); and
* Consumers.
These stakeholders have conflicting interests: Copyright owners have an
interest in strong copyright law and control; independent labels need unbiased
distribution mechanisms; performing artists have an interest in the protection
provided by copyright law but not necessarily the total market dominance of

74 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT ch. 3 (Copyright and Compromise)
(Prometheus Books 2001); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital
Millennium," 23 CoLuM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 137, 178-79 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Copyright Legislation].
75 In the Senate Committee on the Judiciary alone, since November 2000, the following
hearings have been held: Music on the Internet: Is there an Upside to Downloading?:
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. (2000); Online Entertainment:
Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary

Committee, 107th Cong. (2001); Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital
Age: Is the Marketplace Working to Protect Digital Creative Works?: Hearing Before the

Senate Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong. (2002). See United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/scheduleall.cfm (last visited May 31, 2002).
76

See Online Entertainment: Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearings

Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Hank Barry, Interim
Napster CEO), availableat http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cffn?id=198 (last visited May

31,2002).
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the large labels; 77 music retailers rely on copyright but also may be harmed by
the market power of the major labels; and some digital music companies would
be better served by more open or even compulsory licensing schemes.
Consumers, of course, have various interests which are further explored in Part
II. Other interested parties include academics and librarians, who present a
vision of the public interest rooted in the importance of an informational
"commons," 7 8 and proponents of the free software movement, who are deeply
affected by the "locking up" of technology.
2.

Who are the institutions involved in making copyright law and policy?
a.

InternationalInstitutions

This article focuses predominantly on domestic US institutions. The reader
may however protest - given the borderless nature of the Internet, why not
look to existing international institutions instead - such as the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), and/or the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") which administer the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS")?
The WTO's international
importance and its existing dispute settlement mechanisms make it an obvious
international forum for dealing with the issues arising from online music
distribution. This route, however, has its limitations: The institutional structure
is still relatively rudimentary 79 and does not deal with individual disputes.
More fundamentally, however, intellectual property law has historically been
structured around
multinational harmonization rather than international
80
governance.
In practice,
harmonization
difficult to achieve, even at a
broad level of principle,8 ' and copyright is
law varies significantly between

77 See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1642-45 (2001).
78 Not all are of this view of course. Several law professors provided an amicus brief for

the motion picture industry in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 322-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (referred to as the DeCSS case). See Amicus Brief from Law

Professors for the Plaintiffs,

Mar. 12, 2001, available at http://www.eff.orglpub/

Intellectual-property/Video/MPAADVDcases/20010312_nylawprofsamicus-for

op.h

tml (last visited March 29, 2002).
79 See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, BargainingAround The Trips Agreement: The
Case For Ongoing Public-PrivateInitiatives To Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 20-21 (1998); J.H. Reichman, Charting the
Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International
Intellectual Propert, System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 479 (1993) (suggesting
that the TRIPS Agreement may be bogged down by an "obsolete and increasingly
dysfunctional institutional framework").
80 See Lee Ann Askew, The ECJ, the ICJ and Intellectual Property: Is Harmonization
the Key?, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375 (2000) (considering how EU harmonization
techniques could be applied more generally).
81 This is exemplified by the difficulties faced by the Members of the European Union in
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countries in both approach and detail. 82 Copyright, and particularlY83 its
exceptions, over which countries have historically had broad discretion,
is
seen in many countries as an important instrument of public policy. 84 With
respect, therefore, to those who have proposed international institutions to
address these issues,85 we would argue that, realistically, for the present, such
issues can and should be dealt with at a national level.
b.

Executive andLegislature

Since copyright is statutory law, Congress has played a significant role in
shaping the contours of the rights associated with copyright, particularly in
recent times. In the 1990s alone four major copyriht reforms were enacted:
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ('DMCA")
and the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, the Digital Performance Rights in
Sound Recordings Act ("DPRA") of 1995,88 and the Audio Home Recording
Act ("AHRA") of 1992. Congress affects copyright law not only by amending
legislation, but also through other forms of monitoring, such as the recent
Senate and House Committee hearings. 89 Although Congress is the main
their efforts to harmonize their copyright laws in relation to digital copyright - a process
that has taken some 5 years.
82

See

COMMITTEE

ON

INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE,
TECHNOLOGY

BOARD,

THE

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS

AND

THE EMERGING

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE

DIGITAL

AGE 54 (1999), available at http://bob.nap.edu/html/digitaldilemma!
index.html (last visited May 31, 2002) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA REPORT].
83 TRIPS does not fully regulate scope of protection issues or the extent of permissible
exceptions. See Reichman & Lange, supra, note 79, at 21; Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries
INFORMATION

of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions: International Conventions and

Treaties, I.P.Q. 1999, 1, 56-94. The extent of allowable exceptions was explored by a WTO
Dispute Settlement Panel its Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act (WT/DS160/R) (adopting a quite strict interpretation of the freedom to individual
Member States).
84 See Reichman & Lange, supra, note 79, at 21-22 (noting that "the decision- makers in
developing countries will logically favor those practices that Seem most favorable to their
own, often shifting interests" and that similar arguments can be made about the approach of
the developed countries.)
85 See, e.g., Note, Howard P. Goldberg, A Proposalfor an InternationalLicensing Body
to Combat File Sharing andDigital Copyright Infringement, 8 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 272

(2002) (advocating the creation of an international licensing body that would hold a registry
of the world's copyrighted works, license those works to Internet sites that permit secure
downloading, distribute royalties to artists, and monitor the Internet for the unlicensed use
of copyrighted works).
86 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (adding §§ 512 and 1201-05 to the
Copyright Act of 1976).
8 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
88 Pub. L. No. 104-39, Sec. 1, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
89

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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source of copyright policy4 impacting the legislative agenda is an extremely
arduous and complex task. Part III will show that the legislative process is
unlikely to promote online music distribution in a fair and balanced way.
c.

Administrative Agencies

The Copyright Office, a division of the Library of Congress, has played an
important role in developing copyr9ht law. 9 1 In addition to dealing with
compulsory and statutory licensing, - the Office also recommends exceptions
to the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"). 93 The Antitrust Division of the DOJ has also been involved in
copyright policy through its enforcement of consent decrees against collecting
societies such as the American Society of Composers and Publishers
("ASCAP") 94 and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"). 95 Most recently, the DOJ
has investigated the online digital music ventures of leading record companies.
The FTC has also maintained an interest in this area, reaching a settlement on
CD over-charging in May 2000.96
d.

Courts

Copyright owners have fought an increasing number of actions in the courts,
relying on both existing law (particularly in the Napster case), and on new
statutory provisions.9 7 The scope of copyright owners' rights depends in large
90 Professor Jessica Litman, in particular, has traced the process of amending copyright
law. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and the TechnologicalAge, 68 OR. L. REV.
275 (1989); LITMAN, supra note 74.
91 For an overview of the role of the Register of Copyrights, See U.S. Copyright Office:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
92 This is achieved through the Licensing Division of the Copyright Office, and, in case of
dispute, by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels. See 17 U.S.C. § 802 (2000); See
generallv COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 75: THE LICENSING DIVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT

OFFICE, Mar. 2000, available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ75.pdf) (last visited
September 2, 2002).
" See 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(C) (2000). Exceptions so made last for 3 year periods.
After a required rule-making process, the Librarian made its first such recommendation in
October 2000. See Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights and Determination of the
Librarian of Congress, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556 (October 27, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201
(2001)) (giving the ruling and describing the process of rule-making in detail).
94 The decree was most recently amended in June 2001. See United States v. American
Society of Composers, Authors, Publishers, 2001-2 Trade Cases P 73,474, 2001 Copr. L.
Dec. P 28,341 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
95See United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71, 941, 83, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), amended, No. 64-CV- 3787, 1994 WL 901652, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18,
1994) (1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71, 378).
96 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
97 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001): Universal City
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part on courts' interpretation of the copyright statute and common law
doctrines of contract and tort. First Amendment concerns may also bound
copyright; the Supreme Court recently granted certiorariin a copyright case,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, brought to challenge the constitutionality of copyright term
extension. 98 The case will likely indicate the attitude of the Supreme Court
towards other constitutional challenges to copyright law.
e.

PrivateInstitutions

The private entities deeply involved in copyright policy are the collecting
rights organizations such as ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, and the recent addition,
SoundExchange, formed to deal with digital performance rights. 9 9 An
increasing number of private institutions, not all of them traditionally seen as
arenas relevant to copyright policy, have the potential to affect the digital
distribution of copyright content. A notable recent example is T13, a standards
committee organized under the rules of the American National Standards
Institute, which is responsible for "all interface standards relating to the
popular AT Attachment ("ATA") storage interface
utilized as the disk drive
S,,100

interface on most personal and mobile computers.
This technical body
recently became embroiled in the copyright controversy when DRM
technology was proposed as a standard. I I T13 is only one of many such
standards bodies whose work is gaining increasing profile given the current
importance10of
2 standards in consumer electronics to copyright owners' long
term goals.

Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999); Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp.
2d I (D.D.C. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
98 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (mem.) (February 19, 2002). The case is a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L.

No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). The challenge is brought under the Copyright Clause,
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the First Amendment, U.S. Const. amend I.
99 Note that industry bodies are not included here; they have been classified as
'stakeholders' and are dealt with elsewhere, although the line is, inevitably, highly artificial.
100 T13
Technical
Committee,
2000
Annual
Report, available at
http://www.incits.org/tchome/tl3.htm (last visited September 2, 2002).
101 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Standards Committee Rejects Hard Drive Copy
Prevention Schenm: ElectronicFrontierFoundationApplauds Victoryfor Fair Use, April 4,
2001, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRMCPRM/20010404_eff tl3_pr.html (last
visited May 31, 2002).
102 See generally Mark Lemley, StandardizingGovernment Standard-SettingPolicyfor
ElectronicCommerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 745, 746-47 (1999) (setting out the reasons
why standards are so important in the network economy).
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The Existing Framework:Law, Reinforced By Code,' 0 3 Reinforced By
Law
In the final part of this introduction, we turn to the legal and technological
framework - the means presently relied on by copyright holders to control
copyrighted works. Control in this context relies on a mixture of law and
"code" - that is, software and/or hardware-based restrictions on what
individuals can do online. Legal rules in the form of copyright law impose
restrictions on individuals' use of content, and code-based self-help methods of
control give effect to (and extend) legal rights. These code-based restrictions
are then backedu0p by laws to bolster the inevitable imperfections of those selfhelp measures.
In short, code backs up law, which, in turn, backs up code.
Recent developments both in the legislative and judicial fields have led to a
general consolidation of exclusionary rights in copyrighted works. On the
other hand, there has been little effective "institutionalization" of fair use or
access rights. 105 Further, there have been important recent developments in
relation to the use of "Code," explored in the remainder of this section, that
threaten to secure an even stronger foothold for content owners as they
transition to the online world. Exploring the desirable balance is a focus of
Part II, and redressing this imbalance will be a key concern in Parts III and IV.
C.

1.

Law

Current factors surrounding the digital distribution of music online raise
issues across the gamut of copyright law, the details of which are beyond the
scope of this article. It is worth summarizing, however, several respects in
which the legal framework, and the property rights of copyright owners, have
been strengthened in recent years.
We can divide the key relevant
developments as follows: (A) the expansion of exclusive rights held by
copyright owners and their increasing complexity in the particular case of
music; (B) the development of "paracopyright" - protection for technological
measures, (C) the further development of concepts of secondary - i.e.,
contributory and vicarious - liability, and (D) the shrinking scope of the fair
use defense. These developments have granted copyright owners a high
degree of control over technologies of music distribution online.

103 "Code" here is used in the sense outlined by Professor Lawrence Lessig in his seminal
work, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Code, as outlined by Professor
Lessig, refers to the "software and hardware that makes cyberspace what it is", and which
imposes real and effective constraints on behavior in cyberspace, Id at 6.
104 See generally LITMAN, supra, note 74, at ch. 2 (Music: Intellectual Property's Canary
in the Digital Coal Mine).
105 As a concerned librarian has observed, "Legally binding license agreements that
readers sign to get access to a database already require them to behave in ways far more
restricted than copyright law would have ever demanded .... threaten[ing] our public and
research libraries as nothing has in decades." JAMES J. O'DONNELL, AVATARS OF THE
WORD: FROM PAPYRUS TO CYBERSPACE 95 (Harvard University Press 1998).
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The Legislative Expansion of the Scope of Copyright

Copyright owners have increased their clout in recent years owing to
expansions in the scope of exclusive rights, particularly in relation to sound
recordings. Copyright in recorded musical works was already particularly
complicated, by the fact that there are several copyright owners: music
publishers, who own the copyright in the underlying musical work (such as the
composition or lyrics) and copyright owners in the recording industry, who
own the sound recording copyright. 10 6 Further, while there are collective
licensing organizations (ASCAP and BMI) dealing with performance rights in
musical compositions, these bodies do not deal with reproduction rights, and
both rights are implicated by online delivery of works. The multiple licenses
required for use of these works online has been, 10 7 and continues to be, 10 8 a
serious obstacle to music distribution online.
Historically, owners of sound recordings, unlike other copyright owners,
have not enjoyed an exclusive performance right. 10 9 This meant that when a
sound recording was played, the composer of the musical works received
royalties, while the owner of copyright in the recording did not. This changed
in 1995 when Congress enacted a new exclusive right to perform the work
publicly by means of a digital transmission. 1 0 Congress however did not do
106

See generally David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, PartI: On the Absurd Complexity

of the Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189 (2000) [hereinafter
Nimmer, Ignoringthe Public].
107 See generally id. But see Ginsburg, supra note 77, at 1629-30 (making sense of the
digital performing rights regime).
108 See Online Music: Record Labels, Publishers Spar over Royalties, INVESTORS'
BusINEss DAILY, May 16, 2001 (describing recent disputes between the various copyright
owners over digital music distribution); Music Execs Find New Target, WIRED NEws, at
http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,43898,00.html
(May
17,
2001)
(quoting
RealNetworks, Inc. and MusicNet CEO Rob Glaser: "Music publishing issues stand out as
the most significant potential impediment to launching great subscription services.").
109 Copyright in sound recordings was not recognized until 1973. See Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 576 (1973) (recognizing the federal government's constitutional
authority to decide whether a particular category of "writings" is worthy of national
protection). In the music industry, the right to reproduce a musical composition (sheet
music or a sound recording) is separate from the right to publicly perform the musical
composition, and licensing one right does not necessarily imply a license to the other. See
Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir 1952); Interstate Hotel
Co v. Remick Music Corp., 157 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1946); Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle,
31 F.2d 832, 834-35 (5th Cir. 1929); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322,
329-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
110 The rights of owners of copyright in sound recordings were expanded by the
enactment of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). The Act added to the Copyright Act to provide holders of
copyright in sound recordings a digital performance right in sound recordings. See 17
U.S.C. 106(6) (2000); see also 17 U.S.C. § 115 (making the digital delivery of a sound
recording an infringement unless it is authorized or licensed). The right is subject to
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this by means of a general right of public performance in sound recordings.
Instead, a complicated three-tier structure was introduced that requires full
permission from copyright owners for certain transmissions (e.g., interactive
transmissions), allows other non-interactive transmissions to occur without
permission, and imposes a statutory license in other cases that fulfil a strict set
of requirements.' 1 ' This schema was further amended in 1998. 112 Generally
speaking, this does not increase the number of copyright owners from whom
licenses must be obtained since digital transmissions frequently involve both
reproduction and distribution rights. However, the new laws do complicate the
copyright regime, raising legal costs for all involved.
b.

"Paracopyright":The Anti-CircumventionProvisions ofthe Digital
Millennium CopyrightAct of 1998

fortress
The DMCA 113 represents both a further strengthening• in
. the legal
• 114
The
surrounding copyrighted works, and a source of additional complexity.
DMCA strengthens copyright law with "paracopyright" - legal protection for
technological self-hel? measures used by copyright owners to protect their
The "access provision" of the DMCA r l 6 prohibits
copyrighted works.
unauthorized access, by outlawing the act of circumventing "a technological
11
measure•. that
,,118 effectively controls access to a work." 7 The "anti-device
trafficking
or used
sale
provisions
the(a)manufacture,
a copyright
owner has
that either
circumvent import,
measuresprovision,
of technologies prohibit

exceptions in 17 U.S.C. § 114. A statutory licensing scheme is established for noninteractive services, but this is only a very small set of users, not relevant here. The detailed
provisions of the statutory license scheme are set out in 17 U.S.C. §1 14(d)(2); see also
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 65 Fed. Reg.
55,302 (September 13, 2000) (explaining the system of statutory licensing in the copyright
office).
111 See generally Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, supra note 106 (outlining the full
complex digital transmission scheme); Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 74, at
166-70 (describing the digital performance right in the context of the 1998 amendments).
112 The DMCA amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 114, 115. See generally Ginsburg, Copyright
Legislation, supra note 74, at 166-70 (describing how the amendments work).
113 See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (2000) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
512, 1201 et seq. (2000)).
114 See James Boyle, Britney Spears and Online Music Fears, FINANCIAL TIMES, May
2000 [hereinafter Boyle, Britney Spears and Online Music Fears] (referring to the DMCA
as the "Copyright Lawyers Guaranteed Employment Act").
115 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, Jan. 26, 2001, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVD_
cases/20010126._ny_2profs amicus.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
16
' See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
117 This was described by the Congress as "the electronic equivalent of breaking into a
locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book." H.R. REP. No. 105-551(1), at 17 (1998).
...17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), 1201(b)(1).
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effectively to control access to a work (§1201(a)(2)), or which "effectively
protect[ ] a right of a copyright owner under" Title 17 (§ 1201 (b)).
The act
of actually circumventing an anti-copying measure, as opposed to an antiaccess measure, is not proscribed. This distinction represented a deliberate
choice by Congress, which has since been eviscerated by judicial rulings that
every act of access, including one for copying, 12 is covered by the anti-access
provision.
Thus, copyright owners may now control every act of access to
works.
The anti-circumvention provisions have been widely criticized for
unduly (even unconstitutionally) extending copyright protection. 12 3 First, it is
illegal to circumvent protection measures even if not everything "wrapped up"
is copyrighted. 124 One cannot circumvent protection measures in order to get
access to public domain material. Second, there are no time limits: Protection
can conceivably extend beyond the limited term of copyright. Third,
protection can be extended to include all uses by means of the access
provisions, not just those protected by Copyright Law.125 Finally, users' rights
119 See Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualPropertyand the DigitalEconomy: Why the Anti-

Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); see
also David Nimmer, A Riff on FairUse in the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REv. 673 (2000); Jonathan Band, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, available at

www.ala.org/washoff/band.html (November 25, 1998).
120 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I11 F. Supp. 2d. 294, 331-32
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affid, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2001).
121 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, at 64,568 (October 27, 2000). In the
context of the recent rule-making, the Register of Copyrights noted her concern at this result
and recommended reconsideration by Congress. See id.
122

See Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 77, at 1634-36.

123 The

relevant articles are too numerous to cite in full. However, two representative and
well-known critiques are those of Yochai Benkler and Pamela Samuelson. See Yochai
Benkler, Free As the Air to Conunon Use: FirstAmendment Constraints on Enclosure

of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 414-29 (1999) (considering in detail
problems vith the DMCA and possible constitutional challenges); Samuelson, supra note
119, at 534-43, 562 (arguing that the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions are
"unpredictable, overbroad, inconsistent, and complex"). Most strident, of course, have been
organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which in May 2002 issued a "report
card" on the DMCA. See Fred Von Lohmann, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended
Consequences: Three Years

under the DMCA,

May

3,

2002,

available at

http://www.eff.org/IPIDMCAI20020503_dmcaconsequences.pdf (last visited September 2,
2002).
124 See Nimmer, supra note 119, at 712. An argument along these lines was tangentially
raised, but not determined, by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429, 444-45 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the argument was
"speculative and premature" at this stage, as well as barred by a technicality).
125 See Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 74, at 140-43 (describing the effect
of the anti-access provisions: "[I]n granting copyright owners a right to prevent
circumvention of technological controls on 'access,' Congress may in effect have extended
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of fair use are not protected: 126 fair use is not in general a defense to a
violation of the access provision. 127 The constitutionality of the DMCA anticircumvention provisions
was unsuccessfully challenged in Universal City
28
Studios v. Corley.'

A further element of the legal armor sunounding copyright is the
enforceability of electronic licenses, especially those known as "clickwrap
licenses." If enforced, 12 9 as they have been in some cases, 13 such contracts
will be increasingly important because Internet users will often be asked to
click " es" to an electronic contract before obtaining access to a copyright
work.
c.

The Common Law Framework: Vicarious and Contributory
Infringement

The third manner in which the legal rights of copyright holders have been
strengthened is through recent tightening of the rules for secondary liability. 132
In the context of P2P services, ironically, it is these oldest of common law
doctrines - principles of contributory
and vicarious 134 copyright

to cover 'use' of works of authorship.").
126 See generally Yochai Benkler, supra note 123, at 420-27; Samuelson, supra, note
119, at 537-58; LITMAN, supra note 74, at 151-63; Nimmer, supra note 119, at 722-742.
127 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d. 294, 322-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (noting that fair use is not a defense to the anti-circumvention provisions), affd,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2001).
128 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting
that there was no need to decide whether restriction of fair use by DMCA unconstitutional).
129 A model law, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), has
been proposed to validate such contracts but is not yet in force other than in Maryland and
Virginia. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.htm.
Five states are
expected to introduce the law in 2001; several State Attorneys-General have registered their
opposition to the law. See American Library Association. Basic Facts About UCITA, Jan
2002, available at http://www.ala.org/washoff/ucita/factsheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 31,
2002) (stating that 32 State Attorneys-General oppose UCITA). UCITA has the support of
parts of the software industry but many opponents. See UCITA Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.cpsr.org/program/UCITA/ucita-fact.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
130 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
131 The importance of contract here is further illustrated by the case of Professor Felten,
who, it is alleged, is prevented from publishing his research cracking a security measure at
the invitation of the SDMI by not only the DMCA itself but also a click through license.
See Declan McCullagh, Watermark Crackers Back Away, WIRED NEWS, at
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,43353,00.html (Apr. 26, 2001).
132 See generally Alfred C. Yen, A PreliminarvEconomic Analysis of Napster: Internet
Technology Copyright Liability, and the Possibilityof CoaseanBargaining,26 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 247 (2001) (considering the desirable limits of secondary liability, prior to the
appeal decision in the Napster case).
133A party is liable for "contributory" infringement if, with knowledge of the infringing

2002]

USINGANTITRUSTLAJVTOADVANCEAND ENHANCE ONLINE Music DISTRIBUTION

479

infringement - and not the latest legislative amendments, which have assumed
the greatest importance. Under these doctrines, providers of technology that
can be used to infringe copyright may, in some circumstances, be liable for the
infringements of users. The scope of application of these doctrines is likely to
have a significant impact on further technological development since any
technology that may lead to secondary liability for copyright infringement is
to
except under the aei of the relevant coPright
owning
unlikely
•
135 be funded
•6
136
seemed to
the Sony defense
industry.
Prior to the Napster case,
indemnify developers of new technologies for using and distributing
copyrighted works, provided the technology had a substantial non-infringing
use, or, at a minimum, the capacity for such use. 38 This was based on the
strong public interest in the development of, and access to, new technologies
and in preventing copyright owner veto over such technologies. 139 There is, of
course, a distinction between the Napster technology and the video recorders at
issue in Sony: Video recorders are free-standing technology; once sold they are
not in any sense under the control of the developer. The Napster softWare was
an integrated part of an ongoing service, under at least the nominal control of
Napster (which retained rights, for example, to exclude users). The Napster
decision clarifies the importance of this distinction. 14 The Ninth Circuit
decision in Napster did not go so far in terms of imposing liability as did the
trial court. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit arguably tightened the secondary.
liability standard in two ways. First, the court held that the Sony defense did
not apply at all to vicarious infringement suits.14 1 Second, the court held that

activity, they induce, cause or materially contribute to the infringing conduct of another.
See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
134 A party is liable for vicarious copyright infringement if they have the right and ability
to supervise the infringing activity, and also a direct financial interest in the activity. See
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
135See Ginsburg, supra note 77.
136 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
137 See Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
138 See id.
139 See id. at440-441

&n.21.
See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (considering the applicability of the Sony
defense, and finding that "if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing
material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the
operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement"); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Use
and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1, 37 (2000) (describing the
importance of this distinction on the basis that courts in Sony had to make an "all-ornothing" decision on whether the video technology would be distributed, while noting that
in Napster they could "split the difference") [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright Use and
140

Excuse].

141 See

NapsterInc., 239 F.3d at 1022-23.
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in a case alleging contributory infringement, the defense will not avail an
intermediary or provider of technology who has actual knowledge of specific
infringement available on the system and fails to purge such material.This
is an important distinction in the context of an ongoing service. It sets the bar
quite low: Copyright owners can easily "create" actual knowledge by simply
sending a letter. The strictness of this test was underlined when the Ninth
Circuit recently upheld the preliminary injunction and shut-down order entered
by District Judge Patel, prohibiting Napster from recommencing its service
until it does "eveiything feasible
to block files from its system which contain
1 43
noticed copyrighted works."

Further, the Napster decision suggests that the more free-standing the
technology, the more likely it may be to escape liability under Sony; however,
in a networked world in which software is frequently updated by providers,
and even devices (such as video-recorders) may be part of a network, one is
inclined to speculate about how "free standing" any technology will be - in
particular, P2P technology.144 Notably, the developers of FastTrack are
relying on the Sony defense; 145 should a ruling be made on this defense the
judgment would undoubtedly be very important for other future, decentralized,
distributed P2P technologies.
d.

Shrinking Limits to Copyright Rights: Fair Use

Fair use has historically provided the counterweight to property rights in
copyrighted
works, by providing immunity from prosecution for
••
146
infringement.
Courts determine fair use on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account the purpose and character of the use (including whether it is
commercial), the nature of the work, the amount of the work used, and the

142 See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1021 (relying on Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Service, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
143A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to
the "zero tolerance" standard) (emphasis added).
144For example, FastTrack software has been updated several times. It appears that users
with earlier versions have difficulty connecting to the updated network. This suggests that
the network is not entirely "free-standing", as alleged, and copyright protection could be
introduced at a later stage. However, of course these facts could change.
14"Defendants in the MGM case filed a Notice of Motion for Partial Summary judgment,
relying on the Sony defense, in February 2002. See Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment by Defendants Streamcast Networks, Inc. and MusicCity Networks,
Inc., Metero-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Case No. CV 01-08541 SWB
(RNBx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-v_
Grokster/20020122_streamcastsum judg-motion.pdf (last visited May 31, 2002). The trial
judge declined to rule on the validity of the defense. See Brad King, Jury to Hear FileTrading Case, WIRED, available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,50836,
00.html (March 4, 2002).
146See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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effect on the potential market for or value of the work.14 7 The fair use doctrine
serves important constitutional purposes, serving to balance, among other
things, First Amendment concerns against copyriht owners' legitimate
interests in controlling distribution of their work. l1 8 It enables use for
purposes important to the public interest, such as criticism, comment, parody,
and news reporting. In general, however, courts have not been very receptive
to fair use arguments raised in the context of the new music distribution
technologies. 149 The "effect on the market" analysis has been particularly
important to many of these cases involving redistribution of works online:
Courts have often reasoned that because copyright owners are already
licensing, or expect to license their copyrighted works for use online, there is
less justification for fair use. 150 Not only is fair use "under attack" via an
economically-focused analysis, it has also been limited by the DMCA, which,
as noted above, provides no general fair use exception from the
anticircumvention provisions.151
Napster and its ilk and other forms of P2P file-sharing pose a challenge to
the fair use doctrine. Whether or not one believes "non-transformative" uses
should fall within fair use generally, consumers are used to thinking of making
copies for themselves and even friends as de mininis behavior or fair use
147 See

id.

148 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright

Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA. L. REv.

1180 (1970).
With the possible exception of the recent decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. 280
F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing "thumbnail" pictures produced by search engines as "fair
149

use").
150 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(analyzing the fair use doctrine). In that case, MP3.com copied thousands of CDs and
allowed users, upon "proving" purchase by inserting a music CD into their computer, to
"store" that music and then hear it streamed by MP3.com on demand. See id. at 350.
MP3.com attempted to rely on users' fair use rights for space-shifting and making personal
copies, an argument rejected by the court. See id. at 350-53; see also A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a number of fair use arguments,
including use of the Napster system for sampling, and space shifting); Princeton University
Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (anticipating
that a market would exist for the Copyright Clearance Center but for the uses proscribed in
the case); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that certain reproductions of scientific publications were not a fair use of the materials and
bolstering the market climate for the Copyright Clearance Center). But see Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Amer. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999)
(turning primarily on statutory interpretation).
151 See supranotes 126-127 and accompanying text.
152 This view is reflected in Sony, with its protection of copying for time shifting, and the

Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, with its protection of "all noncommercial copying by
consumers." See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455
(1984) (holding that using VCR's for "time-shifting" of copyrighted television programs
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and thus as essentially as acceptable acts. But fair use is a notoriously slippery
concept in the case of "private uses." Courts have never stated that all private
uses are inherently fair. Particularprivate uses may be fair (for example, the
time-shifting in the Sony case 153), and Congress in the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992 sought to protect private, "noncommercial" use. 154 But clearly
neither Congress nor the Courts anticipated a situation in which one individual
could share his or her personal copy, without a profit motive, with millions of
other people. Drawing a line between what is acceptable sharing and
unacceptable has become infinitely more controversial.
e.

Remaining Legal Questions

The legal wars continue: The Supreme Court will soon be considering the
temporal bounds of copyright 155 (though not in an online context), and the
FastTrack software is the subject of current litigation. 56
As these
developments take their course, many of the open questions discussed below
will likely be addressed.
One question is the status of distributed systems such as FastTrack in
relation to secondary liability for copyright infringement, i.e., contributory
and/or vicarious liability. As noted above, a decision rendered in this case
could be of considerable significance for P2P technologies.
Another set of questions arises from the suggestion that the architecture of
the Napster system must be taken as a "given," possibly indicating that the
Court does not see a role for itself in altering code. 1 7 To what extent can and
should courts take on the role of mandating certain changes in software
architecture? The Ninth Circuit decision in Napster seemed to indicate a
circumspect attitude by the court. On the other hand, these possibly liberal
aspects of the appellate decision in Napster are in tension with the form of the
injunction issued by the district court, and its ongoing review, which evidences
constitutes non-infringing fair use under the Copyright Act); H.R. RAp. 102-873(I), at 59; 17
U.S.C. § 1008 (home taping exemption).
153 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455.
14 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000); see also Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d at 1079
(quoting House and Senate Reports to this effect).
155See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002) (mem.).
156See Complaint, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, Case No. CV
01-08541 SWB (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/
MGM v Grokster/ (last visited May 31, 2002).
Is7 These suggestions are more implicit than explicit, but may be found in Napster, 239
F.3d at 1020, 1024, 1027 (stating that "We are compelled to make a clear distinction
between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to the
operational capacity of the system," that "Napster's reserved 'right and ability' to police is
cabined by the system's architecture,"and that "Napster ... bears the burden of policing the
system within the limits of the system ... In crafting the injunction on remand, the district
court should recognize that Napster's system does not currently appear to allow Napster
access to users' MP3 files.") (emphasis added).
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a willingness to require architectural change - that is, to exercise judicial
control over the forn of the network architecture- if change is shown to be

possible. The district court's modified injunction was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit. 158 The court of appeals held that it was a proper exercise of the
court's supervisory authority to modify the injunction in consideration of new
facts (i.e., new technological possibilities) and to require Napster to police its
system "to its fullest extent" and use new filtering systems as suggested by an
expert advisor. 159 The court, it seems, may impose some control over code.
2. Code
The strong legal armor outlined above, on its own, is unlikely to be fully
effective in preventing
infringing uses of copyright. No one wants to sue
160
individual users,
especially since to do so looks like an exceedingly bad
public relations exercise, and no one could sue them all. 161 Moreover, as
indicated above, there will not always be a convenient intermediary to sue.
This, in addition to the problems of international enforcement, has led to
increasing emphasis on technological controls. 162 The aim is to develop
systems, known under the collective term DRM, that allow copyright owners
to control, prevent, monitor or even meter every use of a copyrighted work, or
to automatically detect violations. Such controls could potentially be imposed
at different levels, such as:
* On or in copyrighted works themselves, in the form of "watermarking"
and encryption that embeds in the content both identifying information
and usage rules (to be enforced by compliant devices);
* Through software63 such as sound players that prevent the capture of
streamed media;1
* In recordable media, by the use of rip-proof CDs that
have the potential
164
to severely restrict even legitimate copying activity;
* Embedded in operating systems, e.g., by embedding technology
hampering the playing and recording of unprotected formats like MP3

151

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 1098-99.

160

See GigaMedia, EMI to Forn Online Music Venture, supra note 48. But see Graeme

158

Wearden, Police Raid Napster Users, ZD.NET UK, available at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/
story/0,,t269-s2084479,00.html (Feb. 16, 2001) (indicating that there have been "raids" on
individuals in Belgium already).
161 The recording industry could sue a few well-chosen targets in order to achieve a
deterrent effect, but this does not detract from potential public relations problems and
perhaps a danger of'laying down the gauntlet.'
162 For a discussion of the possibilities, See infra Part II.B.l.a.
163 RealNetworks, for example, developed such streaming technology and even sued a
company that developed a way to capture and store the streams. See RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
164 See Charles Mann, Napster-proofCDs, SALON.COM, at http://www.salon.com/tech/
inside/2001/03/27/cd.protection! (March 27, 2001).
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as a default in Operating Systems 65 with an aim of replacing MP3 with
alternative, proprietary (and secure) compression technology;
" Hardware, e.g., consumer electronics devices that only play secured
formats - the CPRM model envisages deployment on PC hard drives that could eventually lead to a system in which consumers would only
be able to download files
to their computer if their computer hard drive
16 6
incorporated CPRM;'

" Roaming the networks: Another security measure which is being
discussed is the use of roving agents that may search users' hard drives
(on P2P networks, for example, or even otherwise) to find unauthorized
files. 167

Models that are built on the "closed loop" principle use a combination of
these techniques, requiring authorization on each "component" of the loop:
hardware, software, and the copyright file itself. DRM is a developing field;
various forms are presently being explored. 168 It is beyond the scope of this
article to consider the details; suffice it to say that there are many different
kinds of control, which may be used independently or in combination. The
strongest forms of control are those that actually seek to block unauthorized
uses. For example, the technology is being developed to control numbers of
copies, to ensure that copies time out, or to control or prevent printing or
downloading. 169 Encryption techniques may be also be used to ensure that
only authorized persons will obtain access to works. Finally, marking and
monitoring techniques that may not actually prevent misuse but which can be
used to detect unauthorized copies by automatic agents like "web spiders" may
be implemented. For example, digital "fingerprinting" and "DNA" are being
developed which can identify sound files regardless of how the file is
named.' 7 0

Such technologies could enable copyright owners to exert a level of control
165

It was suggested this might occur with the next Microsoft Operating System. See Ted

Bridis, Tech Industrv Aims to Render MP3 Obsolete, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2001 at A3.
166 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Defending the Public Interest: Tile Unfair Use of
Standards,at http://www.tl3.org/technical/e01110r0.pdf (Feb. 18, 2001).
167 Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999).
168 For a general description of the principles behind encryption, watermarking and other

secure technologies, See DIGITAL DILEMMA REPORT, supra, note 82, at app. E
("Technologies for Intellectual Property Protection").
169 See generally Honigsberg, supra note 69, at 505-07 (outlining actions taken by the
Record Industries to protect copyright works). For an older but excellent work on the
technological possibilities, See Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible:How Trusted Systems and
Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 137 (1997).
170 See Jon Healey, Fee Services Prepareto Pick Up where Napster Left Off, L.A. TIMES,

Mar. 5, 2001, at Cl. Such technology was introduced by Napster in an attempt to comply
with the preliminary injunction. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 284 F.3d 1091,
1097 (9th Cir. 2002).
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over musical works that is unprecedented, and indeed unachievable, in an
analogue world. Jonathon Zittrain predicts that copyright owners may create a
market in which music is not "sold," but rather is licensed for streaming via
"small generic jukeboxes." Zittrain comments:
An individual authenticates herself to a jukebox - perhaps with a
fingerprint. . . and then may access specific songs that fall under her
monthly payment plan ....

The songs she asks for are "streamed" to her

player as she listens, and do not remain there any more than a song stays
inside a radio after it ends. An inaudible signal is embedded in the
music; if she holds a microphone to her headphones and thereby makes an
imperfect, analog copy to an old-fashioned cassette, her name and a
unique identifier will be "in" it, permitting prosecution for copyright
infringement if the copy is found...
Although such speculation may
72 seem fanciful, it reflects the current trends
in technological development.1
Can technology succeed in ensuring such control? Some argue no since
absolute control would require a "leak-proof pipe" all the way to, and into,
users' machines and ears. 173 It seems unlikely that any such system would be
perfect; 174 as it would present an inevitable temptation to hackers. It also
remains unclear whether individuals will put up with the burdensome
technology and "friction" needed to make it work - in the case of software,
these burdens led to an abandonment of some copy protection. 175 On the other
hand, as Professor Julie Cohen points out, in some areas copy protection is
already routinely used. 176 No matter which assessment of the technology is
correct, however, in all likelihood, from the copyright owners' point of view,
the technology does not need to be perfect as long as it makes it difficult for
171

See Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual

Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1214-15

(2000); see also Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital
Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink DigitalPublishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137
(1997) (explaining the "terrain" well at an early stage with the advantage of a computer
scientist's perspective); See generally DIGITAL DILEMMA REPORT, supra note 82, at app. E
(outlining basic technical details of a range of technologies such as encryption,
watermarking, digital signatures, web monitoring and cryptographic envelopes).
172 See Saxe, supra note 55, at 23.
173 See Eben Moglen, Liberation Musicology, THFENATION, March 12, 2001, at 5.
174 DIGITAL DILEMMA REPORT, supra note 82, at 87.

175 See Julie Cohen, Lochner In Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy Of "Rights
Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 523 (1998); see also The Future ofDigitalMusic: Is
There an Upside to Downloading?Hearingregardingthe future ofIntellectual Propertyin
the Digital Age Using Music as an Analogfor All Types ofIntellectual PropertyBefore the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gene Kan), available at
http://wwv.senate.gov/-judiciary/oldsite/7112000_gk.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
176Such as video cassettes for rental, and material in some commercial databases. See
Cohen, supra note 175, at 525-27.

B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 8:2

the majority of users to do any unauthorized copying.
Some "underground" copying and copyright infringement is inevitable and
can be tolerated. The real question is one of scale. The DMCA is predicated
on imperfect DRM, and backs it up with legal sanctions for its breach, and
177
more importantly, legal sanctions for distributing any means for its breach.
We might expect that hardware manufacturers would not adopt standards that
restrict user freedom. 178 However, if content owners adopt a given standard so
that the content will not be available to machines or devices that do not comply
with their rules, then makers of hardware or devices may not have much choice
whether to adopt the technology, regardless of whether it is a standard
according to industry bodies.
Notably, the development of DRM has been a largely private effort, not
coordinated by the kinds of consensual standards bodies, such as IETF 1 79 or
W3C. 18 The best-known effort to develop "code controls" is the Secure
Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI") - a private body made up of 200 copyright
owners, technology and hardware developers, consumer electronics and
internet service providers.
Another private body, "4C" ( comprised of Intel,
IBM, Matsushita, and Toshiba) proposed "Copyright Protection for Recordable
Media" ("CPRM"), purporting to be a standard for storage media (including in
computer hardware) and consumer electronic devices. 182
Numerous
technology security
companies
(e.g.,
InterTrust
and
Liquid
Audio)
are also
••
183
developing their own formats.
These private groups are not democratic, nor
do they participate in the IETF model - SDMI, for example, refused to allow
the Electronic Frontier Foundation to join its deliberations, saying it had "no

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).

178 Indeed, this is the reason why legislation has been suggested to mandate the adoption
of copy protection standards in electronic devices; Senator Hollings introduced the
Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S.2048 (2002), in March 2002.

The Act, if passed, would give the Federal Communications Commission to validate agreed
security systems, or impose security systems standards. See id § 3.
179

See

The

Internet Engineering Task Force, Overview of the IETF, at

http://www.ietf.org (last visited May 31, 2002).
1so See The World Wide Web Consortium, at http://www.w3c.org (last visited May 31,
2002).
181See

SDMI, at www.sdmi.org (last visited Sept. 2, 2002). For a different perspective

on SDMI, See SDMI Challenge FAQ, at http:// www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/sdmi/faq.html

(last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
182See Andrew Orlowski, Stealth Plan Puts Copy Protection Into Ever, Hard Drive, THE
REGISTER, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.theregister.co.uklcontent/2/15620.html
(last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
183 See Testimony of Gerry Kearby, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid Audio,
and Testimony of Edmund Fish, Founder and CEO, InterTrust, in Online Entertainment and
Copyright Law: Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong. (2001).
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legitimate interest."'
Recently, however, we have seen an important development in the
legislative field, aimed at further backing up DRM efforts and, in particular, at

creating the genuine "leak-proof pipe." We refer here to the introduction into
Congress by Senator Hollings of the Consumer Broadband and Digital
Television Promotion Act ("CBDTPA").185 In essence, this bill would require
producers of digital devices, and even developers of computer programs, to
embed copy protection standards: those standards to be either agreed upon by
copyright owners and the consumer electronics industry or imposed by
mandate of the Federal Communications Commission. 186 The purpose of the
CBDTPA is clear: Since at present circumvention occurs despite DRM, the bill
aims to ensure that digital devices cannot be used to make or play unauthorized
copies of works. The CBDTPA is supported by copyright owners in both the
recording industry and movie industry; there are, however, strong voices
speaking against the enactment of such legislation, both from public interest
advocates and from consumer electronics industries..187 Even in the absence of
such legislation, however, it seems likely that private efforts will continue.
Defeating this public initiative is unlikely to lead to an absence of privately
developed copy protection technology in consumer devices.
D.

Suinnzaiy

In this Part we have given a brief history of the recent disputes surrounding
music distribution on the intemet, and the complex group of stakeholders and
institutions involved. We have highlighted the consequences of new layers of
protection now devised for copyrighted works. Strong legal rights are backed
up by both private contract and code as means of enforcement. Where these

measures fail, both common law and the DMCA are utilized to stop
unauthorized uses of works. In the next Part, we examine the negative
consequences of increasing copyright owner control over content, and suggest
principles to guide regulation of this development.

18 John Gilmore, What's Wrong with Copy Protection, at http://www.toad.com/gnu/
whatswrong.html (Feb. 16, 2001).
185

S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002). The bill is very similar to a draft predecessor, the

Security Systems Standards and Certification Act (or "SSSCA"). See Electronic Frontier
Foundation, EFF "IntellectualProperty- Security System Standardsand ClarificationAct"

Archive, at http://www.eff.org/IP/SSSCACBDTPA (last updated Mar. 26, 2002).
186

See S. 2048, 107th Cong. § 3.
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on this legislation on March 5, 2002.

187The

See Competition, hInovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age: Is the Marketplace
Working to Protect Digital Creative Works? Hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Conunittee, 107th Cong. (2002), availableat http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfin?id=197
(last visited May 31, 2002). At that hearing, Intel President and CEO, Dr Craig R. Barrett
criticized the move to impose copy protection on consumer electronics and computers. See
id.
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II. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE REGULATION OF ONLINE MUSIC
DISTRIBUTION
Given the present state of law and code, online music distribution is not
simply a business problem. Important policy questions must be addressed. In
this Part, we focus on two areas: (1) the scope of consumer use and (2) the
market conditions that will best balance the rights of creators, owners, and
consumers of musical works. We discuss the principles that ought to guide the
development of policy in these two areas.
The current debates regarding online music distribution have demonstrated
that the boundaries of copyright protection are a vital public policy concern.188
Historically, policymakers have sought a balance between public and private
interests. That balance has become more difficult to achieve. The rise of P2P
technology and digitization has shattered the status quo ante, itself a

"contingent accommodation" reliant upon the characteristics of analogue
media. 1,89 As Professor Yochai Benkler argues, we are unlikely to see a
settlement of values that looks like the prior settlement, "because the relative
costs of communication, reproduction, and use around which that settlement
crystallized are so fundamentally altered by the new environment."19 0 The
technical legal difficulties of applying "old law" to the new situation are
heightened by the polarization of interests on both sides. With the stakes so
high, the content industry's efforts to secure the rights to control their works,
exemplified by the DMCA, have pitted them against their own consumers,
whose embrace of new advances in technology threatens to undermine that
control. A new balance, and a new way of achieving that balance, are reuired.
Thus far, as Part I illustrated, strong property rights have won out; 19 there
has been a shift within the law toward the rigid terms and limitations of a
188 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright and Information Policy, in KRAIG M. HILL ET
AL., GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: EUROPE, ASIA AND

THE

INTERNET

299

(CASRIP

Publication

Series

http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/casrip.html

Number

(last

5

visited

1999),

May

available at

31,

2002)

[hereinafter Litman, Digital Copyright and hformation Policy] ("Time was, copyright was

a niche field ... the community of folks who needed to worry about copyright laws was
really pretty small. But copyright has grown . . . it reaches into most communicative
transactions ...

What that means, is that ...

more and more people who never needed to

worry about copyright discover that it affects all manner of things that are important to
them. And more and more of them, understandably, want to get a say in what the copyright
law looks like.").
18 9 See Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,71 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1203, 1247 (2000).
9

' Id. at 1248.
191This commodification of intellectual property at the expense of the intellectual
commons has been acutely characterized as the "second enclosure movement" by James
Boyle. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain (working draft), available at http://www.james-boyle.com ("[T]he process

of expansion of intellectual property rights has been remarkable in every field of endeavour

2002]

USING ANTITRUSTLA V TOADVANCE.AND ENHANCE ONLINE Music DISTRIBUTION

489

property rules (as opposed to a liability rules) regime. Most importantly, these
shifts, particularly the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, are placing
exclusive control of the code that will accompany content in the hands of the
content-owners, thus " privatizing a large chunk of the public law of
copyright."' 192 Where previously the legal balancing of public and private
interests was subject to political scrutiny and accountability, private
commercial entities are increasingly capable of setting their own terms of use.

The new digital rights management may make copyright owners' rights
absolute. 193 Historically, copyright has granted "conditional" rights, subject to
such doctrines as fair use and the first sale doctrine. Although anti-copying
protections need not lead to rigid limitations on use of and access to
copyrighted works, content owners have many incentives to define the
contours of use to their advantage. In this context, we should consider a more
active role for law and government and ask "if copyright is limited in the
protections 1that
94 it gives, why shouldn't code be limited as well - limited, that
is, by law?"
- from business method patents, to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, to trademark
antidilution rulings, to the European Database Protection Directive. The old limits to
intellectual property rights - the anti-erosion walls around the public domain - are also
under attack.").
192

Yochai Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Infonnation Policy, Sept.

1998, available at http://www.law.nyu.edulbenklery (last visited May 31, 2002). Yochai
Benkler's definition of privatization in the context of information policy, cuts directly to the
issue of control: "Privatization consists of governmental strategies for setting and enforcing
rules (e.g. property and contract rights) that make it possible for market-oriented
organizations to control the production and use of information." Id.
193 This quest for absolute control on the part of the content holders may know no bounds.
In one infamous example, a license distributed with one software publisher's e-books
specified that viewers of the public domain work, Alice in Wonderland, could not read the
text aloud or lend a copy to a friend. See eVIL, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Mar. 2001, at 18
(outlining the license specifications for an e-book of Alice in Wonderland published by
VolumeOne for the Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader). After public backlash, the company
quickly released a new version, which permitted reading aloud, but still could not be "lent"
or "given." See Lawrence Lessig, Adventures in Adobeland, INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 19,
2001 (discussing the debate over use restrictions in the context of e-books). The new
version also graciously permitted users "to copy 10 text selections every 10 days" and "to
print 10 pages every 10 days." See id. The example is more deeply contextualized by
Yochai Benkler, in Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the ConstitutionalFoundationsof
the Public Donain (working draft), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers
benkler.pdf (last visited May 31, 2002).
194 Lawrence Lessig, Life, Liberty, ... and the Pursuitof Copyright,ATLANTIC UNBOUND,
at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/copyright/lessigl.htm (Sept. 10, 1998); see
also Joel Reidenberg, Remarks at The Politics of Open Source and Free Software session of
A Free Information Ecology in the Digital Environment Conference at NYU Law School
(Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ili/conferences/freeinfo2000/
webcast/transcripts/105119OpnSrcFreeSoftware.pdf (discussing the need for social
accountability of commercial actors in the cyberspace).
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Parts III and IV present our suggested means of regulating online music
distribution. Since ongoing scrutiny will be important in a shifting
technological environment, we need to set out substantive principles capable of
providing guidance for regulators. Thus, the discussion in this Part proceeds at
an ideal level, identifying broad objectives and exploring how those objectives
relate to music distribution online. Online music distribution should be
structured so as:
A) To enable diverse business practices and wide availability of
content;
B) To maximize the development of new technologies for
distribution and use;
C) To maximize consumer welfare in the broadest possible
terms;
D) To protect the interests of all stakeholders, including artists;
and
E) To limit technologies of control in the public interest
We discuss each of these principles in more detail below. In Part III, we
address more practical questions, identifying plausible, not ideal reforms.
Some of these principles may conflict; copyright law and policy is always a
compromise of competing interests. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify our
normative ideals before committing to any particular set of reforms.
A.

To Enable DiverseBusiness Practicesand Wide Availability of Content

1. The Majors' Reluctance to Make the Digital Transition
The major labels' historical dependence on high margins in the sale of
physical music "products"' 195 is basically incompatible with the economics of
digital distribution. 196 The "big five" have been reluctant to shift toward
195 "The primary way in which revenue has been raised from music recording ...

has

been . .. to sell that content at above the marginal cost of delivery, a revenue model enabled
by copyright law . . . The points at which revenue is raised are at the points of friction
along the path of delivery."
Christian Baum, The War on Unrestricted Access, at
http://www.internetcontent.net/PrintVersion.asp?ReportlD=267 (Apr. 11, 2001) (arguing

that the "Internet is a distribution environment in which the protection of content is both
impossible and undesirable").
196See Brett Fuller and Marc Singer, UnchainedMelody: The Digitization of Music Has
Industry Execs in a Twist, McKinsey Quarterly 1 (2001) ("What will happen to the major

record labels when all of the music ever recorded becomes available on the Internet? Will
music listeners-that is, pirates-continue to pay $15 for a compact disc at the store?"); see
also Moglen, supra, note 173, at 6. Under Moglen's analysis, "[Artists'] wholesale
defection from the existing distribution system is about to begin, leaving the music industry-like manuscript illuminators, piano-roll manufacturers and letterpress printers--a quaint and
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channels of digital distribution until they have "secured" their work. 197 Critics
argue that they really want to secure the indefinite continuation of their current
business model. If they succeed, all distributors will be required to handle
content on their terms.
In our view, an institutional solution should seek to avoid the entrenchment
of existing business models by encouraging competition through the wide
distribution of content. In short, the existing industry structure should not
dictate technological development. Copyright owners have never had such
complete control over distribution that they could dictate all the terms of use.
To preserve the free flow of culture, online music (and other digital works)
should be subject to multiple terms of distribution. If content were distributed
widely (with guarantees of compensation, if not absolute control, to content
owners), competing online retailers and broadcasters would likely offer diverse
terms of use. New business models would likely result in diverse terms of use,
increasing interoperability of consumer electronics devices and innovative
payment arrangements (including subscription and pay-per-use). Licensed
providers could meet consumers' diverse demands. In a truly competitive
market for online music, legitimate businesses that incorporate reliability,
security, affordability, and balanced
content protections would become
199
viable,1 98 while others would fail.
2. The Stance of the RIAA
The Recording Industry Association of America publicly supports this shift
in business practices. The major labels' industry association has argued that no
additional legislation or governmental action is necessary because it is in the

diminutive relic of a pass6 economy." Id. Yet, even he suggests that "[t]he industry's giants
won't disappear overnight, or perhaps at all. But because their role as owner-distributors
makes no economic sense, they will have to become suppliers of services in the production
and promotion of music; [instead becoming] [a]dvertising agencies, production services
consultants, packagers." Id.
197 James Boyle has noted that for the record labels the true value of new distribution
technologies may be as a scare tactic to tame the net and the legislators. See Boyle, Britney
Spears and Online Music Fears, supra note 114 (arguing that digital piracy is less of a
concern than record industry efforts to eradicate it).
198 Analysts have estimated that it would cost a company $300 million a year to deliver
songs from central distribution points at the same pace that songs were traded on Napster's
service before the injunction. See Bob Tedeschi, Record Labels Struggle with Napster
Alternatives that will Make Money and Please Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at C7

(citing Matt Bailey, analyst at Webnoize). Such costs would fall up to 90% in the next three
years, as the cost of network capacity, or bandwidth decreases. See id.
199
Accompanying Napster's staggering rise in popularity was increasing evidence of its
lack of a proper business model. While dictated by legal necessity, its transition to a
subscription-based model may also been Seen to provide proof that its viability as a business
was reliant on speculative venture capital and free content. See Rob Walker, Napster: Show
Me the Money, SLATE, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=1005231 (May 2, 2000).
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labels' interest to respond to consumer demand. In the words of RIAA
President Hilary Rosen:
[Our] goal is to have several different kinds of systems and business
models for music fans to choose from, available in as many locations
online as possible, on a non-exclusive basis to encourage competition and to make these services and products compatible with the new hand
held devices and other technologies that are emerging around the comer.
To achieve this goal, America's record labels are licensing innovatively,
constantly, and aggressively and they are in some cases
putting finishing
20 0
touches on systems that they have built themselves.
However, this public accession to consumer demand before Congressional
pressure should not lead us to conclude that the major labels will consistently
serve the public interest. In particular, we want to ensure that as the labels
license their content they do not do so exclusively, "misusing" their exclusive
right of distribution to artificially constrain the market on "monopoly-like"
terms.
Industry
developments
since the fall of Napster make clear the need
for sustained
vigilance
in this regard.
3. Proprietary Online Services: MusicNet and Pressplay
As outlined in Part I, the development of label-authorized online music
services, including MusicNet and PressPlay, indicates that the recording
industry has begun to deal with web-based digital music intermediaries. While
a step in the right direction, these services, at least as implemented thus far,
demonstrate foremost the aspiration for the majors to retain the market power
they leveraged in the real-space marketplace. The disconcerting potential of
these licensing arrangements is reflected in the technological protections and
formats such distribution presently entails. 20 2 Tellingly, for example, the
design of the Pressplay system permits users who have paid for the right to
stream, download, and bum music to burn no more than two tracks by an artist
for any month-long billing
cycle. The apparent rationale for this constraint: "to
20 3
protect album sales."
As presently arranged, these entities evince a "disturbing correlation
between the content providers (the record labels) and their distribution
networks." 20 4 In effect, the major labels are acting in a coordinated way that
200 Online Entertainment and Copyright Law: Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near
You: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciaty Committee, 107th Cong. 57-61

(2001)

(testimony of Hilary Rosen, President and CEO, Recording Industry Association of
America).
201For a discussion of copyright misuse, See In re Napster Copyright Litigation, 191 F.
Supp. 2d 1087, 1102-06 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
202 See infra Part III.E. 1.
203 Tom Di Nome, You Listen, You Pay: Post-NapsterMusic Services, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

7, 2002, at G9 (surveying the features and content of the legal online music services).
204 Frank Saxe, supra note 55, at 23.
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Upon the
raises the risk that they will, in the long-term, collude.
announcement of the labels' licensed services, consumers and artist advocacy
groups, disturbed by the major labels' convergence and continuing evidence of
the industry's leverage, raised antitrust concerns. Their uneasiness has since
been validated by the ongoing DOJ investigation. As Future of Music
Coalition's Jenny Toomey has argued, the labels are effectively arranging to
artificially constrain the market to meet their own needs: "They're trying to
make sure they transfer the terrestrial business models to the Web intact so
they maintain the same bottleneck. The idea is that it may be an only $12
billion business, when it could be a $30 billion business, but at least the labels
know they're dividing the $12 billion." 20 5 Such consolidation could squeeze
out independent artists and labels. In the future, the major labels claim that
MusicNet will license content to other distribution platforms, including
Napster, "provided such outlets satisfy legal, copyright and security
concerns."' 2R6 Of course, the industry's subjective take on what efforts will
adequately meet such considerations may differ markedly from that of
consumers, artists, or technology developers.
4. Shifts in the Nature of Use and Consumer Expectations
In our view, the digitization of content requires our society to rethink the
terms of copyright, just as the record labels need to modify how they do
207
In the old order, what the individual could do with media was
business.
dictated by technological limitations: the ability to record for friends (onto an
inferior cassette), to lend or borrow, and to resell. The limitations of use were
clear because they were tied to the physical instantiation of musical content. In
such a regime, the threat of permitting personal copying as use and the latitude
represented by a first sale doctrine did not stir concern like created by today's
state of the art.
P2P technology and Napster have increased public awareness of new
ways of using and distributing copyrighted works. Widespread shifts in
consumer practices have altered the social norms and meaning associated with
the use and enjoyment of musical content. 20 8 As they reflect the improved
205 id.
206

id.; see also MusicNet, FAQ, at http://www.musicnet.com/Frameabout.html (last

visited May 31, 2002) ("When will Napster offer the MusicNet platform? Napster is a very
important distribution partner for MusicNet and they are on track for a fall launch. As we
announced sometime ago, we will deliver our platform and content once they are up and
running. Nothing has changed since we announced the partnership some time ago.").
207 Of course, the need to rework copyright law to fit digital media has been (and may
remain to some) controversial. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law in the
hformation Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19 (1996) (discussing the debate over whether digital
technologies actually necessitate a revision of traditional copyright law).
208 Generally speaking, "law and social norms" scholarship builds from the understanding
that norms, in the absence of law, play a powerful role in regulating individual behavior, and
assesses the potential for law to extend its grasp through shaping norms and attitudinal
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efficiency and breadth of the new information infrastructure, these norms are
apt to conflict with marked changes in the status of law and/or the architecture
of content distribution, even, or especially, if law imposes those changes. 209 In
effect, the facility of digital communications platforms generates an
unconscious awareness for consumers of the tension underlying the application
of real-space intellectual property doctrine to cyberspace. As Yochai Benkler
puts it, "in a near-zero marginal cost communications environment, [a]
'goods'-based concept of information production - [when information is] itself
a zero marginal cost 'good' - [may] no longer [be] the appropriate way to
think of how information is produced." 2 1 The practical efficiency of P2P
distribution concretizes the zero marginal cost of information distribution in
economic terms, highlighting the underlying nature of musical content as a
public good and generating distaste for steeply priced "products" and
constraints on user privileges. While the new norms should by no means
dictate a lack of compensation for creators, any public policy that does not
respect the culturally accepted sentiments of the majority of users is apt to
create a backlash.
Although copyright owners may seek to make the flexibility afforded MP3
format obsolete through the development of DRM systems at both the software
and hardware level, it will be an uphill battle. 2 11 To the extent that hardware-

preferences. The literature also highlights, however, the constraints of using law for the
purposes of "norm management." In many contexts, there may be a potential backlash in
using legal regulation to express judgments about appropriate values. See, e.g., Cass S.
Sunstein, Law, Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Functions of Law 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2048 (1996) (discussing the risk that attempts at norm management through law
will be "futile or counterproductive," as in the government's "Just Say No" anti-drug
campaign). The same qualities that make norms an attractive tool for legal reform - their
ability to trigger group-based sanctions rooted in deeply-held and commonly-shared
sentiments - ensures that once they are developed they are often hard to dislodge. See
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1537, 1537
(2000). In the presence of "hard" norms, law may lose its expressive power and persuasive
edge. See id.
209 See Paul Boutin, Don't Steal Music, Pretty Please, SALON.COM,
at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/12/18/dontstealmusic (Dec. 18, 2001) (quoting
former BMG head Strauss Zelnick: "We need to give consumers a service they want, at a
price they're willing to pay ....People don't like to think of themselves as criminals.").
210 Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Fornard,71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1203, 1248 (2000).
211 Senator Hollings's Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act would,
by requiring copy-protection in any device that "retrieves or accesses copyrighted works in
digital form," prohibit the sale of MP3 players, such as the Apple IPOD or Diamond RIO.
S.2048, 107th Cong. (2002). In effect, this would statutorily overrule the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Recording Indus. Ass'n ofAin. v DiamondMultimedia Svs., Inc., which held
that the Diamond Rio's capacity to "space-shift" musical content worked in harmony with
the Audio Home Recording Act's commitment to "the facilitation of personal use."
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079
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mandated solutions conflict with the norms and practices of technological and
consumer community, Senator Hollings's recently proposed legislation
demonstrates an imperfect solution. Furthermore, the deluge of MP3 files and
players already in existence will likely stifle the ability of labels to stamp out
that format, prospective measures notwithstanding.
Should the industry
succeed in convincing - or forcing - users to adapt a more secure format,
consumers and their advocates are not likely to willingly let go of the
versatility afforded by compressed audio files or the hardware that permits
flexible use. 2 13 Consumers have developed expectations regarding broad and
flexible use of the MP3 and P2P protocols. Notably, attempts to restrict use
and the means of acquiring content differ in the present case from prior
instances to regulate use ex ante (e.g., VHS technology) because the preferable

format and mechanisms of distribution have already flooded the "market."
Content owners and copyright policymakers throughout the 1990s were
primarily concerned with enhancing control over works. It is now time to
balance these protections-to ask what the limits of control should be. In light
of our guiding principles, Part III and IV will outline what we consider to be
the minimum proper restrictions on DRM.
5. Music and Information Services
It is difficult to predict what the recording industry business model of the
future will look like. 2 14 However, given that the architecture of cyberspace
enables wider distribution of content at a reduced cost, some features should be
inevitable. The business models of the future will necessarily utilize this
wealth of circulation and consumption by delivering works to consumers in a
manner parallel to their availability in "real space," but with increased scope
and efficiency. Yet, the new means of delivery should also include innovative
new methods of promoting, sampling, sharing and learning about works. As
the popularity of Napster has demonstrated, users desire, among other things,
ease of access and variety of content. By offering music at a reasonable rate,
(1999).
212

See Ted Bridis, Tech Industry Aims to Render MP3 Obsolete, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,

2001, at A3 (pointing out that the sheer volume of files already available will make it very
difficult to eradicate them or popularize other rival formats).
213 As noted earlier, resistance to rigid control has been evidenced in criticism of the
labels' stumbling attempts to control content through SDMI. Prior to the introduction of the
Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, public interest advocates
began to vocalize their opposition to the technological copy control at hardware levels. See,
e.g., James Borland, Advocates Campaign Against Copy-Protection Plans, CNET

NEWS.coM, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4980230.html (Feb. 28, 2001)
(describing the Electronic Frontier Foundation's call for public scrutiny and participation in
the potential adaptation of copy-protection technology).
See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish: Economic Analysis, Price
Discrimination And Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007 (2000)
214

(discussing the rhetoric of economic analysis as applied to digital intellectual property).
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through their own distributors and by licensing to others, the record companies
could develop new markets and greatly increase demand for their product.
These new markets may well entail reduction in sales in the old media.
Once capable of downloading or streaming individual songs from the comfort
of home, online consumers may buy CDs far less frequently. However, there
is no reason to assume that physical distribution will be eliminated altogether.
The pleasure of shopping lies at the center of our consumer culture. People
enjoy the purchase of well-designed concrete artifacts. Furthermore, there will
always be an adult portion of the consuming public for whom it will be more
cost-efficient to purchase prepackaged commercial products. Exposure on P2P
networks may serve the same purpose as radio broadcasting-whose
promotional effect makes it lucrative for copyright owners even though any
consumer with a tape recorder can copy broadcasted works. Like the movie
industry executives who rapidly moved to promote VCR rental tapes after they
lost their battle to stamp out the new technology, recording industry executives
may eventually welcome the new channels of digital distribution.2 15 Those
capable of moving from a high margin/low volume business model to a low
margin/high volume model are most likely to be able to take advantage of the
new channels of distribution.
Digital musical content is integral to cyberspace's greatest promise-the
expansion of access to information, art, and entertainment.2 16 The labels might
soften the transition by developing innovative ways to market their content. A
fee-based service may become more successful than the Napster and the
FastTrack networks if it delivers on features lacking in P2P networks - such as
consistent speed, sound quality, and security from viruses. Moreover, the
215

These suggestions may be speculative.

However, the same may be said of the

economic analysis underpinning most defenses of extensions of intellectual property rights.
As George Priest has argued, economists are largely unable to "resolve the question of
whether activity stimulated by ... protection of intellectual property enhances or diminishes
social welfare." George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawy.ers About Intellectual
Property, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS 21 (James Palmer ed., 1986). In the face of uncertain economic analysis, fair
use, interoperability, and innovation ought to be particularly valued.
216 To expand on what the distinction between information and products might entail for
the major labels, consider the concept of 'paperback music.' See Rob Walker, Paperback
Music, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2001, at 17. Walker proposes a two-tiered approach
in which the CD would exist along with downloads. See id. Record companies could offer
a CD version, followed by a downloadable version. See id. The "hardcover" version could
capitalize on the cultural capital of immediately acquiring an artist's latest hit and need not
be threatened by the "paperback" download available for less committed users. See id. He
argues the physical object of the CD will remain viable, because the physical object is more
valuable as a "cultural artifact." Id. Walker notes that "[a] new CD release is . . . an
official, completed object. It's satisfying." If online music distribution becomes the primary
method of distribution, such a model may not be viable. See id. However, paperback,
remaindered, and used books happily co-exist with more expensive hardcover versions, like
first-class and coach seats on airlines. See id.
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major labels could build on the network's interactivity to specialize as
information suppliers, for example, by building upon their unique relationship
to artists.2 17 To differentiate themselves, they might have to bundle works
with enhancements (e.g., web exclusives, concert tickets, or artist contact) so
as to make either the physical distribution more attractive or make their own
online distribution models preferable to licensed competitors.
Official distribution networks should place a premium on security. The
greatest strength (and weakness) of a P2P network is its decentralized
framework. As a non-discriminatory communications platform, P2P systems
are by their nature untrustworthy. Simply put, anonymous users have no
guarantee of the quality and content of files they exchange with other users.
Corrupt files and viruses are a constant threat. 2 18 Decentralized networks rely
generally on a framework of reciprocity, yet user anonymity and the broad and
amorphous nature of online P2P communities deter mechanisms of
accountability and enforcement. Without introducing centralized distribution
and filtering mechanisms, P2P software providers will be unable to cure this
defect within their sub-networks. As network intelligence brings with it the
enhanced prospect of legal liability, the major labels have the capacity to
capitalize from the distrust inherent in decentralized networks by providing a
stable alternative.
Not only are P2P users unreliable, but P2P developers and distributors
appear to tarnishing their own reputation by raising the hidden "cost" of their
free services. As P2P developers try to translate popularity with users into
profitability, file-sharing programs frequently come bundled with adware or
spyware-programs, that execute pop up advertisements as users surf the Web
217 SDMI technologist Talol Shammon has discussed the possibility of super-distribution,
a method rewarding users for become distributors. See Damien Cave, Watennarks in
Music?,

SALON.COM,

at

http:/lwww.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/03/19/divx-part2/

print.html (July 31, 2000). Cave notes:
You can do things like super-distribution, for example, where you can e-mail the song
and say, "If you get 10 of your best friends to buy it, I'll give you free tickets to the
Britney Spears concert next month." So you get on AOL and you e-mail the thing to
50 of your best friends and so on... you can go down as many levels as you want, so
they can e-mail it to 50 of their best friends, turning the consumer into a distributor of
sorts.
Id.
218 For example, in January of 2001, it was reported that a Trojan horse program
masquerading as an advertising application was included with versions of file-sharing
programs like BearShare, LimeWire, KaZaA, and Grokster - the Trojan tracked URLs that
users visited and posted them to a website and also opened a security hole on infected
systems by downloading and activating executable files. See Michelle Delio What They
Know Could Hurt You, WIREDNEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,49430,
00.html (Jan. 3, 2002); see also Brad King, Security Fearsfor Peers, WIREDNEws, at
http://www.wired.comlnewsfbusiness/0,1367,42438,00.htm (Mar. 21, 2001) (discussing the
trade-off between security and privacy, as P2P developers transition toward profitable
business models).
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or track user surfin habits, collecting information that can in turn be sold to
marketing entities.
Consider, for example, the widely publicized case of
KAZAA's covert bundling of a spyware-program, which could connect users
to a secondary, private network for the distribution of paid music and
advertising. While users were made aware of the possibility that their hard
drive could be co-opted in the small-print of their "terms-of-service"
agreements and the company stated that they would ask users before
harnessing their processing power, users
and privacy advocates were rightfully
22 0
alarmed by such misleading practices.
B.

To Maximize the Development of New Technologiesfor Distributionand
Use.
In conjunction with our first policy goal, which emphasized wide
availability of content, it is also important to permit the development of new
technologies that will improve the ways in which digital music is accessed,
produced, and distributed over the Internet. Institutions involved in copyright
policy should promote technological innovation. Looking past Napster's
transitional technology, policymakers need to guard this "innovation market,"
since it is likely to generate economic growth down the line. It is important
that the concerns of one particular sector of the information economy - those
of copyright owners - do not dictate technological development. By reducing
barriers to entry for commercial entities offering innovative business
alternatives, advances in network technologies may spark commercial
development beneficial to all.
1. How Copyright Law Threatens Innovation
The current state of copyright law threatens technological development by
(i) giving content owners de facto control over new technologies of
219 See John Borland, Stealth P2P Network Hides Inside Kazaa, CNET.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-873181.html (Apr. 1, 2002 ); see also Jeffrey Benner,

Spyware, In a Galaxy Near You, WIREDNEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/

0,1282,49960,00.html (Jan. 24, 2002) (describing the scandal over spyware included in
Audiogalaxy's software, that tracks surfing habits, delivers pop-up ads and could collect
information filled into online forms, such as credit card information); Matt Richtel, It FreeMusic Software, A Hidden Fee-Based Service, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at C2.
220

See Borland, supra note 219 (quoting Larry Poneman, CEO of Privacy Council: "A lot
of the people most likely to use this software are teenagers or college students. There's a
lack of sensitivity about privacy in that age group. Do they really want to be commandeered
and have their machines do things that aren't necessarily in their best interest?"). The termsof-service agreement stated:
You hereby grant the right to access and use the unused computing power and storage
space on your computer/s and/or Internet access or bandwidth for the aggregation of
content and use in distributed computing ....The user acknowledges and authorizes
this use without the right of compensation.
Id. Users who did not agree to these terms were unable to download the software. See id.
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distribution, (ii) failing to encourage the development of (fair) use
technologies, and (iii) giving content owners control over every step in the
chain of distribution.
a. The Technological Veto
The courts and Congress have often given copyright owners control over
new markets for their work, allotting them veto power over new uses of
works. 22 1 Their current veto power over digital distribution systems stems
from two conditions outlined in Part I above: (a) the ability to protect content
through technological controls coupled with (b) the strong legal protections of
copyright. The technological veto was at work, for example, in the Napster
case, as the labels were able to leverage their licensing capacity to knock
Napster out of business and off the internet.2 22 Judge Patel's order, upon
Napster's request, that the labels demonstrate their ownership of the copyrights
they claimed to hold represented a small but significant qualification of this
.223
capacity.
The inherent danger in a technological veto is that, in many instances,
industry's immediate reaction to a content-based format shift will lack
foresight. There is ample precedent for this dangerous character. The movie
industry, for example, feared and fought VHS technology, although the
technology eventually revitalized the movie business by opening a secondary

221

See Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 77, at 1613 (discussing legal

responses to "mass market video and audio recording equipment").
22" For an argument that copyright law should not be extended to "disable new
technologies," especially when those technologies are "capable of substantial non-infringing
use," See Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal, Napster
Inc. v. A&M Records, available at http://web.umr.edu/-canisr/cs3l7/napster/amicus_
aw.pdf (last visited May 31, 2002). Ginsburg offers an analysis of the responses by the
courts and Congress to the tensions arising from the arrival of new means of disseminating
content and the control of works by copyright owners. See Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control, supra note 77. She argues that in the confrontation between copyright and new
technologies, courts do not always refuse to protect the right to disseminate works and
Congress does not always grant a compulsory license. Rather, "when copyright owners
Seek to participate in and be paid for the new modes of exploitation, the courts, and
Congress, appear more favorable, not only to the proposition that copyright owners should
get something for the new exploitation, but more importantly, to the proposition that when
the new market not merely supplements but also rivals prior markets, copyright owners
should control that new market. The control permits copyright owners to refuse to license,
and therefore to charge market prices." Id. at 1617. In the context of digital technologies,
she therefore concludes that Internet represents a new market which copyright owners
should be permitted to exploit. At the same time, she argues that "greater author control,"
may permit authors to bypass "the traditional intermediary-controlled distribution system,"
and to offer the public "an increased quantity and variety of works of authorship." Id. at
1619.
223 See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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'home-viewing' market. 2 24 Innovation in the technologies of distribution will

decline markedly if potential new innovators are chilled by a threat of legal
action or believe they will not be able to attain access to works for their
networks.
A preferable copyright regime would create incentives for
technological advancement rather than punish it.
b. Technologies of (Fair)Use

Policy-makers should also be concerned that the present legal environment
creates disincentives for innovation that could enable flexibility at the user's
end. As recognized by the court in Recording Indus. Ass 'n of Am. v. Diamond

Multimedia Sj's., Inc., consumers have established fair use rights in keeping
to utilize and "space-shift" content they have
with the copyright statute
2,5
obtained legitimately. 25 DRM systems that are designed to limit consumer
options to attain security may threaten legitimate personal uses and undermine
sales. Consumers are likely to think twice about buying music if they cannot
"move" it from their computer to a portable player and back again. Napster
itself represents the efficient overlap of the computer terminal with the stereo
system.Similarly, we may imagine a not-so-distant-future in which
entertainment/information services will become both increasingly converged
and versatile-cable, phone, and internet access may all come through the
same device. Developing easy-to-use and affordable applications for content
use requires that creative works be compatible across platforms, ensurig that
consumers will be able to utilize legitimate content in a variety of ways.
224

Due to bandwidth constraints, the movie industry was initially spared an identity crisis

akin to that of the record industry upon the popularization of online communications media.
Yet, broadband delivery - rather than speeding up the delivery of on-demand movie services
as promised - has made piracy a primary issue for Hollywood. As a result, like the record
industry before them, the movie studies have held back on digital delivery absent a closed
delivery platform, facing criticism that their desire to hold back on the delivery of content
has forestalled the deployment of broadband services. See Lawrence Lessig, Who's Holding
Back Broadband, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A17 (analogizing the movie and music
industry's behavior, both evincing not only a fear of piracy, but a desire to retain established
and comfortable ways of doing business in a concentrated industry). Meanwhile, the search
for a secure network has brought the movie industry alongside the record labels in the fight
to impede innovation and constrain use through hardware-controls. See Declan McCullagh,
Anti-Copy Bill Hits D.C., WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,
51245,00.html (Mar. 22, 2002) (noting that the "Motion Picture Association of America and
the Recording Industry Association of America hailed the CBDTPA as the only way to
prevent the continuing Napsterization of their businesses") (last visited May 31, 2002).
225 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (1999).
226

See

Brad

King,

Students

Rave

about

PC Music,

WIRED

NEWS,

at

http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,43029,00.html (Apr. 13, 2001) (discussing
that over one-third of students are eschewing their stereos in favor of their personal
computers to listen to music).
227 See generally Brad King, Subscribing to Convergence Theory, WIRED NEWS, at

2002]

USING ANTITRUSTLA WTO ADVANCE AND ENHANCE ONLINE Music DISTRIBUTION

c. Role Conflation

-

501

"

The coordination and consolidation of hardware, software, and content
providers also threatens technological development. In the past, content
owners and providers of technologies of distribution had distinct management
structures. For example, music content owners did not own radio stations or
control radio manufacturers. This division acted as a crucial constraint on the
record industry's behavior. Over time, the record industry .paid228for an
imperfect influence over radio airplay, as well as retail display.
The
separation, however, is significantly less distinct in the Intemet context, in
which music owners are now becoming distributors, giving them less incentive
to cooperate with other potential distributors (now potential competitors rather
than facilitators of distribution). If these developments remain unchecked, we
risk putting the future of Internet distribution into the hands of the record
labels, when "what works for the RIAA [will] not necessarily work for

innovation."22 9 If the content owners have the power to determine the future
of the online musical environment through code and architecture, we have no
assurance that they will permit the development of formats and protocols such as P2P - that they perceive as a threat.
2. The Value of P2P
Should we care if content owners have the last say over future
technological development in this field? Is P2P technology so very valuable?
It is our position that policymakers should encourage development in this
arena. File-sharing technology has the potential to do far more than channel

http://www.wired.com/newsfbusiness/0,1367,42903,00.html (Apr. 10, 2001).
228 Almost all airplay on FM commercial radio is paid for by the five major record labels.
See Eric Boehlert, Record Companies: Save Us Front Ourselves, SALON.COM, at
http:/www.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/13/indie-promotion/index.html (Mar. 13, 2002).
While FCC rules prevent direct pay-for-play, the "labels pay millions of dollars each year to
independent radio promoters, universally referred to as 'indies,' who in turn pass along
money to radio stations whenever they add new songs to their playlists." Id. The "indies'
contributions are written up as "promotional expenses" and the labels stay lawfully onestep-removed from the process. See id. This corrupt and costly system, however, has taken
its toll on the labels. Faced with declining profits and the increasing consolidation of the
radio and "indie"marketplace, the labels have ironically been arguing for intervention by the
FCC on public-policy grounds to help reign in the system they fought to create. See id. For
more on the economics of payola, See Eric Boehlert, FightingPay-for-Play:Sources in the
Music Industry Call for a Federal Clampdown on the New Payola, SALON.COM, at
http://www.salon.com/entmusic/feature/2001/04/O3/payola2/index.html
(Apr. 4, 2001)
(noting that it costs S100,000 to S250,000 to launch a single on rock radio).
229 Lawrence Lessig, Just Compensation, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 6, 2001, availableat
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/content/standard/0,1902,23401,00.html (last visited Aug.
31, 2002) (arguing for a balance in copyright between the right to compensation and the
right to control innovation).
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illicit content. 230 As Professor Yochai Benkler has persuasively illustrated, as
an integral and emergent property of a "pervasively networked environment,"
"peer production" exists as a generalized means of information production and
exchange.23 1 As evidenced most notably in the success of the open source
software movement (discussed in more detail below), "peer production" is a
"phenomenon [that] has broad iiplications throughout the information,
As an altemative to traditional marketknowledge, and culture economy."
based proprietary distribution and control, P2P's promise stems from its ability
reduce the cost of drawing information out of and inputting information back
into the network. Given these efficiencies, as Benkler has highlighted, peer
namely the
production has the capacity to enhance core political values, 233
principles of autonomy and democracy that underlie liberal society.
Against this potential, code restrictions focused on securing content by
altering the network architecture may stifle all uses of the network, including
but not exclusive to P2P, by altering the information processing capacity for
distributed creation and exchange. For example, the proposed Consumer
Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act would severely impact the
freedom and flexibility of programmers and software companies - "both those
distributing code for free and those selling it" -by requiring the inclusion of
Within a networked
federally approved copy-protection schemes.
230

See Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal, Napster
Inc. v. A&M Records et al., available at http://web.umr.edu/-canisr/cs3l7/napster/
amicuslaw.pdf (last visited May 31, 2002).
231Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, o, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, (working
draft) (forthcoming YALE L.J.), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/Coase'sPenguin.pdf (pointing to evidence of "peer production" in open source software, the Open
Directory Project, Distributed Proofreading, Project Gutenberg's collection of public
domain books, collectively authored encyclopedias, NASA Clickworkers, multi-player and
online games, Amazon's accreditation system, and many other projects of distributed
production).
information
232
Id at 1.
233 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional
Foundationsof the Public Domnain, supra note 193, at 207. Benkler states:

There are .. .aspects of autonomy that are directly tied to the emergence of peerproduction . . . The emergence of peer-production as an economic-and ultimately
social-transformation represents, most importantly, a change in the menu of options
for being productive in the information economy. . . .What is emerging in the
information economy is a model of peer-production-where individuals communicate
with each other about what projects are worthwhile pursuing, who might want to take
them up, and share their products in an economy of gifts, reputation, and relationallybased rewards. Consumption and production are integrated, not separated, so that each
individual is a "user," rather than either purely a "producer" or a "consumer."
Id.
Declan

McCullagh,

Bill Slams
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51274,00.html
234

Anti-Copy

Coders, WIRED NEWS, at
Many
(Mar. 22, 2002).

telecommunications firms offered similar arguments against the Clipper Chip and early
versions of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. See LAWRENCE
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environment, such constraints could not be isolated and may have unintended
negative consequences.
If policymakers permit the enclosure of the
informational commons, endeavors like open software development may be
endangered
and new collaborative models may not have the opportunity to
2 35
thrive.

In its initial incarnation, the Napster network promoted the abuse of
technology, as it supported illegal copying. But the same technology has the
potential to allow and encourage distribution, use, and access to content in
ways that fundamentally advance the underlying goals of copyright law by
maximizing access to content, providing new incentives for creators, and
serving as an "engine of free expression."2 3 6 In particular, in contrast to the
top-down structure of centralized distribution services that permit a limited
distribution supplied to consumers, the structure of P2P networks permits the
even-handed and democratic distribution of musical content by all artists.
Though the removal of intermediaries, consumers need no longer be situated at
the receiving-end of content, but as users may be positioned to both accept and
contribute content to the network.2 37 An ideal copyright policy will, therefore,
allow for continuing development of new P2P practices.
a.

P2Pand Community

P2P has special relevance in the context of online music since peer-based
exchange systems generate an interactive listening community.
P2P
technology effectively generates a vast library of works, enabling individuals
to share files among their computers, a practice that reflects the communal
innovation that led to the development of the Internet itself.2 38 In keeping with
44-46 (1999). The Clipper Chip was
ultimately abandoned, while court battles have hampered the Federal Communications
Commission's efforts to implement the latter. See id.
235 McCullagh notes that the legislation would in effect create a "national firewall,"
isolating the American open-source programming community from international
collaborators. Id.
236 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
237 For a further discussion of the shift in socio-political dynamics facilitated by
distributed technologies in a ubiquitously networked environment and its impact on the
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE

future of information policy, See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the
Deeper Stnctures of Regulation Towards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 561 (2000).
238 See Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant:FreeSoftware and the Death of Copyright,
FIRST MONDAY, at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edulpublications/anarchism.html
(last

visited May 31, 2002). Moglen asserts:
[E]veryone living in the networked portions of the world can now communicate with
anyone else directly, without intermediaries, reaching very large numbers of people at
almost no cost. [Such a] society in which everyone is connected to everyone else
behaves differently from any society that has ever existed before; past "principles"' of
social and economic law, things that Seemed always true everywhere, aren't anymore.
Id.
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the nature of the Internet, Napster and P2P services generate taste through
interactivity. Other users act as filters and bellwethers, potentially catalyzing
239
mutual
With the exponential increase in the production of
• ,. tastes.
.. 240
information,
services of customization, personalization, mediation, filtering,
and screening are going to become increasingly important. 24 1 At the same
time, the underlying interaction between users is an integral part of the network
and the P2P protocol's efficiency - individuals sharing with one another in a
networked environment benefit from the positive externalities of "network
effects."' 24 2 It is also the element likely to be absent from industry-sanctioned
protocols, as the labels are more likely to think of information-sharing
mechanisms as avenues for illicit channeling undermining their preferred oneto-many distribution framework. Moreover, the diversification of user tastes
through exposure to new and less-publicized artists stands to diminish the
ability of the majors to shape the listening practices of consumers.
3.

Innovation in Communications Technologies furthers First Amendment
Principles

First Amendment principles require both the legislature and judiciary to
allow technologies vital to free speech to develop freely, within reasonable
grounds, and ensure that copyright content is not locked up and subject to
complete control by copyright owners. 24 3 As has been the focus of academic
debate and recent challenges within the courts, the development of digital
technology has increased the potential for conflict between free speech
principles and copyright law. In our view, policymakers should remain
cognizant of this dynamic and seek to incorporate First Amendment concerns
into copyright policy.

239 See Janelle

Brown, Personalize Me, Baby,

SALON.COM,

at http://www.salon.

com/tech/feature/2001/04/06/personalization/print.html (Apr. 6, 2001).
240 See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information?, School of Information

Management and Systems, University of Berkeley, Project Report, available at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/ research/projects/how-much-info/summary.html (last visited
May 31, 2002) (attempting to measure the amount of information produced in the world
each year and the repercussions of information overload).
241 See JOSHUA SHENK, DATA SMOG 7 (Harper 1995) (arguing that information overload
threatens to breed apathy, disaffection, and alienation from the online environment).
242 The economic theory of "network effects" instructs us that, the Internet, like the
telephone system before it, increases in economic and social value as more people are
connected to it. As many of the positive benefits of the Internet are linked to this dynamic,
in assessing the impact of regulatory efforts that Seek to alter the underlying architecture,
"interconnectivity is an important goal that should not be sacrificed lightly." Neal Kumar
Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (2001).
243 This position of technological deference was arguably advocated by the Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence in Reno v. ACLU. See Reno v. ACLU, 544 U.S. 844, 891
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (looking towards a future in which online zoning may be
possibility, yet noting that the "transformation of cyberspace is not complete").
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a. FreeSpeech: The Blindness ofthe Courts

Although music has not traditionally occupied the core of First Amendment
concerns its expressive dimensions are undeniable. Music is not simply
property.
If we ignore its important role in the public sphere, we risk
permitting the commodification of informational content vital to cultural
development. Would we acquiesce so readily if access to literature or news
was absolutely contingent upon the supplier's express permission?2 4 5 First
Amendment principles require us to consider the limitations of a regime in
which content-holders dictate all terms of use.
Copyright law imposes select prohibitions on communication in order to
encourage the creation of new works. 246 A robust commitment to the First
Amendment will ensure that the law is no more restrictive than necessary,
rewarding creation while fostering the capacity of individuals to communicate
with one another in the broadest possible terms. In the words of the Supreme
Court, "[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential
to the welfare of the public." 247 Unfortunately, U.S. courts have been
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 971
(10th Cir. 1996) ("Intellectual property, unlike real estate, includes the words, images and
244

sounds that we use to communicate .... Restrictions on the words or images that may be

used by a speaker, therefore, are quite different than restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of speech.") (citations omitted).
245 See Lawrence Lessig, Reclaiming a Commons, Keynote Address at The Berkman
Center's "Building a Digital Commons," May 20, 1999, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/lessigkeynote.pdf
(last visited May 31, 2002)
(discussing the closed society, in which open access to intellectual property is defeated by
technological
controls).
246
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal, Napster
Inc. v. A&M Records et al., available at http://web.umr.edu/-canisr/cs317/napster/
amicuslaw.pdf (last visited May 31, 2002) (supporting Eric Eldred's Petition for certiorari).
The Copyright Professors note:
The Copyright Act is a statute that regulates speech. It tells some people that they
cannot print or publicly present certain words or images. It is not a law aimed at
general conduct that has incidental effects on expression -like a trespass statute or an
anti-littering ordinance. It is a law aimed solely at expression.... Its entire purpose
and effect is to regulate the production of information, culture, and knowledge-all
aspects of society central to the ambit of the First Amendment.
Id.

The Court's use of the phrase "diverse and antagonistic sources" was introduced in
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("[The First] Amendment rests on
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition
of a free society"). The phrase has been repeatedly cited since. See, e.g., Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997) (Turner II) (holding that state regulation does
not violate First Amendment); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64
(1994) (Turner I); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United
247

B. U. J. SCI. & TECH.L.

[Vol. 8:2

unwilling to temper copyright law with First Amendment values. 248 As Jessica
Litman has argued:
American copyright law has never had to worry too much about a
collision with the First Amendment ....
Chiefly because the limitations
that restrict copyright - the idea expression distinction, the fair use
doctrine, and, I would even argue, the first sale rule - kept collisions to a
minimum. Copyright has ended up not significantly restricting either the
ability to speak or the ability to gain access to information; and when it's
threatened to, the courts have called the use fair. Once we enact the new
access control[s] ... we have what in effect is a copyright law without
those limitations. And one that promises or threatens (depending on your
viewpoint) to have important
effects on who has access to what
249
information on what terms.
Recent developments in law and code prefigure the creation of a privatelycontrolled information environment that impose significant costs on speech.
Information policymakers should recognize that the Internet and P2P
subnetworks are fundamentally speech-enabling technologies.
Running
against this potential, strong "intellectual property regimes, particularly online
• . . have subtle effects in shaping
the architecture
•
•
,251 political economy, and
structure of preferences in our speech universe.
When copyright law
rigidly defines what may be done online, it has an obvious and predictable chill
252
on the development of new expressive technologies and expression itself.

States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); see

also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (noting the First Amendment
purpose of promoting "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas").
248 James Boyle notes that part of the difficulty is the fact that "there is no case - no
single pronouncement - that speaks to the First Amendment constraints on intellectual
property law with the simple authority of New York Times v. Sullivan [in the area of
defamation]." James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 345 (2000) [hereinafter Boyle, The First Amendment and
Cyberspace]. The Reno Court was especially attentive to the nature of the Internet as a
communications medium, as well as the connection between the growth and development of
the Internet as a network and linkage between the growth of the network and the democratic
value of a free exchange of ideas. See Reno v. ACLU, 544 U.S. 844 (1997).
249 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright andInformation Policy, supra note 188, at 299.
250 The companies have been able to threaten free speech in such a manner due to the bold
"propertization" of ideas and works. James Boyle lays part of the blame on the Clinton
Administration: "The Administration's proposals -- successful, unsuccessful, and currently
pending - [present] a remarkable picture ...

in which concern for First Amendment values

Seems entirely over-shadowed by a commitment to intellectual property maximalism."
Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace,supra note 248, at 341.
251 Id.

252 In 2000, Lawrence Lessig proposed that the Supreme Court would get this connection

right when it heard a case dealing with the intersection of the First Amendment and
copyright. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's Rule, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 2, 2000.
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To miss the connection then between the First Amendment and copyright is to
jeopardize the potential of the Internet as a communications medium.
Although the decisions against Napster and MP3.com may have properly
stopped as violations of copyright law, they improperly ignored the costs of
that law enforcement-namely, the diminution of such services' capacity to
enhance speech. It is likely that, in both cases, copyright concerns would have
outweighed speech concerns. But the courts' unwillingness to recognize, even
in principle, potential collisions between intellectual property rights and free
speech immunities is disturbing, given its potential to undermine a broad
communications infrastructure.
b. The Information Commons and the PublicDomain
Another important value, closely linked to the intersection of copyright and
free speech, is the concept of the information commons and the public domain.
The commons is a space in which works are available for the taking, and a
space in which the right to speak does not require the permission of anyone
else. In the context of online music, the notion of the commons seeks to ensure
that two goals are met: first, that there is a public domain to ensure free use,
and second, that the distribution of content is not accompanied by perfect
control over use. An information commons is valuable as a workspace for the
exchange and development of ideas and a common culture.
The increased commodification and commercial control of intellectual
property threatens to undermine the online commons by concentrating
information production and control into the hands of a few. Only positive
action can check this trend. As in the First Amendment context, law must
actively work to limit the controls granted to copyright owners so as to ensure
that works remain free for personal use. Unfortunately, the government so far
has evaded this responsibility, by declaring that the Internet should take of
itself while at the same time bolstering the intellectual property rights of
copyright holders. 253
Alternative models of intellectual property production would promote open
and ongoing progress of technology. Chief among these is the open source
software movement. Open source software has thrived because its source
material lies squarely within the commons and is open to all. An open source
project begins when a programmer writes the basic software to perform a

Lessig argued that these issues "require a patient and well-informed inquiry about the
effects of different legislation. They require an opportunity for innovators to try out
different models of content distribution. They require, in short, all the hesitancy - and
humility - that the courts have demonstrated in the face of the regulation of porn." Id. The
Supreme Court's decision to hear the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft ensures that the Court will
be compelled to confront the issue head on. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (2001), cert.
granted, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002) (mem.).
23

See William J. Clinton, A Franieworkfor Global Electronic Commerce, July 1997,

availableat http://www-06.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm.
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function, and then distributes it openly with its source code as an invitation
254 for
others to contribute their ideas and skills to the development that kernel.
Culture,~55
like the open source enterprise, is centered on dialogue and
exchange.
Recent scholarship has urged us to take the lessons learned from
256
the networked world and feed them back into the shaping of law and policy.
Rather than impose 'real world' values onto the Internet, we should instead let
Internet values shape real world policy. 257 To that end, Lawrence Lessig has
identified two values manifested by the free software movement: open
evolution (no rules that say "what is right') and universal standing (anyone can
contribute without asking permission).
Open evolution mirrors a classic
nostrum of free market economics-no central authority should be permitted
to
"pick winners" and elevate them above the fray of market competition.2 59
Are these values in any way relevant to online music? Undoubtedly, the
analogy has serious limits. Popular musicians, even if they may make some
income from performances, rely on conventional compensation in a way that
contributors to code may not. While musicians undoubtedly build on the work
of others, individual musical works are not usually created by a series of artists
contributing to the same project. Nevertheless, the success of open code
underscores the values of "open-evolution" and "universal standing" and
cautions against the creation of an overly-strong property regime. In the digital
music context, these qualities should be translated into policies that promote
broad technological development, opening wide distributional opportunities for
all artists and equally wide listening opportunities for all consumers. Thus,
when it comes to setting the limits of distribution and use, the law should

254

For a breakdown of the open source/free software production process and its historical

development, See Moglen, supra note 173.
255 Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information
Production, Oct. 1999, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/benklery/Ipec.PDF
visited May 31, 2002)

(forthcoming 2002 in INT'L REV. OF L. & Ec.).

(last

Professor Benkler

notes:
Open source development relies heavily on contributions among volunteer
users/developers . . . . users are invited to use the software, and when they develop
needs unfulfilled by the program, they post questions to mailing lists dealing with the
particular type of software, and either they, or (usually) someone else in the network of
users/developers will provide the fix.
Id.
For a general description of open source strategies, See ERIC RAYMOND, THE
CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL

REVOLUTIONARY (O'Reilly & Associates 2001).
256 See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE 14 (1998) (conceptualizing all culture
as software that "provides us with the tools and pre-understandings that enable us to make

judgments about the social world").
257 See Lawrence Lessig, The Charles Green Lecture: Open Code and Open Society:
Vahtes of Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1405, 1409-1410 (1999).
25 Id. at 1414-1419.
29

1 Id. at 1418-1419.
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respect cyberspace's access
26 and openness, qualities made possible by nurturing

the intellectual commons. 0
Linus Torvalds, the founder of the Open Source Movement, and Richard
Stallman, the founder of Free Software Foundation, both believe in the
continuing vitality of intellectual property and copyright. 2 61 The nonproprietary peer production of the open source community complements its
commercial embodiment in the form of "for profit" companies, such as Red
Hat, which rely on copyright. 262 As we forge copyright policy, we should
learn from this balance. It reminds us that intellectual property rights, properly
conceived, will function more as an incentive for innovation than as an
obstacle to access. To preserve innovation, law and policy should preserve
certain parameters of online use; establishing the pre-conditions of openness
and accessibility is necessary for the realization of the expressive/creative
potentials of the medium. 2 63 The freewheeling openness of the open source

movement may be neither appropriate nor necessary in the context of digital
music. However, its success should be borne in mind before content owners
advocate for greater control over copyrighted works.
C.

To PreserveSpacefor Individual Use and Maximize Consumer Welfare

1. Putting Consumers at the Bargaining Table
So far, our focus has been on the need to protect individual consumer
interests as well as the public interest. The need to safeguard user interests is
particularly acute because consumers have historically had little influence over
copyright policy.2 64 The legislative process is designed to assure that the
260

See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv.
L. REv. 501 (1999).
261 See Lessig, The Charles Green Lecture, supra note 257, at 1420. Torvalds has said:
"My opinion on licenses is that 'he who writes the code gets to choose his license, and
nobody else gets to complain.' Anybody complaining about a copyright license is a whiner."
Id.

See About Red Hat, at http://www.redhat.com/about (last visited May 31, 2002).
See Moglen, supra note 173 ("[T]he use of intellectual property rules to create a
commons in cyberspace is the central institutional structure enabling the anarchist triumph.
Ensuring free access and enabling modification at each stage... [ensured] the speed, with
which the Linux kernal, for example, outgrew all of its proprietary predecessors.").
264
See Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 207, at 23. Professor Litman notes:
The current federal copyright statute (and its predecessors) were composed by
representatives of copyright-related industries to govern interactions among them. We
have built into the process a mechanism for the cable television industry, or the
software publishers' association, or the manufacturers of digital audio tape to insist that
the law include a provision privileging this or that use that that party deems essential..
. The design of the drafting process (in which players with major economic stakes in
the copyright sphere are typically invited to sit down and work out their differences
before involving members of Congress in any new legislation) excludes ordinary
citizens from the negotiating table.
262
263
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parties with the biggest financial stake can set the legislative agenda. This
leaves little opportunity "for the members of the general public to exert
influence on the drafting process to ensure that [a] statute does not unduly
26
burden private, non-commercial, consumptive use of copyrighted works." D
The Napster phenomenon demonstrated that en masse the weight of
public/consumer ractices can bring user interests to the attention of politicians
and the media. 26 However, the dispersal of users across a variety of services
does not bode well for continued 'mass popular involvement.' Furthermore,
even free services suspiciously coopt modes of political protest, revealing an
underlying motivation 267
undoubtedly commercial in nature: Napster's interest is
interest.
public
the
not
2. The Vagaries of Musical Taste
What is consumer welfare in this new digital environment? The value and
enjoyment of intellectual property is notoriously difficult to quantify. 268 Some
consumers invest a large percentage of their income in music; others would
never spend a dime on a CD. While musical taste represents an important
manner in which individuals define themselves through cultural consumption,
it is a fluid and protean preference. Nevertheless, precisely because demand
for music is so difficult to quantify and so volatile, we believe that two
values--diverse choice and flexible use-should figure heavily in the
calculation of consumer welfare.
Historically, the record industry via its marketing tactics - in conjunction
with popular radio and MTV - defined taste through the limitations of genre.
This system failed to recognize the breadth across genres of certain users'
musical appreciation, and through hit songs and albums made content within
each genre needlessly shallow.
As a result, music has fallen within

Id.
265

Id.

266

As it became increasingly clear that it would not win favor with the judiciary, Napster

sought to sway policymakers by galvanizing its user-base in the hopes of inspiring political
action. The company invited users to D.C. to participate in a 'teach-in' style rally and
established a toll-free number that fans could use to convey their support for file swapping
directly to Congress. See John Borland, Napster Asks Friends to Join D.C. Caravan, CNET
NEWS.COM, Mar. 26, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-254776.html?tag=m (last
visited Aug. 31, 2002). The company adapted the guise of grassroots activism with the
company-sanctioned Napster Action Network, soliciting users on its website to "e-mail
friends or even 'form or manage a local Napster advocacy chapter."' Id.; see also Ryan

Sager, Napster 'Teach In': All Hail Shawn, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,42797,00.html (Apr. 3,2001).
267
See Andrew Leonard,
Don 't March for Napster, SALON.COM,
at
http://www.salon.com/tech/ col/leon/2001/04/02/napstermarch/index.html (May 31, 2002).
26 See RICHARD CAVES, Buffs, Buzz, and Educated Tastes, in CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:
CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 175 (Harvard University Press 2000) (observing

that "sociologists have given these questions more attention than economists").
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increasingly rigid categories. An ideal online music delivery service of the
future would not just permit the downloading of music that users currently
want, but would also provide accessibility to music of which they might not be
aware. As an online analogue to radio and "sampling stations" in CD stores,
this development would promote the complementary values of serendipity and
experimentation. As James Boyle notes:
[M]uch of learning is serendipitous and unplanned, and the pursuit of
apparently non-productive knowledge is both inherently pleasurable and
practically useful. One's current preferences are formed by one's past
experiences and those, in turn, are shaped by the costs of
9
26 experimentation,
on which legal rules may have a considerable influence.
From the consumer's perspective, one of the strongest arguments against
locking up content is that often we do not know what we like until we
hear/read/see it, either by finding it ourselves or by being referred to it by
others. 27 To increase niche listening and expand user access to new artists in
that regard, copyright policy should aim to provide users with diverse sources
of music and critical opinion.
3. Fair Use Doctrine: Free of Use, Not Free of Payment
While the public does not shape copyright policy directly, the law of
copyright
seeks to take the public interest into account via the doctrine of fair
271
use.
The copyright fair use privilege excuses a variety of otherwise
infringing uses, including personal copying, research and educational copying,
copying for purposes of reverse engineering, copying for use in parody,
Boyle, The FirstAmendment and Cyberspace, supra note 250, at 349. The vision of a
combining a broad catalog of musical content alongside the network's infomediary capacity
is but one example of the ways in which the networked environment lends itself to a blend
of fun and filtration. The fashionable practice of maintaining a Weblog - defined broadly as
"a frequently updated Web site that is arranged in reverse chronological order" - has been
described as an art of "targeted serendipity," at best "pointing readers to things that they
didn't know they wanted to See." See Anni Layne Rodgers, Targeted Serendipity, FAST
CoMPANY, at http://www.fastcompany.com/feature/02/blood.html (Mar. 2002). The act of
compiling selected links and sharing personal interests and observations is rooted upon an
experimental ethic that, as one prominent Weblogger puts it, "is all about fostering real
connections based on trust, respect, and creativity." Id. User communities take shape
around the perspective and judgment of individual users; unsurprisingly, the most popular
sites are authored by those who are both avid surfers and discriminating readers.
269

270 See CAVES, supra note 268, at 175 (discussing fads, fashion, herd behavior, and the
market for critical opinion).
271As discussed in Part 1, fair use originated as a judge-made doctrine, and is now
codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). As an
affirmative defense to a copyright infringement suit, the fair use doctrine allows some use of
copyrighted works without the permission of the copyright holder. See id. Fair use is a
case-by-case, fact-dependent issue, determined by a four-part balancing test established in §
107. See id.
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copying short quotations, etc. 2 72 In this way fair use (1) secures creators'
ability to build on the work of others, and (2) enables the critique, parody, and
discussion of works.
To uphold the welfare of users, fair use should remain a robust exception to
copyright law and code-based copyright protections. While we acknowledge
that it is difficult to define fair use in cyberspace, it is not impossible. Fair use
as applied in cyberspace must reflect "a deliberate choice about how to
regulate the
• technology and how to regulate
,,273 activity that stimulates valuable
interaction and discourse among users.
Of course, such immunity must
have limits given the countervailing interest of artists and their backers to
receive proper compensation-a reasonable rate of return for their investment
of time, energy, and money. We discuss the appropriate reconceptualization of
this exemption in section III by distinguishing between private use and
public/commercial distribution. In short, we believe the former deserves far
more "fair use" protection than the latter.
Online musical content should be free of use, but not free of payment.2 74
While we recognize the genius of the Napster network, we believe that
Napster, as a public commercial entity that completely denied compensation to
artists, should not be absolved of liability. Yet to stamp out uses that may be
legal would be to take the compensation principle too far. In particular, as we
discuss in Part III, virtual private networks arguably represent the
technological equivalent of sharing with friends or establishing an informal
record club.
We believe in a regime in which copyright owners are
compensated for new public/commercial uses of their works but do not get to
dictate all the terms on which that occurs. Bearing in mind these concerns of
compensation, we turn to the interests of artists themselves.
D.

To Ensure the Welfare of Other Stakeholders, In ParticularArtists
1. Watching from the Sidelines

In the digital content wars, the interests of musicians and writers been
marginalized. This may be blamed in large part on the "information wants to
be free" libertarian bias of the online world popularized by John Perry
Barlow 275 and Esther Dyson. 276
By slighting the "actual creators of

272 LITMAN, supra note 74.
273 Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrinefor

Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REv. 107, 181-82 (2001) (arguing that a fair use doctrine for
cyberspace must consider the nature of the technological medium and account for the value
of the alleged infringer's use of the work). As copyright is strengthened to accommodate
new technologies so should the model of public welfare be adjusted to account for how new
technology promotes or hinders access and use of copyrighted works. See id.
274 We note, however, that while use should entail an obligation to pay it, it should not
mean that users must pay without limit what content owners demand.
275 See John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without the Bottles: The Econony of Mind on the
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intellectual property," this position betrays "a mindset that artists should not be
compensated for their works."' 2 7 7 We are likely to have less creation (and very
poor artists) in such a system.
2. Artists and Advocacy
In considering the welfare of artists, we should recognize that their interests
may diverge from those of the RIAA and the labels.2 79 Since the onslaught of
online file-sharing, record company executives and representatives have
wielded one compelling "moral argument that has [seemingly] placed their
position beyond self-interest: the fans take the music without proper
permission and don't pay the artists a dime." 279 However, just as the labels
may spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to launch an act, an artist herself
may rationally decide to give away some of her work in order to build an
audience that will eventually pay for it. The labels are far more threatened by
online file sharing 2than
artists, many of whom enjoy the wider distribution they
80
experience online.

Global Net, WIRED, Mar. 1993, at 86.
276

See Virginia I. Postel, On the Frontier,REASONONLINE, at http://www.reason.com/

9610/fe.dyson.shtml (last visited May 31, 2002).
277
Paulina Borsook, Art's Cold Welcome on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at Al 9.
278
At an April 2, 2001 hearing, Don Henley noted:
While we support the copyright infringement lawsuits filed by the record industry, the
lawsuits should not be used to destroy a viable and useful independent Internet
distribution system. It is in the best interests of recording artists, as well as consumers,
that Congress promotes an atmosphere of independent digital distribution of music.
The solution resides in the marketplace and not in the courtroom. If, however, a
resolution cannot be reached quickly, compulsory licenses should be considered - but
only as a last resort.
Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You , Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Hearing
on Online Entertainment and Copyright Law, 106th Cong. (2001) (statement of Don
Henley).
279 Neil Straus, Record Labels' Answer to Napster Still Has Artists Feeling Bypassed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al.
280Consider, for example, the story of neglected 60s recording artist Joseph Byrd. Byrd
sought to obtain unpaid royalties from Sony music unsuccessfully for many years, even
though Sony released his music in recent years. With his music populating the Napster
network, Byrd sent of a latter of complaint to Judge Patel stating:
I am not alone. Literally thousands of musicians like me, who are purportedly
represented by record companies and distributors in the current Napster case, are in my
situation. The record companies' representation that they are legitimate agents for their
artists is false. The only payments they make are to those who have the means to force
them to be accountable; to the rest, a vast majority, they pay nothing ...I personally
would prefer to allow my music to be freely shared, to the present situation, in which
only the corporations stand to gain.
See Damien Cave, Musician to Napster Judge: Let My Music Go, SALON.COM, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/04/23/copyright/print.html (Apr. 23, 2002).
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The asymmetric relationship between the artists and labels correlates with a
potential divergence of interest. Profits are unevenly distributed between
artists and labels-artists generally receive royalties between "7 to 12 percent
of the suggested
retail price for United States sales and a lesser percentage...
t,9,281
for sales outside the country."
Once the artist has signed a contract, the
labels' ability to maximize their wealth with an artist's "product" need not
coincide with an artist's interest in economic or other terms, (e.g., developing
a listening community). Demonstrating this point, as the labels transitioned to
online distribution, they were immediately criticized by artists, lawyers, and
managers for failing to share revenue with artists and for not obtaining or
acting upon the proper licenses for digital distribution. 282
When the
subscription-based online services launched, artists such as Offspring, Beck,
and No Doubt, were surprised to find their material licensed with neither their
permission and in breach of their contracts. 283 Artists found that they stood2 to
84
profit mere pennies from the "authorized" digital distribution of their works.
Although historically the interests of artists have been marginalized,
organizations such as Future of Music Coalition represent an approach
sensitive to artists' interests as a collective. 285 They argue that "for too long
musicians have had too little voice in the manufacture, distribution and
promotion of their music on a national and international level and too little
means to extract fair support and compensation for their work."' 2 8 6 It must be
281 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 51, at 4; see also Courtney Love, Courtne Love
Does the Math, SALON.COM, at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love (June
14, 2000) (detailing in numbers the disparity between record label and artist profits).
282 At the center of the debate lay the question of whether artists should receive a
licensing payment or a royalty fee for such services. When their works are licensed, e.g.,
for use in movies, artist split 50% of the profits with the label, after deductions for the
producer and publisher. Straus, supra note 279, at Al. While the services licensed the
artists' music, the arrangements called for a royalty fee. On a royalty measure, the artists
receive 15% instead, with deductions for CD production and promotional copies, which are
clearly not applicable to the online distribution of their works. See id.
283 See id.
284 As Straus notes, "To try to avoid future protests, most major labels have added a

clause to their standard recording contracts allowing the label to sell an act's songs on the
Internet, including all subscription and pay-per-use services. It is very difficult.., for a new
band to have enough leverage to remove this clause from its contract." Id.
285 For information about the organization's activities and personnel, See Future of Music
Coalition, at www.futureofmusic.org (last visited May 31, 2002). The FMC has developed
an ambitious and aggressive agenda to raise public consciousness and educate legislators on
Capitol Hill about the stranglehold that the major labels have on many artists. See id.
286
Future
of
Music
Coalition,
Future
of
Music
Manifesto,
at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/manifesto/index.html (Feb. 12, 2002).
Artists such as
Courtney Love have taken a role in increased advocacy for artists' interests, urging artists to
resist unfair contract provisions and Seek proper royalty payments. See Johnny Temple &
Courtney Love, Toward a Union Label, THE NATION, Apr. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010423&s=love (last visited May 31, 2002); see
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noted that in the era of physical music distribution, "roughly 80 percent of
albums . •287 fail[ed] to cover" the costs invested in them by recording
companies.
Given that ratio, if labels were forced to give up more profits
and control to the artists they backed, investors may have chosen not to
promote music at all. Yet, given the capacity for new communications
technologies to alter the calculus of the old regime, artists should at least get a
chance to voice their concerns in policymaking circles, so as to be permitted to
shape their own creative future.
3. Benefits and Losses
In general, artists, like users, will increasingly be affected by what has been
referred to as the digital dilemma: namely, that the new information
infrastructure promises more "quantity, quality, and access [to intellectual
property] while imperiling one means of rewarding those who create and
publish [it]." 288 While consumers clearly benefit from the growth of online
musical content, the creators of music also stand to benefit by reaching a
greater number of listeners. Specifically, technology promises to open new
modes of distribution, empowering artists by unsettling the status quo of the
concentrated five-label market. 28
As outlined in the Future of Music
Coalition Manifesto, the development of digital music technologies may grant
artists greater decision-making power and ability to manage their own
careers.
In particular, it may open options beyond the polarized
decision of
291
signing on•• to (and•292
thus indebting oneself to) a major label and languishing
in obscurity at an independent label. Consolidation between content owners
also Chuck Philips, Recording Stars Challenge Music Labels' Business Practices, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at Al (describing artists the increasing efforts to galvanize artists
collectively in support of royalties and contract rights).
287 CAVEs, supra note 270, at 61.
288 DIGITAL DILEMMA REPORT, supra note 82, at 2 (describing how the shift in
information distribution technologies, while a boon for users and creators alike, is a doubleedged sword).
289
Future
of Music
Coalition,
Future
of Music
Manifesto,
at
http:llwww.futureofmusic.orglmanifesto/index.html (Feb. 12, 2002). The Manifesto states
that:
In a marketplace where manufacturing and distribution monopolies concentrate the
power of over 90% of music sold into the hands of five labels, with huge media
mergers continuing to consolidate the decisions of what to play and promote, it
becomes more and more difficult for artists to gain exposure through the few remaining
coveted radio spots.

Id.290
291

See id.

It is common knowledge that the labels' industry-standard contract requires artists to

underwrite their own recordings, videos, advertising, marketing, promotion and tour support
before they are paid royalties. See Philips, supra note 286, at Al.
292
See Julene Snyder, Musicians FindNet Success Without Record Labels, CNN.cOM, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001[TECH/intemet/05/10/music.net.success.idg/index.html (May 10,
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and distributors should not stifle fresh intermediaries that give artists and their
fans more options. By encouraging a wide range of distribution networks,
artists and labels can promote works in innovative ways while displacing
technologies that utilize their content without paying royalties.
4. Just Compensation for Artists
In the early discussion of digital intellectual property, many commentators
argued that artists should not bemoan their loss of royalty payments, as they
would benefit online exposure and would derive profit via performances and
through as-yet uncovered ways. 293 Meanwhile, techno-anarchists look past the
"problem" of providing economic incentives for creative endeavors, and would
be content to have users compensate whomever with however much they
desired. 294 These impulses are yet alive. A recent proposal for an Open
Audience License by the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") builds on
these notions of reciprocity and good will, by allowing artists to use the "open
copyright symbol" - "(0)" - to grant the public permission to copy, distribute,
adapt, and publicly perform their works royalty-free as long as credit is given
to the creator as the original author. 295 The proposal represents a promising
means for lesser-known artists to retain the capacity to use new technologies to
encourage wide dispersion of their work, so as to gain exposure and develop an
audience base.
While it is worth retaining such options of open use for artists, such
approaches will be viable only if they coexist with opportunities for genuine
compensation. Inherent in new technologies is the capacity for all artists to
benefit directly from the enjoyment of their works. Once the bounds of fair
use are set, it should be possible to trace usage and directly provide
compensation to artists, perhaps in the form of micropayments. Closed
networks of content, such as trusted systems,2 96 offer the possibility for
tracked usage and specified compensation. A likely scenario is a three-tiered

2001 ) (discussing the success of former major label artists Jonatha Brooke and Aimee Mann
in signing to independent labels and promoting and selling albums on their own websites among other advantages, as Mann notes, "On a major, you might make 50 cents a record and you have to pay back the costs to make that record. As an indie, you make S8 a
record.").
293 See Barlow, supra note 275.
294 See Moglen, supra note 173 ("[Mjusic doesn't sound worse when distributed for free,
pay what you want directly to the artist, and don't pay anything if you don't want to. Give it
to your friends; they might like it.").
295 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Open Audio License, at http://www.eff.org
IP/Openjlicenses (last visited May 31, 2002).
296

See

LAWRENCE LESSIG,

CODE: AND

OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE

129 (1999)

(discussing trusted systems as a controlled method of distributing and guarding digital
intellectual property); See generally Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997, at
78-81, as cited by Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation Of hformation
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 568 (1998).
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regime of content: a closed system of tracked usage, a public domain of
untracked usage, and an underground of illicit content. The more perfect
control and compensation made possible within closed networks may
compensate for those losses that arise from illicit usage. In competitive
marketplace, new agencies and intermediaries will arise to fill the role of
tracking and rewarding for such top-tiered use.
E.

To Limit Technologies of Controlin the PublicInterest
The foregoing discussion argues that copyright owners in the digital era
should be guaranteed neither as secure a distribution right as was vindicated in
Napster, nor the technological latitude permitted by the DMCA. That is, new
substantive policies are necessitated by shifts in the nature and possibilities of
use, before the currents of an ever-widening copyright swallow even fair use.
The delicate ecology of the Internet does not mesh well with perfect control.
At the same time, copyri'ht
law has never secured absolute and exclusive
2 7
rights for content-owners.
Copyright law should protect a distribution right only insofar as it provides
incentives for the creation of works. When the distribution right is defended at
the cost of competing purposes, threatening legitimate access and circulation of
works, careful balances must be struck. As demonstrated above, technological
limits on the scope of distribution online could be truly absolute and thus allow
for a substantial risk of copyright misuse. The next section introduces our
vision, through institutional analysis, for countering the hazards of perfect
control.
Ill. CREATING POLICY TO PROMOTE FAIR COMITETITION AND
FAIR USE
A.

Introduction
Part I of this Paper set out the history and context of disputes over the digital
distribution of music. Part II described the principles that should govern the
resolution of these disputes. We have raised two broad areas of concern:
The scope of personal and private use: Content owners may eviscerate
traditional rights of fair use through increasingly sophisticated digital rights
management techniques. The law should aim to preserve the type of personal
andfair uses that have historically been protected by law.
The nature of commercial and public distribution: Consumers and artists
worry that the key players in an already concentrated industry will leverage
their ownership of content into control of new channels of distribution. The
law should promote fair competition via robust and diverse distribution

297 See Brad King, Copyright: Your Right or Theirs?, WIRED NEWS,
http://www.wired.com/news/print/ 0,1294,41199,00.html (Jan. 19, 2001).

at
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channels. This would require access to content for distributors of digital
content other than the copyright owners themselves.
Collective action will be required to achieve these goals. Present antitrust
inquiries are a good first step toward their realization, but proposing
-'98
appropriate regulation is no easy task.'
As we noted in Part I, the
technology, the relevant markets, and copyright law are all in flux. Given this
uncertainty, it is not useful to set out a fixed set of recommendations
purporting to settle copyright controversies in the digital arena.
Policymakers can respond to this situation in many ways. Governmentcommissioned studies, such as the Digital Dilemma Report, have endorsed
incrementalism - marginal reform and continued study. Superficially prudent,
their approach would fail to preserve fair use and promote fair competition.
Our approach is more ambitious. In the last Part of this article we set forth
broad substantive principles; we now seek to narrow and formalize these in the
form of a proposed consent decree. We conclude the article by identifying
those institutions best able to apply the recommended policies.
Part I set out the broad substantive principles that should guide
governmental monitoring of online music distribution. In Part III, we detail a
range of policies and reforms available to preserve fair use and promote fair
competition. Our aim is to assess these policies along two equally important
axes: comprehensiveness and plausibility. This is a useful way to order
potential responses to the issues we address. The most comprehensive
proposals - those that most adequately address the concerns raised in Parts I
and II - are also the least plausible from an institutional point of view. The
most plausible proposals only marginally advance fair competition and fair
use. Unfortunately, popular proposals in this area have tended to gravitate
toward one of these two extremes. Liberal activists and scholars, pointing out
the dangers in the current regime, have proposed comprehensive legislative reordering. Despite the compelling logic behind many such approaches, they are
not plausible given the current state of the law and institutions. On the other
hand, industry leaders (and some conservative scholars) rearrange deckchairs
on the sinking ship of conventional copyright law, suggesting reforms
ultimately unlikely to guarantee fair use, fair competition, and robust markets
in intellectual property.
This article aims to move the debate beyond discussions of impossible
revolution and trivial reform. The impossibility of achieving comprehensive
change in the law, along with the irrelevance of continued judicial tinkering,
have led us to try to balance plausibility and comprehensiveness. We have
settled on four minimum advances of copyright policy based on the five
fundamental principles discussed in Part II. In order (A) to enable diverse
business practices and wide availability of content, we endorse the present
antitrust investigation into the business practices of the record labels. In order
(B) to maximize the development of new technologies for distribution and use,

298

See Richtel, supra note 1, at C2.
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we call for a temporary moratorium on infringement lawsuits against virtual
private networks of less than ten members (essentially permitting groups of
this size to form on-line record clubs designed to pool resources to purchase a
common library of works). In order (C) to preserve space for individual use
and (D) to ensure the welfare and interests of all stakeholders, we call for
disclosure of and limits on DRM techniques and, in particular, a strict limits on
DRM techniques that infringe on personal privacy. Finally, in order (E) to
tailor distribution rights in the public interest and to limit technologies of
control, we call for public
2 99 interest representation on industry-dominated DRM
standard-setting bodies.
After describing these proposals in some detail, we consider how they
might be implemented. There is more than one way that these proposals could
be put into practice: They could be enacted via legislation or made a matter of
administrative regulation. We propose their concrete legal instantiation in a
consent order between the relevant companies and U.S. antitrust authorities.
We propose relying on institutions, such as the FTC and DOJ, that presently do
not have a large role in copyright policy. We believe that an exclusive focus
on traditional copyright law occludes broader debate on copyright policy,
blinding commentators to creative institutional options. Not copyright law, but
traditional hedges on the market power it confers - such as antitrust and
consumer protection regulation - offer possibilities for assuring fair
competition and fair use in the digital age. Since the recording industry needs
antitrust clearance to assure rapid deal-making for online distribution, antitrust
authorities have a unique opportuniy 0 to leverage industry concessions
designed to domesticate perfect control.
We recognize that others may disagree with one or more of the specific
proposals we advance or may criticize the means we suggest. The analysis in
this part should, nevertheless, provide some framework for thinking about the
state of the debate and, we hope, provoke others to think in terms of both
plausibility and comprehensiveness, as well as in terms of the relevant
institutions through which proposed reforms can be achieved. We also hope to

encourage copyright scholars to recognize the importance of doctrines (like
antitrust) that limit the power of copyright owners. In short, rejection of part
of the following analysis does not necessarily mean rejection of the whole.

299 Of course, this matching of goals to rules is somewhat artificial; anything that
promotes fair competition usually promotes fair use, and vice versa. But the matching helps
us understand the most important problem to which any particular proposed rule responds.
300 This is not to deny the continued role of institutions already involved in copyright
law; we do, however, suggest that we also need to look further afield. In particular, for
example, we would expect the Register of Copyrights to continue to fulfill a minor role in
making adjustments to the DMCA for exceptions to anti-circumvention provisions in
particularly egregious cases. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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Fair Competition and Fair Use: The Two Central Challengesfor
CopyrightPolicy in the DigitalAge

The rise of digital media in a networked environment creates two problems
for copyright policy: (1) encouraging diversity and competition in commercial,
public distribution of copyrighted content online and (2) maintaining fair use
and a robust public domain.
We need new rules and new rule-generating
mechanisms (institutions) 30 2 in order to solve problems that arise in (1) the
commercial and public sphere, and (2) the noncommercial and private sphere.
Commercial distribution occurs when copyrighted content (such as music) is
sold for profit. Such distribution now typically occurs on a large scale from
one source, such as a record company, to many consumers, usually by way of
some intermediary, such as a retail distributor of music. On the other hand,
noncommercial distribution typically occurs when the owner of an instantiation
of copyrighted content, such as a CD, shares the product, permitting one or
more persons to copy it for free. For example, she might lend the CD to a
friend, or make it available on her hard drive to members of a network. These
cases display core examples of the commercial/noncommercial distinction.
While fair use exceptions to copyright presently cover a patchwork of rights
accorded to consumers, librarians, and educators, some commentators would
simplify this regime by focusing copyright restrictions on commercial uses.303
Before digital distribution, such a focus would likely have guaranteed
copyright owners nearly all the protection they could reasonably expect.
However, P2P networks give nearly every individual with a large hard drive
(not just profit-seeking pirates) the opportunity to distribute a great amount of
material to a great number of persons. Therefore, copyright owners are not
only legitimately concerned by unauthorized commercial distribution, but also
30 4
by unauthorized public distribution-i.e., distribution to many people.
Users of Napster did not pay for the music that they procured from other
participants. Their use could be seen as public, however, in that it was a mass
distribution of content. In contrast, private
• 305distribution occurs only in smaller
networks among more intimate associates.
301

See discussion supra Part II.A.

302 See JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 4 (1992) (defining

institutions as rule-generating mechanisms).
303 See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 74, at 180-86 (arguing
for a simple
commercial/noncommercial distinction to replace present complex exceptions).
304 Thanks to Ernie Miller for pointing out this distinction. As the No Electronic Theft
Act indicates, copyright stakeholders are as interested in stopping non-commercial online
distributions of content as they are in stopping distributions that are commercial. See The
No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
305 The public/private distinction is notoriously amorphous; however, the distinction
between intimate associates and people "brought together" via some "public" or commercial
link has long been used in copyright law. Section 101 of the Copyright statute, for example,
in defining "public performance," refers to "unrelated" people. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see
also Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
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We therefore believe that public and commercial distribution of music has

quite distinct implications for the copyright policy than its private and
noncommercial use. Within the realm of public/commercial distribution, it is
necessary to ensure that diverse sources of music in cyberspace mirror the
array of wholesalers, retailers, broadcasters, and record clubs presently enjoyed
by consumers in real space. Extensive DRM may be a necessary prerequisite
for content owners to feel comfortable in licensing music to such a diversity of
sources.
However, DRM should not so dominate the sphere of
noncommercial/private use that it eliminates traditional fair30use,
6 eviscerates the
public domain, or needlessly compromises interoperability.
C. The Remedy Continuum: Balancing Comprehensivenessand Plausibility
Potential remedies not only arise in these two areas (public/commercial and
private/non-commercial), but also scale an axis between the most
comprehensive and least comprehensive solutions. Moreover, the more
comprehensive the solution, the less institutionally plausible it is at present.
Less comprehensive remedies are more readily applicable, but may end up
failing to address our most important concerns. The following chart maps out
the main policy options in descending order of comprehensiveness and
ascending order of plausibility. The particular options referred to in the table
are discussed in further detail below.

306

See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the

DigitallyNetworked Environment, I1

HARV.

J.L. & TECH. 287, 365 (1998).
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The Continuum of Remedies:
Balancing Plausibility and Comprehensiveness
Commercial/
Public

Noncommercia/
Private Sphere

Distribution

Most

Comprehensive,
Least plausible

Least
Comprehensive,
Most plausible

1) Comprehensive shift in
property rights
via legislation
2) Promotion
of fair competition and fair
use via
regulation
authorized
under existing
legal framework
3) Reactive and
incremental
development
via court-based
doctrine and
market models

Compulsory
licensing
scheme
Antitrust and
fair competition
enforcement
actions

Market development of music
industry online
distribution
models and
licensing
agreements

Legal mandate
of fair use
standards into
code
Consumer
protection via
fair competition
regulation

Development of
anti-circumvention doctrine: in
particular,
development of
further
exceptions via
judicial interpretation, legislation or administrative
intervention

It is our goal to strike a proper balance between comprehensiveness and
plausibility. We will now consider the most and least comprehensive solutions
on this chart. Although we ultimately reject these options, it is important to
understand why they will not work in order to demonstrate the promise of our
own proposal.
D. Comprehensive ReorderingofProperty Rights: The Most Comprehensive
and Least PlausibleSohtion
Radical reordering of property rights via legislation would result in the most
comprehensive approach to ensuring both fair use and fair competition in
digital music distribution. Just as it did in 1976 to advance cable
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retransmission of broadcasts, 307 Congress could impose a compulsory
licensing scheme designed to advance commercial distribution. To preserve
fair use and promote interoperability, Congress also could, through statute,
limit the types of protective measures used as DRM. As the following sections
demonstrate, a number of respected academics and business •interests
have
. 308
advocated both compulsory licensing and code-based restrictions,
but the
current matrix of copyright policy-making institutions almost certainly dooms

such comprehensive public ordering.3 °9
1.

Comprehensive Reordering in the Public/Commercial Realm: The
Compulsory Licensing Alternative

Compulsory licensing represents a highly regulatory, comprehensive
approach to promoting fair competition and access to content in the
public/commercial realm.
Governments have previously resorted to
compulsory licensing where (a) new distribution media or technologies are
introduced, (b) transaction costs are very high owing to the large number of
licensors, and (c) where potential
.310 licensees need to obtain licenses from most

or all of them to be effective.
Compulsory licensing is also a preferred
option when dominant players threaten to exercise market power anticompetitively. 3 11 Digital music distribution, including P2P networks, clearly
falls within these parameters: There are complicated copyright rights involved,
owned by a large number of different entities, and access to a vast array of
307
308

17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2000).
See infra Parts III.D.1, 2.

3

9 See infra Part III.D.3.
310 Examples include the compulsory licensing of

"mechanical reproductions" of

musical works (allowing anyone to record a cover of a song once it has been recorded once),
17 U.S.C. § 115; licenses for the retransmission of broadcast works over cable and satellite,
17 U.S.C. § 111 (c); compulsory licensing of music for use in jukeboxes, 17 U.S.C. § 116;
and compulsory licensing for non-interactive services of the digital performance right in
sound recordings, 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).
311 The compulsory license for mechanical reproductions, originally introduced to cover
piano rolls, was introduced in part to reduce the power of the Aeolian Company. For the
history behind the introduction of the compulsory license as a Congressional response to
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that piano rolls
were not ingringing), See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 67 (Hill & Wang 1995);
see also Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 77, at 1623-24, 1627 (discussing the
court decisions considering cable transmission was not a "performance", and introduction
by Congress of a compulsory license in 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)). For a comparison of the
English situation and policy discussion, See generally THOMAS GALLAGHER, COPYRIGHT
COMPULSORY LICENSING AND INCENTIVES (OXFORD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WORKING

PAPER SERIES No. 2, May 2001), available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0201.html
(last visitied May 31, 2002); see also Jane Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1926 (1990)
("[T]he real purpose of a compulsory license is to reduce the extent to which copyright
ownership of the covered work conveys monopoly power.").
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music is required, as no one wants a system in which they can only get a very
limited selection of music. 3 12 Napster (at least before it tried to be acquired
by Bertelsmann) argued for such a scheme, as have other stakeholders such as
3 14
MP3.com. 3 13 Under a compulsory licensing scheme, all copyright owners
would be required by law to license their content on a non-discriminatory
basis, at a regulated
Z
distributor who met certain
313 to any potential digital
S rate,

baseline requirements.
This would effectively replace3 1groperty rules,
historically the baseline for copyright law, with liability rules. P
Compulsory licensing schemes are heavily regulated. In the context of
online distribution, prospective licensees would submit applications to a
government agency designed to assess their technical competency and security.
Compensation to the copyright owner could be determined according to (a) a

pre-determined, general schedule (as they are presently for broadcast
performances of musical works) or (b) ex post facto in some adjudicatory
process via a "safe harbor" approach permitting distributors to "distribute now,
pay later." By breaking the nexus between the copyright owners' rights to
payment and their control over the terms on which distribution occurs,
compulsory licensing would ensure compensation to copyright owners without
ceding them absolute control over works.
A compulsory licensing scheme could advance online music distribution in
many ways. It could reduce the transaction costs of licensing,3 17 and include
The real value of a Napster system was, in part, access to any and every work under
the sun; such a system loses a significant part of its value if confined to a finite list of works.
See generally Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Hearing on Online Entertainment and Copyright Law, 106 Cong. (2001)
(statement of Hank Barry, Interim CEO, Napster, and Consumers Union); Yen, supra note
132.
313 See generally Online Entertainment: Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You:
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Hank Barry,
Interim Napster CEO) , available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=198 (last
visited May 31, 2002); Lawrence Lessig, Just Compensation, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD,
Apr. 21, 2001, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,23401,00.html (last
visited May 31, 2002) (implicitly advocating some form of compulsory licensing scheme).
314 Including both owners of the copyright in the musical work and owners of copyright
in the sound recording.
315 Prior conditions might include, for example, the level of digital rights management to
be applied to the content, and/or perhaps basic quality requirements. This would need to be
set by regulation.
316 We refer to the schema introduced by Calabresi and Melamed distinguishing between
different rules for the enforcement of entitlements. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARv L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (distinguishing between property rules that protect
entitlements (where the entitlement can only be interfered with or taken with the consent of
the owner or after paying the owner's price) and liability rules (where anyone can take or
interfere with the entitlement provided they pay some price determined by a third party)).
312

317 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of tire Anticonnons: Property in the
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direct payments to artists. 3 18 A wide variety of different distributors and
models might take advantage of compulsory licensing-particularly if the
licensing authority promotes varying models of distribution. 3 19 Compulsory
licensing would promote further innovations in business models and
distribution technologies by assuring that they do not fall under the control of
the owners of copyright
through the effective
power of veto that property rules
• "21
..
currently provide.
Provided that licensees could provide music files in
different formats, compulsory licensing may also promote fair use. Finally, as
Ayres and Talley have pointed out, forcing copyright owners to bargain under
the shadow of a liability rule could promote more efficient bargaining.32 '
Of course, these are all hvoothetical gains and must be balanced against
potential drawbacks. Critics 22 offer a litany of concerns about compulsory
licensing: It interferes with the market; takes away property rights; reduces
incentives for production and innovation; reduces incentives for copyright
owners to form their own collective licensing bodies to license works;
encourages inefficient rent-seeking behavior by parties seeking to ensure
favorable terms; imposes excessive levels of bureaucracy and can increase
costs through lengthy fee determination proceedings. 3 A compulsory
licensing regime may also conflict with the obligations of the United States
under the TRIPS agreement. 324 It is beyond the scope of this article to
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621, 622 (1998) (discussing these
costs by arguing that too many rights of exclusion can lead to under exploitation of a scarce
resource).
318 See The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 36 (1995) (requiring a direct share to artists to be collected by the

Collective Rights Organization of the recording industry, SoundExchange, controlled by
RIAA).
319 See Saxe, supra note 55.
320 See Lessig, supra note 313, at 8 ("Dinosaurs should die. A truly free market would
let them die, and Congress could help this evolution along by passing laws to make sure

artists get paid without delivering the Internet into the hands of the labels. Compensation, in
other words, without control."). But See Ginsburg, Copyrightand Control,supranote 77, at
1645 (observing (with approval) that Congress has accorded copyright owners control over
new technologies of dissemination when such control appeared to advance wide
dissemination of content). As Bertelsmann negotiates to buy Napster, it appears that the
dynamic identified by Ginsburg is already occurring in the online environment.
321 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Soloionic Bargaining:Dividing a LegalEntitlement To
FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1092-94 (1995) (arguing that liability rules
endow each party with a partial claim, reducing incentives to behave strategically during
bargaining, and thus promoting more efficient bargaining).
322 See generally Robert Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996) [hereinafter

Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules].
32 See, e.g., Copyrighted Webcast Programming on the Internet: H.R. Subcomm. on
Courts. & Intell. Prop., 106th Cong. 50-55 (2000).
324

See generally Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and
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consider these arguments in detail. Insofar as they assume that the market will
do better, or that there will be less rent-seeking in compulsory licensing than
there already is in regard to the delineation of property rights, these
assumptions are debatable given the arguments
in Part I above, and the history
3 25
of copyright revision in the United States.
There are, however, more novel objections to compulsory licensing in this
particular context. First, the parties to whom licenses would be granted would
vary in nature far more than is the case with present schemes - which tend to
regulate more homogenous industries. 326 If we envisage the distribution of
music on a spectrum ranging from a pure broadcast model (which does not
enable retention of high quality copies) to a pure copy distribution model (for
example, the sale of CDs where individuals buy not only the CD, but its
packaging and status as a "fetish object") a system allowing the downloading
of files (that can be copied) or the streaming of files (that cannot be copied)
falls somewhere in between. 327 Further, in the case of broadcasting or
retransmission, the copyrighted work is being used by the licensee in a single,
predictable way. In the case of digital downloads of files, particularly as DRM
technology becomes more sophisticated, it will be possible to provide
copyright works in many different forms: for example, for single playback; or
playback but no copying; or in a form that "expires" after a given date.
Moreover, there are a number of different secure formats for music files.
Thus, unlike broadcast models, the terms on which copies are to be provided to
individuals could vary enormously, and would need to be fixed ex ante.
compulsory
These factors considerably complicate any proosal
329 poa for cmusr
an
328
licensing.
The difficulties of collective valuation 3 would be increased by
Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REv. 93, 151-156
(2000); Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INTL. L. 441, 456-463 (1997) (arguing that TRIPS

more narrowly circumscribes the kind of public policy limits that may be imposed on
intellectual property rights, including protection of copyright); World Trade Organization,
United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R,
June 15, 2000 (concluding that subparagraph (B) of section 110(5) of the Copyright Act of
1995 does not meet the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, indicating a strict view of
copyright exceptions.).
325 See LITMAN, supra note 74, at ch. 3 (discussing the 1909, 1976, 1998, and other
revisions to the copyright law).
326 This is perhaps not true of the mechanical reproduction compulsory license, but that is
a special case, involving "one-off' recordings of existing songs, rather than ongoing
licensing relationships like that involved in, say, cable re-transmission or webcasting.
327 See Rob Walker, Paperback Music, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2001, at 17
(arguing for a two-tier market for music like that prevailing in books, with a much larger
role for used music sellers); but See Ken Lovem, Evaluating Resale Royalties for Used
CD's, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 113, 113 (stating that the market for used CDs is growing)
(1994). See generally THORSTErN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 52-76, 112
(1934) (discussing fetish-objects, conspicuous consumption and valuation).
328

See Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 77, at 1643 n. 131 (pointing out the

2002]

USING ANTITRUSTLA IVTO ADVANCEAND ENHANCE ONLINE Music DISTRIBUTION

527

the need to determine not only the price, but also the "product"--i.e., what
rights individuals would be granted to use, copy, and transfer the file and what
form of DRM would be permitted or required. This is obviously a far more
sizeable interference with copyright owners' rights than previous compulsory
licensing regimes, and a significantly more difficult determination. The chief
advantage of compulsory licensing - enabling the rapid development of new
business models and technologies and reducing transaction costs - would very
likely evaporate in the midst of interminable controversy.
2.

Comprehensive Reordering in the Private/Non-commercial Realm:
Mandated Code-Based Fair Use
In the area of private/non-commercial use of digital music, one legislative
proposal raised by Pamela Samuelson and by the DigitalDilemma Repor?3 is
that § 1201 of the Copyight Act should permit "fair breach" of anticircumvention technology. 33 1 Such permission would depend on a "legitimate
purposes" exemption to the anti-circumvention rules, which courts would
flexibly interpret in order to reach just results. 332 To be effective, such an
exception would need to extend not only to the "access" provisions but also the
"device" provisions of the DMCA, so that technologically unsophisticated
would-be fair users could employ others to circumvent protection measures for
them. 333 Such a provision would not be a radical departure from established
copyright law; so far Congress has delegated to courts the power to determine
the contours of fair use via case-by-case balancing that takes into account the
interests of both the copyright owner and the user of copyright works.
Congressional intervention here is unlikely, however, since the DMCA itself
was so solicitous of content owners' interests, and the main players responsible
for its adoption are still at the helm of the relevant committees.
A more radical proposal in the area of private/non-commercial use comes
from Professors Dan Burk and Julie Cohen, who propose a two-tier system for

intractability of the pricing problem).
329

See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U.

DAYTON

L. RPv. 547, 584 (1997) (proposing network transmissions subject to a negotiated

or compulsory license); Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note, at 1307-1308

(discussing collective valuation).
330 DIGITAL DILEMMA REPORT, supra note 82, at 221-24 (discussing DMCA and noting
views of some members that circumvention should be allowed for "other legitimate
purposes").
331 See Samuelson, supra note 119; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
332
See Samuelson, supra note 119.
333 At present, the exceptions do not extend to the device provisions, and even exceptions
allowed by the Library of Congress are similarly limited to the access provisions. See 17
U.S.C. §1201 (a)(1)(C). For the effect of this limitation, See generally, David Nimmer, A
Riff on FairUse in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. Rv. 673, 727-37
(2000) (analyzing the exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 1201).
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protecting fair use in a DRM environment. 3 34 They propose, as a first tier, a
mandated level of flexibility built into all DRM, reflecting an agreed minimum
of fair use, to be implemented by making copyright protection or anticircumvention
provisions
• 3.,5
.. unenforceable for works in which no such flexibility

was provided.
Since this would not cover all possible fair uses, they also
propose a second tier whereby a "trusted third party," probably a public body
like the Library of Congress, would hold decryption keys, to be given out on
application by prospective "fair users" - without the Library
.. 336of Congress
making any determination as to the legitimacy of the application.
There are a number of minor problems with the Burk and Cohen proposal.
It seems less suited to music distribution perhaps than other areas of content
because it is difficult to imagine any "agreed minimum" of fair use that could
be mandated and consistently applied. 33 What would be the size of the
extract that should be allowed as a minimum, where even quotation of a very
small amount of music ray not be fair use if it happens to be a composition's
most distinctive phrase? 3 Can copyright owners be expected to agree to a
minimum number of copies to be allowed as fair use when it is quite possible

334 See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 65-66 (2001).
335 See id. While Burk and Cohen do not specify what such a minimum might be, one
way to fill it in would be to use Professors Lessig's and Benkler's suggestion of a system
that allowed first generation, but not second generation, copying - suggested in the context
of "less restrictive means" analysis and reflecting the system that does apply under the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 for digital audio tapes. See Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellant, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Jan. 26, 2001, availableat
http://vww.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVDcases/20010126_ny-2profsamicus.html
(last
visited May 31, 2002).
336 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 334, at 63, 65-66 (suggesting that the trusted third party
would not make a determination about the bona fides of the access application and
discussing the "mixed" infrastructure proposed).
337 For example, many of the most valuable fair uses of music do not require access to or
copying of perfect copies. The parodist does not require a perfect copy in order to create a
parody. Of course, this assumes access to copying technology which is not digital. We
have already noted that fair use is an evolving concept. Should analogue be phased out and
no public access to works be available, then these issues would need to be thought through
again. This simply points to the very real need for a body other than Congress with ongoing
supervisory power.
338 See, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (admonishing at the digital sampling case's outset that "thou shall not
steal"); Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (1976)
(holding that George Harrison had plagiarized the Chiffons' song "He's So Fine" with his
composition "My Sweet Lord"), aff'd sub nora. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs, Ltd.,
722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd. v. Paramount Film
Serv. Ltd. [1934] Ch. 593 (English authority, holding that 20 seconds of a song was
sufficiently "substantial" to be copyright since anyone would recognize the excerpt).
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3 39
that some business models will be built on subscriptions or micropayments
with which this kind of copying might interfere? If music is supplied initially
in digital form, even allowing all first generation copies but not second
generation copies, as with a serial copy management system similar to that
required under AHRA, free riders would be able to evade the payments that
incentivize collective licensing. 340 There are more fundamental problems,
however, with the proposed reliance on statute.

3.

The hnplausibilityof Radical Public Reordering of Copyright Policy:

Copyright Capture of the Legislature
In theory, both compulsory licensing and statutory limits to DRM might
advance online music distribution. However, it is difficult to imagine them put
into practice. Such comprehensive reordering of property rights would depend
on legislative action-and we doubt such action could occur in the United
States. Although some analysts have praised legislatures as a forum for open
34 1 past
debate among a broad range of interests,
revisions to copyright law
342
have not been models of transparency.
This should not be surprising: Copyright legislation presents a classic public
choice conundrum. The considerable benefits to be reaped from expanding
copyright rights accrue, in general, to a concentrated group of large, wellfinanced and well-organized entities. The costs of any rent-seeking by such
interests are diffuse but mainly affect three groups: existing intermediaries,
developers of as-yet-undeveloped technologies, and the content-consuming
public.3 43 These three groups are substantially more diverse and dispersed
339 See Teresa N. Kerr, Bowie Bonding in the Music Biz:

Will Music Royalty
Securitization be the Key to the Gold for Music Industry Participants?,7 UCLA ENT. L.

REv. 367 (2000) (explaining how uncertainty over the bundle of rights protected under
copyright laws may undermine complex, Pareto-optimal transactions in the music industry).
340 Of course, arguably a broader criticism of the Burk and Cohen proposal is that these
same issues arise not just in the case of musical works, but others such as films and literary
works. The focus of the present analysis, however, is musical works.
341 See NEIL

K.

KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53-58 (University of Chicago Press 1994).
342 See, e.g., LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, at 23; Jessica Litman,

Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989)
[hereinafter Litman, Copyright Legislation].
343 James Q. Wilson's famous typology classifies four types of legislation: (1) legislation
with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, (2) legislation with concentrated benefits and
concentrated costs, (3) legislation with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs, and (4)
legislation with diffuse benefits and diffuse costs. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 366-67 (Basic Books 1980). The first category often includes economically
inefficient legislation because rent-seeking lobbyists can get benefits without drawing
scrutiny from those from whom they are ultimately taking the benefit. See id. Copyright
legislation usually falls into this region of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs since
content owners gain a great deal from it and consumers are largely unorganized. See infra
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than the concentrated recording industry and are thus unlikely to be effectively
represented in any bargaining over legislative amendments; inventors of asyet-undeveloped technologies by definition are not at the bargaining table. On
the other hand, copyright law has become a highly technical subject, so
legislators tend to look with favor on delegating the drafting of legislation 44
to
interested parties, rendering the law even more technical and specialized.3
Jessica Litman has revealed the drawbacks of this lawmaking process in her
studies of copyright revisions of the twentieth century:
About one hundred years ago, Congress got into the habit of revising
copyright law by encouraging representatives of the industries affected by
copyright to hash out among themselves what changes needed to be made
and then present Congress with the text of appropriate legislation. By the
1920s, the process was sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member
of Congress came up with a legislative proposal without going through
the cumbersome prelegislative process of multiparty negotiation, the
affected industries united to block the bill. Copyright bills passed only
after private stakeholders agreed with one another
on their substantive
345
provisions. The pattern has continued to this day.
Though other groups, such as the home-recording industry, librarians, and
educators, have attempted to exert their own influence, revisions to the
copyright laws have by and large favored the content industries. As Litman
further explains, even with the involvement of some opposing public interests:
There is no overarching vision of the public interest animating the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. None. Instead, what we have is what a variety
of different parties were able to extract from each other in the course of
an
incredibly
complicated
four-year
multiparty
negotiation.
Unsurprisingly, they paid for that with a lot of rent-seeking
at
the expense
346
of new upstart industries and the public at large.
In this context, a fundamental problem with both the Burk and Cohen
proposal, and the idea of compulsory licensing, is that it is unrealistic to
imagine that the required legislative amendments could be passed by Congress.
Because copyright law traditionally has been, and presently still is, essentially
a legislative schema, and given the centrality of the legislature in the
formulation of American public policy, Congress would be extensively
notes 342-346 and accompanying text.
344 See Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, at 277 (discussing how this
delegation to interested parties renders the law more technical and specialized given the
number of narrow exemptions that are exchanged as part of negotiated deals).
345 LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, at 23; see also Litman, Copyright
Legislation, supra note 342, at 277 (noting that "copyright legislation in this century has
evolved from meetings among industry representatives"); William F. Patry, Copyright and
the Legislative Process: A PersonalPerspective, 14 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 140142 (1996).
346 LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, at 144-45.
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involved in any comprehensive policy shift. While reformers call for limiting
property rights, Congress has expanded them throughout the 1990s. Its record
should give one pause about enhancing the Congressional role in copyright
policymaking.
Additionally, while compulsory licensing requires a continuing body to
resolve issues of valuation and the kind of rights to be attached to the work,
Congress
- 347 has neither the time nor the attention to continually monitor these
3448
Fair use, as Burk and Cohen acknowledge, is an evolving notion.
issues.
The doctrine is likely to fare poorly if set in legislative stone-particularly in
this area, in which it largely consists of code flexibility. Of course, legislative
hearings (backed by threat of legislation) can be effective-the April 3, 2001
Congressional hearings appeared to spur the recording industry toward putting
music online.3 49 However, this kind of supervision on an ad hoc basis would
be inadequate for the task at hand. Determining which uses or distributions
should be allowed and protected will require particularized fact-intensive
inquiry and strong institutional memory. In summary, Congress is ill-suited to
monitor the recording industry, and its role in any rule-making capacity should
be limited, if necessary, to a broad delegation of authority to another institution
accompanied by whatever ad hoc supervision is appropriate in light of
changing circumstances.
E.

Promotionof FairCompetition and FairUse Within Existing Legal

Frameworks:Is The Least Comprehensive and Most PlausibleSolution
Enough?
At the other end of the "plausibility/comprehensiveness" axis are
incremental approaches endorsing only minimal intervention from government
authorities. Despite the ominous trends described in Parts I and II of this
article, many respected commentators argue that market forces should be
allowed to play out within a framework of reactive incremental
development.
If comprehensive solutions are not realistic, is it better to rely
solely on incremental development? Our answer is: yes and no. With respect
to ensuring the growth of public/commercial distribution, and competition in
such distribution, we endorse incrementalism. Investigation, not active
intervention through enforcement, is warranted at this stage. However,
government initiatives are required to preserve fair use.

347 But see Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 1201(a), 17 U.S.C.S. § 1201 et seq.

(2000) (mandating rulemaking by the Copyright Office).
348 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 334, at 45-46.
341 See Ted Bridis, Online Music: Is It Time to Rewind or Fast Forward?, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 4, 2001, at B3 (explaining that "The hearing came just days after AOL and another big
music company, EMI Group, announced a deal to sell their music online.").
350 See, e.g., Merges, ContractingInto Liability Rules, supra note 322, at 1376-1378;
Ginsburg, Copyright and Control,supranote 77.
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Incremental Development in the Public/Commercial Realm: Allowing
and Monitoring Market Developments

The most plausible, but least comprehensive approach to policy problems
within the commercial/public sphere would consist of permitting the
development of online distribution models, with the Big Five of the recording
industry taking the lead in first putting content online and then negotiating
licensing agreements with distributors. Robert Merges suggests that, left to
market forces, industry actors will contract into
liability rules through the
• . 351
development of collective rights organizations.
Merges argues that
"property rules entitlements drive [intellectual property rights] holders in high
transaction cost industries into repeat-play bargaining
which leads to the
.. "52
f
formation of [collective rights organizations]."
These repeat players
develop norms that reduce transaction costs. If Merges is correct, this market
approach might allow rights-holders to negotiate a web of agreements more
efficient than a compulsory licensing scheme. Such cross-licensing may
reduce transaction costs in the long term for digital distributors and permit
extensive online distribution of music.
Here we must acknowledge a direct conflict between two of our policy
goals: efficient distribution may require reducing the diversity of sources of
music online. Clearly a balance must be struck between these two principles.
The most obvious way to reduce transaction costs would involve
combinations-precisely what we are seeing now with the creation of
MusicNet and Pressplay. Such combinations give rise to the possibility of
obtaining licenses from copyright owners in sound recordings through these
joint ventures thus lowering transaction costs. Indeed, current developments,
including in particular the anticipation of cross-licensing between the
companies participating in PressPlay and MusicNet 353 so that distributors
online can354obtain access to a wide range of works, point tentatively in this
direction.
Because the markets for online music are so volatile, caution is in order for
would-be regulators of commercial/public distribution of music online. We
therefore do not at this stage recommend legislation or regulation to force
copyright owners to license to all distributors who meet some baseline - as
might be required by compulsory license, or by an antitrust agency seeking an
enforcement order to deal with the question of commercial/public distribution.
This would involve antitrust policymakers dictating business models, and even

351Merges, ContractingInto Liability Rules, supra note 322, at 1293.
352 Id. at 1296.

353 See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1106-07 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (referring to evidence from the plaintiffs in the action that MusicNet anticipated
obtaining cross-licenses from other copyright owners).
354 See, e.g., Nick Wingfield & Jennifer Ordonez, Sony, Universal License Music to
Yahoo!, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at B5.
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imposing de facto compulsory licensing, on the industry. That is not a
desirable development, and not warranted at this stage.
We do believe, however, that these commercial developments - indeed,
these combinations - need to be scrutinized. If such licensing organizations
develop a control over the market for recordings analogous to the control
enjoyed by musical composition licensers like ASCAP and BMI, they merit
close monitoring. This monitoring should occur under the auspices of antitrust
law, and 3be
55undertaken by the antitrust regulatory authorities: either the FTC or
the DOJ.
Why is antitrust supervision justified in the present context? Those familiar
with the literature in this area will at once recognize the controversy. The
intersection, and sometimes conflict, between intellectual property law and
antitrust law is "notoriously contentious." 356 Writers have rightly emphasized
the need for great care in attempting to reconcile the two.35 7 Moreover, if we
are suggesting that the matter of concern is the licensing practices of MusicNet
and/or Pressplay, this touches on the question of refusals to license intellectual
property. This is one of the most controversial issues in reconciling
intellectual property and antitrust given that one of an intellectual property
owner's key legal rihts is the right to exclude - to refuse to license their
intellectual property.
355See ifra discussion Part III.G.
356 David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16

BERKELEY TECH L. J. 729, 781 (2001).
357 See generally id.; Maureen O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual
Property,Antitrust, Contract, and Standardizationin the Computer Industry, 12 HARv. J. L.
& TECH. 1 (1998) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate Balance]. Still others have
argued that intellectual property owners should be immune from antitrust scrutiny in most
cases. See Daniel B. Ravicher and Shani C. Dilloff, Antitrust Scrutiny of Intellectual
Property Exploitation: It Just Don't Make No Kind of Sense, 8 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 83
(2001-02). The latter is an extreme position not generally followed, and inconsistent with
the approach of both the DOJ and the FTC. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY,

April 6, 1995, § 2.1 [hereinafter DOJ/FTC IP

GUIDELINES].

358 In this area, U.S. decisions are inconsistent. Compare Image Technical Services v.

Eastman Kodak, 125 F.2d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding Kodak incurred antitrust liability
for refusing to supply spare parts to independent service organizations) with Independent
Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reaching the opposite
conclusion on very similar facts in which Xerox's refusal to sell or license its patented and
copyrighted materials was deemed to be squarely within the statutory intellectual property
rights and hence gave rise to no antitrust liability). The matter is also the subject of
controversy in the European Union, where a "refusal to license intellectual property"
decision is currently on appeal. See IMS Health Inc v. Commission of the European
Communities (T184/01 R) (No.1) [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 1, and (No.2) [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 2.
The issue has also been left uncertain in Australia by a decision of the High Court decided
on narrow legal grounds. See Melway Publishing Pty Ltd. v. Robert Hicks Pty Ltd. tlas
Auto Fashions Australia (2001) 178 ALR 253.
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The determination of whether in fact there is a breach of antitrust principles
is a highly fact-specific inquiry that cannot be undertaken on the presently
available information. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out why there may be
grounds for ongoing supervision. First, it is axiomatic that while intellectual
property rights do not give rise to a presumption of market power, 359 they do
not confer immunity from antitrust scrutiny. 36 0 Second, evidence already on
the record indicates that scrutiny is justified. Although the "Big Five" have
contracted with Web portals and MTV, some smaller distributors complain that
they are being cut out of key deals. 36 1 Not only has the DOJ already become
involved, as noted in Part I, but in addition, findings of the trial judge in the
Napster litigation indicated that licensing practices of the major labels may
constitute copyright misuse, a doctrine which, while not co-extensive with
antitrust law is nevertheless closely related. 362 Judge Patel found that there
was some indication that the licensing terms offered to Napster were
"overreaching. ' 36 3 Such contractual terms are commonly addressed through
antitrust lawi 64 In terms of market power, the FTC has already indicated its
view that "The five distributors together account for over 85 percent of the
market . . . and each has market power in that no music retailer can
realistically choose not to carry the music of any of the five major
distributors." 365 This would also be true of online distributors/retailers.
Gallagher has referred to this feature of the music industry, in which
366
distributors need access to all labels, as a "natural monopoly of demand."
The known structure
of the joint
ventures, MusicNet and PressPlay, facilitates
•
• 367
collusion on matters of price.
Moreover, while there has been some
359DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES, § 2.2.
360 DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES, §2.1; U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (endorsing a statement of the Federal Circuit that "Intellectual property rights do not
confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws."); Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994).
361 See Saxe, supra note 55, at 23.
362 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. On the doctrine of copyright misuse,
See In re Napster Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1102-06 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

Id. at 1102.
364See O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate Balance, supra note 357, at 3 (noting that
"Antitrust's relationship with contract law has traditionally been an important part of
antitrust litigation.").
365 Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony,
Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary, In re Sony Music
Entertainment, Inc., File No. 971-0070, Sept. 6, 2000, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/09/index.htm (last visited May 31, 2002). Similar findings were made of the
industry in a recent Australian case. See Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission v. Universal Music Australia [2001] FCA 1800 (Federal Court of Australia,
December 2001) (the case is on appeal).
366 GALLAGHER, supra note 366.
367In re Napster Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. at 1108-09. The court noted:
363
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criticism of using antitrust analysis in "high technology" markets, 368 the

market for the distribution of recorded music, even online, is not an innovation
market with low barriers to entry. Rather, the copyrights in existing music act
as barriers to entry given the natural monopoly of demand referred to above,
and the enormous cost of setting up rival music production.
Recording industry consolidation has effectively reduced the number of
players in the market for online music distribution from five to two. 3 6 9 The
online market for sound recordings may turn into an effective duopoly,
analogous to the market for public performance licenses presently dominated
by BMI and ASCAP - organizations which have long been subject to antitrust
scrutiny as a result. As the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index-(HHI) indicates, that
level of market concentration has provoked antitrust investigation in the past
(in the context of horizontal mergers) and should do so now.
Although we cannot be certain that unfair practices will hamper the growth
of online distribution, authorities will not be able to make that determination
without more information. We therefore endorse scrutiny at this stage. Such
monitoring has the twin benefits of a) public scrutiny of licensing practices and
business practices 37 1 and b) the possibility of ensuring certain protections for
[E]ven a naif must realize that in forming and operating a joint venture, plaintiffs'
representatives must necessarily meet and discuss pricing and licensing, raising the
specter of possible antitrust violations ....

These joint ventures bear the indicia of

entities designed to allow plaintiffs to use their copyrights and extensive market-power
to dominate the market for digital music distribution.
Id.
368 See, e.g., Judge Frank Easterbrook, Information andAntitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL. F.

1 (2000).
369 See MusicNet, at http://www.musienet.com (last visited May 31, 2002); Duet, at
http://www.duet.com (last visited May 31, 2002).
370 See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines for the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission § 1.4: Calculating Market Shares, reprinted in MORGAN, MODERN
ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINs 894 (1995). The HHI is "calculated by summing the
squares of the individual market shares of all the participants." Id. Markets are "moderately
concentrated" when the HMI is between 1000 and 1800 and highly concentrated when the
HHI is above 1800. See id. Since the Big Five market share is 26%, 15%, 16%, 9%, and
16%, the HHI is well over the threshold. See Music CD Industry: Competition, The Rise of
the Big Six. . . or Five?, at http:/Iwww.soc.duke.edu/-sl42tmOl/compete3.html (last
accessed May 31, 2002) (listing the current figures); Music CD Industry: Big Six Profile,
The "Big Six" Profile, at http:/www.soc.duke.edu/-s142tm0l/profile.html (last accessed
May 31, 2002).
371 Such scrutiny has been provided in Australia recently through a court case which has
examined industry practices in the area of importing non-infringing copies of CDs from
overseas. While the result has been highly controversial owing to the definition of "market
power" adopted by Justice Hill in the Federal Court, the extensive facts found by the judge
in the case have provided a basis for some discussion of the practices of the recording
industry. See Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v. Universal Music
Australia [2001] FCA 1800, 2001 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 2082 (Federal Court of Australia,
Hill J, 14 December 2001), available at www.austlii.edu.au (last accessed May 31, 2002);
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fair use that we propose below. We return to the plausibility of antitrust
involvement in Section G below.
Thus, within the sphere of commercial/public use of copyrighted
material, we endorse the present antitrust investigation, but do not recommend
immediate enforcement action. At this point in time, the industry is
developing so rapidly that it would
.. 372be premature to propose any concrete
restrictions on licensing practices.
Enforcement actions could dampen
enthusiasm for precisely the kinds of deals all sides on the public distribution
debate claim to want. However, the threat of antitrust enforcement may be a
powerful tool that policymakers
S 373 in either the FTC or DOJ could use in order to
leverage fair use concessions.
2. Incremental Development in the Private/Non-commercial Realm:
Allowing Market Development and Anti-Circumvention
Rulemaking in Accordance with the DMCA
Within the private/non-commercial sphere, reformers of an incrementalist
cast argue that courts could protect the commons with existing copyright
doctrines. One argument that has been raised, most notably in the context of
the DeCSS case, is that the courts either should interpret the DMCA to allow
for (a) circumvention of DRM for purposes of fair use, or (b) should simply
declare the DMCA unconstitutional on its face. 3 7 4 Alternatively, some have
recommended that the DMCA be amended to make clear that "fair breach" or
circumvention for fair use purposes is allowed. 37 5 The difficulty with these
arguments is that they risk an "all-or-nothing" logic that leads either to infoanarchy or perfect control. If unfettered circulation of anti-circumvention
devices is allowed on the reasoning that they can sometimes, or even often, be
used for the purposes of fair use, 3 6 then we may as well abandon all pretence
of enforcing anti-circumvention measures. We would thus resign ourselves to

see also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets? An
Inquiy into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and BroadbandRegulation as Applied to the
"New Economy, " 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 41, 45 (2001) (referring to the value of antitrust

enforcement as a visible, public way of educating commercial culture).
372 Except, perhaps, for the kind of covenants-not-to-compete mentioned in Lasercomb
and cognate copyright misuse cases. See PETER JASZI ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 810 (4th ed.
1998).
373 See supra Part II.

374 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, Jan. 26, 2001, available at http://www.eff.org/IPNideo/MPAADVDcases/

20010126_ny_2profs-amicus.html (last visited May 31, 2002). These arguments have been
rejected at every stage thus far.
375 See, e.g, Samuelson, supranote 119, at 545-46.
376 This approach would probably be required if the "right to circumvent" is not to
be
limited only to the tech-savvy. Non-tech-savvy users wishing to circumvent for legitimate
purposes require some means of access to circumvention technology. But see Burk &
Cohen, supra note 334 (proposing a means to avoid this end).
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the fact that copyright owners will have to choose among engaging in a
technology war with hackers, suing users, or using drastic means like seeking
to cut off users' Interet access via the DMCA's "notice and take down"
provisions. 3 7 7 None of these options would advance a fair copyright regime.
This is not to argue that the lockup of content in DRM technology beyond
the scope of publicly granted copyright rights and beyond the term of
copyright protection should be allowed.. Rather, given the current state of the
law and legislation, leaving the matter of fair use to the courts is not a viable
option because rigid doctrine effectively forecloses a nuanced and balanced
approach. Courts must choose between a) upholding the DMCA and ensuring
perfect control, or b) not enforcing the DMCA and beginning a socially
wasteful technology arms race. The rule-making procedures under the DMCA
offer some possibility for adjustment, but are strictly limited by the terms of
the legislation and the Copyright Office's reluctance to intervene. 378 It is clear
the situation is unlikely to improve without new initiatives.
F.

BalancingPlausibilityand Comprehensiveness in the Non-commercial,
PrivateReahn: Minimum PolicyAdvances

Although we cannot be certain whether present industry developments
threaten or advance the development of a "Celestial Jukebox," 379 they clearly
do threaten fair use and an extant "commons" of copyrighted material. 38 0 We
377 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3) (2000).

See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (describing the rule-making
procedures). In particular, the Register of Copyrights's recommendations to the Librarian of
Congress, since accepted by the Librarian and Congress, have narrowly interpreted "class"
of works in §1201(a). See Oversight Hearing on the United States Copyright Office:
HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property 107th
Cong. (2001) (statement of Marybeth Peters). This interpretation, if it holds, is likely to
limit the usefulness of the rule-making procedures.
379 This is the slang term for a commercial database that permits users to purchase all
available works online. See Charles Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIc MONTHLY,
Sept. 2000, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/09/mann.htm (last visited
May 31, 2002).
380 We recognize the potential tensions between celestial jukebox development and
preservation of fair use. Nevertheless, we believe that the value of the commons may justify
delaying the development of a universal commercial catalog of works on line. See, e.g.,
Dennis S. Karala, FederalPreemption ofShrinkwrap and On-line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 511, 518-521 (1997) (arguing that, even if all consumers were willing to sign away
all of their rights, they should not be allowed to because the public has a strong interest in
ensuring that a widely available work's unprotected elements become potential source
material for other authors to create new and different works). Karjala further argues that
copyright owners and consumers should not be allowed to directly contract because the
public interest protected by the federal law is not represented in the contracting process. See
id. at 518-20. Therefore, "any state contract rule that purported to validate any shrinkwrap
license terms that most licenSees would be willing to accept would inhibit - indeed, would
reduce to naught - the benefits to the public that flow from the federal limitations on
378

B. U. . SCI. & TECH.L.

[Vol. 8:2

can point to no recent developments to assure us that, left alone, the market
would preserve these spheres. To the contrary, the growth of "clickwrapping,"
the SDMI, and the CPRM demonstrates just the opposite. 38 1 Much of what
Hannibal Travis writes of the publishing industry could apply to music as well.
The "Celestial Jukebox" may have transaction cost benefits - but it has
dangers as well:
As the public's easements in the public domain are transformed into
piracy, into trespass, independent Web publishing will be steadily
displaced by intensive exploitation of established works. The Oversoul
that is cyberspace will give way to the Celestial Jukebox, to the corporate
synergies of the diminishing number of publishers, networks, and studios.
The agenda hinted at by the Harper & Row opinion, and aggressively
advocated by the White Paper and other documents, namely the capture
by copyright holders of the full social value of their works and the
expansion of copyright infringement to encompass interference with any
new licensing scheme, leaves no room for the independent Internet
publisher's necessary easement upon the intellectual commons.382
The DMCA allows for content owners to back up the most stringent
technological protections with legal action against those who would
circumvent them, even for legitimate purposes.383
The music industry stands at a critical threshold. While rapid development
of new digital distribution networks could provide massive profits to recording
companies and artists alike, further delay, and over-extensive use of DRM
technology, threaten to frustrate and alienate consumers. It is time to leverage
the market forces that are presently threatening fair use into positive
developments that can assure its future. While antitrust policymakers cannot
prescribe business models to the industry, they can delay the worst business
models by initiating lawsuits or failing to approve mergers. Antitrust
authorities can preserve fair use from perfect control if they skillfully leverage
industry concessions in return for permitting coordinated market initiatives.
As noted above, we cannot expect full implementation of all of the
substantive policy goals that we have outlined. 384 Some of those goals
conflict, and the dynamic field of intellectual property admits no permanent
solutions. Effective copyright policy largely consists of choosing the right
principles
to guide, institutions engaged in ongoing monitoring and
o.385
enforcement.
We have, therefore, identified four minimal standards
designed to protect fair use:

copyright rights." Id. at 519-20.
381
See id. at 520 (giving empirical evidence of these phenomena).
382 Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Ifrastnecture: Blackstonian
and the FirstAmendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 861 (2000).
383 See supra Part 1.
384
See supra Part III.A.
385
See supra Part III.D.3.
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Minimum Standard 1: Immunizing Virtual Private Networks

Virtual private networks are a relatively recent development in online music
distribution. A virtual private network is a small group of friends or associates
who agree to share some or all of the resources on their hard drives with one
another, yet are not acting in an "underground fashion." 386 Rather, VPNs may
constitute an attempt to build a commercial model for file sharing within the
bounds of current copyright law.
VPNs deserve special solicitude because they only represent a slightly more
convenient form of file sharing than have long been tolerated, even if not
strictly allowed by law. As the Sony decision makes clear, the first sale
doctrine and fair use combine to protect individuals who wish to share
copyrighted content with their friends by passing on copies or by inviting
friends over to watch with them.3 87 Except for a few half-hearted public
relations campaigns to the contrary, recording industry leaders have tacitly
conceded that "sharing" by friends often involves duplicate copies of material.
The VPN only makes this tolerated sharing of content easier. 388 Given the
controversy that efforts to prosecute such small networks would raise, we do
not believe that the record industry gives up much by allowing VPNs. Such
networks might even be good for their business-they might allow users to
sample different types of music, or to create informal record clubs, distributing
costs among themselves for a common library of recordings. 38 9 However, to
fully understand their legal status and potentially benign economic effects, it is
important to define them more carefully.
Until it changed into the fee service Madster, the leading VPN was Aimster
39
a system that piggy-backed on AOL's AIM instant messaging service. 6
See Cisco Systems, The ABCs of VPNs: A Virtual Private Networking Primerfor
Enterprises, at http:l/www.cisco.com/offer/tdmhome/pdfs/vpnVPNABCs.pdf (last
visited May 31, 2002).
387 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
388 We note the comment of Professor Jane Ginsburg that file-sharing in whatever form is
not "sharing" because the user who "shares" does not thus make their copy unavailable to
themselves - i.e., he or she does not delete or give up their own copy. See Ginsburg,
Copyright Use and Excuse, supra note 140, at 30. However it would be an exaggeration to
argue that file sharing is "totally unlike" sharing that went before because users need not
give up copies. The reality has been some duplication but on a limited scale between
limited numbers of people - something our proposal seeks to recognize.
389 The record club offers a humble example of a low margin, high volume business
model. Members of record clubs agree to spend a certain amount of money within a set
amount of time. In return, they either get free CD's (the classic "12 CD's for a penny"
offer) or significantly reduced rates on CD's purchased beyond those necessary to fulfill a
membership obligation. See, e.g., Columbia House, Columbia House Music Club, available
at http://www.columbiahouse.com/salch/homepage.jsp (offering "12 CDs for free (plus
shipping and processing)"); see also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, Record Clubs, in Tis
BUSINESS OF MUSIC, supra note 5 1, at 345.
390 See Gwendolyn Mariano, Aimster Loses Domain Name Battle with AOL, CNET
386
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Aimster allowed users of AIM to see and swap files on selected areas of the
computer's hard drive with their buddies on the messenger system. 39 1 Instead
of just being able to send text messages to their buddies, they could transfer
and receive files. 39 2 In effect, Aimster added a middle zone of "privication"
between private ownership, like something that is on one's own PC that no one
else can see and publication, like the Napster approach of exposing my files to
the world.33 The technology meant that Aimster could create smaller, more
hidden swap meets that are virtually untraceable because the indices
of all
394
these files were stored only on each AIM user's personal machine.
Although VPN users cannot access as many songs as they could using a
centralized database like Napster, they can feel more secure because the files
come from a friend's machine, rather than a stranger's. Thus they are less
likely to include Trojan horses or viruses. 395 There is also less strain on
individual users' bandwidth, since only a select group can actually request
files.
As avatars of privication, virtual private networks straddle the divide
between public distribution (which involves large numbers of users) and
private use of a single individual. If VPNs have too many members, or if
persons join multiple VPNs, such networks would cease being private and
would rightly be considered a tool of public distribution analogous to Napster.
To address these problems, we propose limiting membership in VPNs to ten
persons, and only permitting individuals to join one VPN at a time. Although
the industry still might worry that serial membership in a number of VPNs
could permit a "promiscuous" user to share a vast amount of music with a vast
number of potential consumers, relatively simple serial copy management
(analogous to that mandated by the Audio Home Recording Act) could address
that problem.
Such DRM would employ robust and fragile watermarks to
NEWS.COm, at http://news.search.com/click?sl%2Cnews.43.232.942.0.7.Napster-like.0%
2Chttp%3A%2F%2Fnews.cnet.com%2Fnews%2F0-1005-200-5993790.html
(May
21,
2001).
391 See John Borland, RIAA Sues Aimster Over File Swapping, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.search.com/click?sl%2Cnews.43.232.942.0.5.Napsterlike.0%2Chttp%3A%2F%2Fnews.cnet.com%2Fnews%2F0-1005-200-6033575.html
(May
25, 2001).
392 See id.

393 See Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: IntellectualProperty
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1214-15 (2000).

Zittrain argues that "a well-enforced technical rights architecture would enable the
distribution of information to a large audience - publication - while simultaneously, and
according to rules generated by the controller of the information, not releasing it freely into
general circulation - privication." Id. at 1201.
394 See Borland, supra note 391.
395 See P. J. Huffstutter, File-Swapping Aimster Offers Promise, Peril,L.A. TIMES, Dec.

18, 2000, at Cl.
396 See Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 1629.
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prevent any piece of music from being copied more than, say, nine times (and
only for members of one's own VPN) and would prevent any of the copies of
that music from ever being copied.
Industry leaders might protest that they should get some compensation for
those extra copies. However, it is difficult to see how small VPNs are different
from the record clubs they have already endorsed. All the members of a VPN
would be doing is pooling their resources to build a larger common collection
of music. The industry certainly would not complain if five brothers and
sisters pooled their allowances to buy a CD to which all could listen. In a
given VPN, five individuals who would usually buy (and individually enjoy)
ten or so CDs each year may well purchase (and enjoy) sixty or so collectively.
Obviously the demand functions here are speculative. But VPNs could be as
desirable a development as radio and record clubs, and should be allowed to
proceed experimentally for the time being.
3 97

2. Minimum Standard 2: Disclosure of and Limits to DRM
As discussed above, the confluence of code and law stands at present to
reinforce the interests of content-holders over other parties by providing them
with an absolute right of control. 398 We believe that such DRM techniques
have negative externalities: They make content more difficult to use and pave
the way to a pay-per-use world that stifles innovation. Thus, we advocate
balancing copy-protection with usability.
DRM is problematic because it is concerned mainly with illegal use and
not the lawful customer.39 9 Copy protection enhances the difficulty and
complexity of use for all consumers, who may also have to pay extra (through
pay-per-use or by buying new hardware and software) for uses they had
assumed they had purchased already. Moreover, aggressive DRM, such as that
suggested in the form of Senator Hollings' CBDTPA mentioned in Part400I
above may create dire incompatibilities if applied at the level of hardware.
397 Since the time of this writing, very similar issues have been raised in relation to copyprotected CDs, in a suit brought by a purchaser of a CD. In the case, DeLise v. Farenheit
Entertainment,the purchaser complained that the CD was not labeled as protected, and that
consumer protection laws had therefore been breached. There were also privacy concerns
raised in the case. The bringing of this case (which was settled) indicates only that these
issues are pertinent, and do not represent a significant concession on the part of the
recording industry. See generally Copy-Protected CD Makers Lose Battle, ZDNET
NEWS.com, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-843616.html (Feb. 22, 2002).
398See supra Part II.
399 See Andreas Pfeiffer, Digital Rights Management's Hidden Dangers, ZDNET
NEws.com, at http://www.zdnet.com.com/2102-11-528106.html (Feb. 12, 2001).
400 See Jakob Nielsen & Susan Farrell, Nielsen on Useability: The Seven Sins of Copy
Protection
Tools,
INTERNET
WORLD
DAILY
NEws,
available
at
http://www.internetworld.com/news/archive/01232001d.html
(Jan. 23, 2001) ("[Copy
protection] creates problems between compliant and noncompliant media and drives. On
the user side, products that worked before stop working, and new products might never
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Problems with copy protection in the software industry highlight the
inadequacy of such an approach within the •online
regime: "Users hate it, and it
•,,401
doesn't really stop hackers from pirating programs anyway.
By stifling
innovation and frustrating consumers, industry advocates of DRM threaten to
throw the baby of new markets out with the bathwater of piracy.
People should be able to utilize content across the many devices that they
own. Such a baseline expectation of usability will ultimately benefit artists and
intermediaries by encouraging consumers to buy. If they can assume
interoperability, consumers now skittish at the prospect of multiple
incompatible devices will be more comfortable with investing in hardware,
software, and content. DRM should only diminish the distributional capacity
of online service intermediaries to the extent necessary to assure secure
content.
Furthermore, DRM should respect individual users' privacy. The risks
to privacy from some forms of copyright management technologies have been
well noted. 4 02
Where metering systems are used, extensive personal
information may be collected. Some enforcement techniques, especially on
P2P networks, involve searching users' hard drives. We would recommend
that anonymous payment systems be required and that disclosure of identifying
information be banned.
We propose,• in addition,
adequate disclosure of all DRM techniques
403
embedded in products.
Too often limitations on use are not clearly
stated. 40 4 Disclosure guarantees the transparency of contracts between content
producers and consumers and, it is hoped, more public discussion of the same.
If users understand limitations, consumer sovereignty should eventually reward
companies with limited DRM and discourage aggressive control over use.
Disclosure accords with the intuitive belief among consumers that they
should be able to utilize products in customary ways. Consumers may never
again be able to assume that music is "theirs" once purchased, subject to
whatever use they choose for it. However, regulators should at least ensure
that consumers can help shape the terms of use by requiring that limitations on
a purchase are known beforehand.
Beyond privacy and disclosure limitations, we are reluctant to propose
particular limits on DRM techniques at this early stage. Such techniques will
change rapidly as new services are marketed. We only suggest that whatever
work.").

401 Richtel, supra note 2, at C2.
402 See, e.g., Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace,28 CoNN. L. REv. 981, 1036-38 (1996).

403 Both in response to past battles over easy reprography and present circumstances,
many authors have advocated conspicuous notice of unusual copyright terms. See, e.g.,
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 83-87 (1997) (offering qualified support for a rule
requiring conspicuous disclosure of contract terms that diverge from copyright).
404 See Gilmore, supra note 184.
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minimum standards are imposed, they come in the form of a consent decree
following an antitrust investigation.
As such, particular terms would be a
matter for negotiation.
3.

Minimum Standard 3: Inclusion of Public Interest Representation on
Industry Standards-Setting Bodies
Finally, we believe it is important that members of public interest
organizations have membership in all relevant digital rights management
standards-setting bodies and a right to participate actively in all such bodies.
In standards-setting bodies, we include all formal industry groups and
discussion forums, as well as inter-industry groups and more formal standards
setting organizations with responsibility for approving or recommending
standards for adoption in both hardware and software. Given the variety of
DRM techniques that are possible at hardware, software and operating system
levels, it is important that all such bodies be included. The existence of
consensus-based, loosely organized entities that coordinate the development
and adoption of common standards and protocols has been one of the noted
features of early Internet development. 4 06 This practice, though changing,
continues in the form of the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C" ).4 07 This
institutional feature has been absent from the development of DRM in the
copyright field. The more coordinated and centralized effort to develop
protocols, the Secure Digital4 Music
Initiative ("SDMIr), has been slow and
8
unsatisfactory in its progress. 0
Public interest groups should not be given veto power over the adoption of
new standards, for that would be too great an interference in market forces and
private ordering. Rather, the aim is to ensure representation of the public
interest at least to some limited extent, and perhaps more importantly, to
ensure a greater degree of transparency in any processes of development. We
are concerned, in other words, about standards developed in smoke-filled
backrooms and presented as afait accomplito the public.

The obvious question is whether public interest representatives could
effectively contribute to the debate over standards without having veto power
over their development. They may not even be able to assure transparency their inclusion would not prevent extra-organizational negotiation between
major players. Moreover, "network effects" ensure that a particularly
important player, like Microsoft, can effectively set standards for the rest of the
industry regardless of organizations designed to assure broader input. One
See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 334, at 55-68 (taking a similar approach in
noting
the difficulty of determining actual limits to facilitate fair use).
406
See Paulina Borsook, How Anarchy Works, WIRED MAGAZINE, Oct. 1995, availableat
http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/3.10ietf_pr.html(last visited May 31, 2002).
407 See World Wide Web Consortium, at http://www.w3.org (last visited May 31, 2002).
405

408

See Sam Costello, Why Secure DigitalMusic Initiative Is FallingApart, IDG.NET, at

http://www.idg.net/ic_411846_1793_1-1681.html (Feb. 6,2001).
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might argue that SDMI has failed so far because a concentrated market renders
it redundant.
Nevertheless, we remain convinced that requiring inclusion of public
interest representatives would be of some benefit. First, to consider is a recent
precedent for non-inclusion of such representatives, by SDMI itself, which
refused membership to the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") on the basis
that it did not have any legitimate interest in the work of SDMI. 4 09 Our
proposal would prevent such actions. Second, there is recent precedent for
EFF action, and even some success, in a standards body that did allow
membership and advocacy by public interest groups. 4 10 This in itself indicates
some benefit to such inclusion. Finally, there are a number of large industries
involved in digital music distribution online at present with varying, and at
times conflicting, interests. The interests of content providers in maximal
protection and control may conflict with the interests of providers of hardware
and consumer equipment whose main appeal lies in ease of use. In this
context, both sides need to cooperate. By including informal discussion
forums, we hope to include as many opportunities for public interest
participation as is reasonably possible. We would also recommend that such
participation be a condition wherever negotiation occurs in the context of
legislative reform. On many occasions, as Jessica Litman has chronicled in
some detail, industry Aroups are told to go away and negotiate a deal before
legislation is passed.
If such a legislative process continues, public interest
representation would enhance its fairness.
Such representation would be preferable to the process proposed in the
CBDTPA referred to in Part I, which envisages private negotiation of
standards, under the threat of legislation in the absence of agreement. First, the
legislation is quite apparently designed to increase property rights rather than
exceptions for fair use, demonstrating again the problems of using the
legislative process in this area. But even if that were not the case, the
advantages we point to need to be instituted at the earliest stages so that public
discussion of proposed standards is made possible. Public representation
during the discussions is necessary. And the extreme sanction - the possibility
of government-mandated standards - has few apparent supporters and would
represent a massive intervention in the market.
4.

Other advances?

As was highlighted at the beginning of Part III, one cannot ensure fair
competition and fair use of digital music online with a single set of proposals.

409

See Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Standards Committee Rejects Hard

Drive Copy Prevention Scheme (Apr. 14, 2001) available at http://www.eff.org/IP/
DRM/CPRM/20010404eff tl3_pr.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
410 See id.
411 See Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 74, at 282-322 (detailing techniques for
copyright law reform).
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Rather than fixed rules, ongoing monitoring will be the key. Revision of the
terms set out above may well be necessary from time to time. Furthermore,
American law will need to respond to international developments, such as the
new European Union Directive on Cooright in the Information Society, due to
come into effect by January 2003.
This directive includes some very
interesting provisions, including a requirement that, in the absence of voluntary
measures by rightsholders, member states are to ensure that "fair use"-type
exceptions to copyright law are given effect in the digital environment. 4 13 The
agency involved would be well advised to monitor these developments in
Europe and determine whether similar techniques would be useful in the
United States.

G. InstitutionalMechanisnisfor Setting the General Terms ofFair
Competition and FairUse Policy
1. Possible Institutional Mechanisms
Having outlined our policy recommendations, we are left with a key
question: Which institution(s) can best promote them? This question has two
main aspects. First, which institution(s) can best formulate the range of rules
that will govern the use of digital music? Second, which institution(s) can best
apply and implement these rules, either through enforcement with respect to
entities that do not adhere to the rules or through continual monitoring? The
rest of Section III will explore the first set of concerns. Section IV will cover
the second.
The policies outlined could be enacted through legislation or delegated to an
existing administrative body by Congress, or, potentially, undertaken by an
existing authority, using existing powers.
As mentioned above, congressional action authorizing the kinds of
regulation described above - through legislative amendment - is exceedingly
unlikely.4 14 Reformers who want results need to root their institutional
strategy in the existing statutory framework. Fortunately, antitrust and
consumer protection law, traditional brakes on expansive intellectual property
rights, provide useful tools for promoting online music distribution.
We
See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, Official Journal L 167, June 22, 2001, at 10-19.
411 See id. at art. 6.4.
414 If this is so, it rules out not only legislation, but also delegation by Congress of
responsibility for such standards to the Library of Congress as was done in relation to the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.
412

415

See Stephanie Brauner, Preparing Your Music Client For Web Distribution, 22

& ENT. L.J. 1, 20-21 (1999) (listing a variety of defenses a contracting
party can assert, including consumer protection); Merges, ContractingInto Liability Rules,
supranote 322 (analogizing intellectual property rights to robust plants and antitrust laws to
HASTINGS COMM.
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therefore propose that antitrust authorities supplement existing copyright law
with antitrust and consumer protection laws, which may provide limits to
expanding copyright protections.
Two agencies, the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division, have already begun
preliminary investigations into the recording industry, as noted above. Further,
as discussed, there is evidence and analysis to su ,est, at least at this
preliminary stage, that some scrutiny is warranted.
Some preliminary
background on the two4 17agencies can aid in assessing their relative
policymaking capabilities.
The FTC was formed in 1914, when the Federal Trade Commission Act
4 18
gave it broad powers to regulate business practices in the United States.
The FTC has many responsibilities, including enforcement of consumer
protection and antirust laws.4 19 Although the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
was established
later in 1933, it has since come to predominate in antitrust
4 20
matters.

herbicide); see also Radio Telefis Eirann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v.
E.C. Commission (McGill T.V. Guide Limited Intervening) [ 1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718, 762-63
[hereinafter "the McGill case"] (recognizing the role of European competition law (the
equivalent of antitrust) in defining the scope of copyright).
416 See Richtel, supra note 2, at C2. (regarding the DOJ); see also Press Release, Federal
Trade Commission, FTC Charges Warner Music and Universal Music, July 31, 2001,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/07/tenors.htm (last visited May 31, 2002)
(explaining that "[i]n an effort to shield ... new products from competition, Warner and
PolyGram agreed not to discount and not to advertise certain of their catalog products for a
limited period of time").
417 Until 2002, the FTC and the DOJ had shared authority over all antitrust concerns,
dividing cases among themselves on an ad hoc basis. The leaders of the DOJ's Antitrust
Division (Charles James) and the FTC (Timothy Muris) have recently signed an agreement
allocating antitrust enforcement authority over the entertainment industry and software,
inter alia, to the DOJ. Federal Trade Commission, FTC andDOJAnnounce New Clearance
Proceduresfor Antitrust Matters: Memorandum of Agreement Allocates Industry Sectors
Between Agencies, Mar. 5, 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/
clearance.htm (last visited May 31, 2002). The status of the agreement is in doubt; Senator
Ernest Hollings has threatened to withhold appropriations to the FTC if it is maintained. See
Hollings Questions Ashcroft about Merger Review Agreement, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY,
Feb. 27, 2002. If the allocation agreement holds, the following section (assessing the
relative competence of the FTC and the DOJ to regulate the music industry) may be moot.
Id. However, given that the memorandum of agreement was largely based on a personal
friendship between James and Muris, it may not survive past the presidency of George W.
Bush. See Muris Pitches FTC Common CarrierJurisdiction to House, COMMUNICATIONS
DAILY, Apr. 11, 2002.
418 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
419 Id. §§ 45-47; see also Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The
ChangingNature ofAntitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REv. 1383, 1389 (1998).
420 See Waller, supra note 419, at 1430 (arguing that the Antitrust Division has had
greater practical independence than the FTC throughout most of its history, that its
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The FTC has authority under the Sherman and ..
Clayton
. . .. Acts
421 to investigate
combinations in restraint of trade and price discrimination.
The Federal
Trade Commission Act empowers the FTC, among other things, to prevent
unfair methods of competition; prevent unfair or deceptive acts; seek monetary
redress and other relief for conduct that injures consumers; promulgate trade
regulation rules that specifically define acts or practices that are unfair or
deceptive; establish requirements designed to prevent such unfair or deceptive
acts or practices; conduct investigations relating to the organization, business,
practices, and management
of
entities engaged in commerce; and make reports
•
•
•422
and legislative recommendations to Congress.
The FTC has used this broad
mandate to regulate Internet privacy policies a useful precedent both
procedurally and substantively for our purposes.
Extant doctrines surrounding monopolization and merger review, as already
outlined above, render the intervention of both the DOJ and the FTC
institutionally plausible. 424 Like Microsoft and Intel before them, the major
record companies appear to be trying to leverage control over a copyrighted
item (musical content) into control over retail, resale, rental and other markets.
Although the "Big FIive" have announced a number of transactions with Web
portals and MTV '45smaller distributors complain that they are being cut out
of the key deals.f26 Industry consolidation for the purposes of online music
distribution may mean that, like the market for mechanical licenses dominated
by BMI and ASCAP, the market for sound recordings will turn into an
effective duopoly. That level of market concentration has provoked antitrust
monitoring and investigation in the past and should do so now.427
We state again that findings of antitrust breaches, especially in the
controversial area of the relationship between intellectual property and antitrust
law, are highly fact-specific and require detailed analysis of complex facts, and
without access to all the evidence, we cannot venture a definite opinion as to
whether there has in fact been some breach. The proposed remedy below via
consent order is therefore necessarily speculative. But the speculation is
procedures (albeit informal) are fairer, and it decisions worthier of court deference than
those of the FTC). Hereinafter, we will assume that the Antitrust Division of the DOJ is the
acting administrative agency when discussing an antitrust centered regulatory scheme.
421 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13.
42
-1 d. §§ 41-58; see also Federal Trade Commission, Statutes Relating to Both Missions,
available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/ogc/statl.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) (explaining
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, as amended).
42 See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives,at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy (last
visited May 31, 2002).
424 Although it may Seem disingenuous to argue for such an investigation before we are
certain that unfair practices will hamper online distribution, the need for more information
about
industry practices is indisputable.
42
5 See supra notes 19-24, 103-106 and accompanying text.
426 See Saxe, supranote 55, at 23.
427 See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
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worthwhile. At least some evidence supports scrutiny, as outlined above.
Moreover, we submit that this scrutiny will need to be ongoing given the
dynamic nature of the market and the ongoing opportunities, if MusicNet and
PressPlay continue, for collusion between competitors.
If there were to be some basis for the suggestion of antitrust breaches, this
would provide either of the agencies the leverage to argue for consent orders.
In accordance with our approach, such consent orders should not impose de
facto compulsory licensing at this stage. Rather, we suggest they should aim to
protect the consumers' interests. There is an obvious objection to this
proposal: that the measures in the proposed "consent order" relate, not to the
direct preservation of competition, but rather to the preservation of particular
aspects of copyright policy - i.e., to matters that are Congress's concern or
perhaps that of the Librarian of Congress in his delegated role, not antitrust
regulators. Even assuming there is some antitrust breach which can be
established on the facts, the ordinary remedy would consist of measures to
ensure competition, rather than measures aimed at specific aspects of consumer
welfare. There is no doubt that the proposal is an extension of the traditional
role of either the FTC or DOJ. However, it is an extension that could be
justified in the particular circumstances here. Antitrust is not aimed at
protecting particular market entrants (such as Napster or others), 428 but to
ensure that social welfare - including consumer welfare - is maximized. Thus,
some provisions in consent orders going to protection of interests other than
those of distributors may be justified. We have identified problems in the
present constellation of institutions that do not inspire confidence that these
desirable ends could be achieved by resort to those institutions. Second,
antitrust law is concerned with strong property rights. Strong property rights
are of very particular concern where copyright owners are able to control all
use of copyrighted works; as we have illustrated in Part I, they now can. They
are also of particular concern where the copyright owners concerned constitute
a very small, very powerful group. These concerns would not be as great, and
the threat to user freedom likely less, if there were more competition in the
market, but such competition is unlikely to emerge. Finally, all the other
possible institutions cannot adapt copyright with sufficient nuances, on an
ongoing basis, as would be possible through the antitrust regulators and
through a mechanism such as a consent decree - a notably more
flexible
429
mechanism than "one size fits all" intellectual property regulation.

428

See David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 788 (2001).
429

See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets?: An

Inquiry into Antitrust, Intellectual Property,and BroadbandRegulation as Applied to 'The

New Econonl , '52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 41, 62 (2001).
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The FTC and DOJ as Antitrust Policymaking Institutions

Both the DOJ and the FTC could initiate a program of monitoring fair
competition and protecting fair use. 430 Leaders in both organizations have
focused on the special challenges raised by the intersection of intellectual
property and antitrust law. For example, the DOJ has cautioned the Supreme
Court to avoid addressing the questions raised by the intersection of antitrust
law and intellectual property until an appropriate case arises. 4 31 Furthermore,
given the commitment of both the Clinton and Bush administrations to the
Microsoft case, it is likely that the DOJ will scrutinize efforts by dominant IP
owners to leverage their patent or copyright monopoly into broader market
power. The FTC has also taken an activist approach. Ex-FTC Chairman
Robert Pitofsky has stressed the potential synergy between intellectual
property and antitrust law. During his tenure, his agency was at the forefront
of IP/antitrust
concerns, as evidenced by its inquiries into Intel and CD price4 32
fixing.

Although the DOJ and FTC have
433 overlapping jurisdictions, they have
different institutional competences.
While the DOJ can prosecute antitrust
violators criminally and civilly, the FTC can only sue civilly.4 3 4 Only the FTC
can sue under the Federal Trade Commission Act (the unfair competition
law).4 35 The FTC Act is an antitrust law similar to the Sherman and the
Clayton Acts, but it grants a greater degree of discretion to the FTC, under §

430 See

Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct: The
Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 279, 281 (2001) (asserting that the Copyright Office has so
far been exceptionally quiescent on these issues, despite the role envisioned for it in the
DMCA).
431 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.,
203 F.3d 1322 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2000) (arguing against Supreme Court
review of a Federal Circuit case protecting the rights of intellectual property patent holders
to refuse to license their inventions), available at http:/lwww.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2000/
2pet/6invit/2000-0062.pet.ami.inv.pdf (last visited May 31, 2002).
432 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the
Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 535 (2001) (discussing whether the

present level of intellectual property protection is adequate, and whether antitrust
enforcement has protected incentives to innovate); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New
Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Address at
Conference: An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century (June 15, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm_(last visited May 31, 2002).
411 See FTC, Mission Statement, at http://www.fte.gov/bc/mission.htm (last accessed May
31, 2002) (stating that both the DOJ and the FTC are responsible for enforcing the federal
antitrust laws and consult with each other before opening a case to avoid duplication).
434 See

E.

THOMAS SULLIVAN

PROCEDURE 69 (4th ed. 1999).
411 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
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5(a), and also protects consumers from unfair and deceptive acts and
practices.4 36
Both agencies are staffed by lawyers and economists. At the DOJ, the
ultimate decision whether to intervene is made by the Assistant Attorney
General who heads the Antitrust Division.
At the FTC such decisions are
made by the five commissioners through a majority vote.4 38 While the DOJ
initiates most actions sua sponte,4 39 the FTC is slightly more permeable to
public input. According to its website, "The FTC may begin an investigation
in different ways. Letters from consumers or businesses, Congressional
inquiries, or articles on consumer or economic subjects may trigger FTC
action." 44 0 After the FTC has initiated an investigation, if it believes a
violation of the law occurred, it may either "attempt to obtain voluntary
compliance by entering into a consent order with the company... [or] [ilf a
consent agreement cannot be reached, [it] may issue an administrative
complaint." 44 1 The DOJ
operates
through a similar process. But while the
•
•442
.
DOJ must file suit in an Article III court, 44 3the FTC may file suit in federal
court or before an administrative law judge.
While the DOJ has gained a higher profile in this area, the FTC actually
covers a somewhat broader area of market and consumer concerns. The FTC
has also taken a lead....
role in promoting online
444 privacy, a key component of the
effort to cabin invasive DRM techniques.
While the DOJ's economists are
more familiar with traditional antitrust analysis, the FTC's experts on
consumer protection are likely to be slightly more capable of marshaling new
legal theories to advance their cases.445
436 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 434, at 73.

437 See DOJ, Overview: Antitrust Division, at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/atrloverview.html
(last visited May 31, 2002).
438
See 16 C.F.R. § 4.14 (1985).
439

See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 434, at 69-70.
440 FTC, How the FTC Brings an Action, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/action.htm (last visited

May 31, 2002).
441Id.

442 See DOJ, Antitrust Division Manuel, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/

three.htm (last accessed May 31, 2002).
443 See FTC, Mission Statement, at http://www.ftc.govfbc/mission.htm (last visited May
31, 2002).

4 See FTC, Privacy Initiatives, at http:/lwww.ftc.gov/privacy/index.htm (last visited
May 31, 2002).
445 See generally In re Napster Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1102-06

(N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing copyright misuse doctrine); Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) (deviating from the doctrine that copyright
misuse is bound together with antitrust principles by concluding that the misuse doctrine is
not simply a branch of antitrust law, or an expansion of patent doctrine, but serves to
promote the policy goals behind copyright); CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 810 (4th

ed. 1998) (explaining the chief new legal theory of misuse). Many commentators have
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Admittedly, the FTC has some key disadvantages. Although its past
participation in Internet privacy policy provides some precedent for our
proposal, the situation is not identical. The area of online privacy was not in
any agency's jurisdiction when the FTC took it on. 446 This contrasts with
copyright, where a number of different government entities - the Registrar of
Copyrights, DOJ (through the consent orders entered into with ASCAP and
BMI), the Senate Judiciary Committee, the House Commerce Committee (in
the context of the DMCA), and even the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks - have been involved for some time.44 7 The FTC would have
more difficulty intervening here because there are so many other competing
interests and competencies. The FTC may need specific legislative mandate to
fully regulate this area, and even if it did intervene, some skeptics doubt that
the FTC44has
the expertise necessary to keep up with fast-paced technological
8
change.
Nevertheless, the FTC is an administrative agency well-suited for the role of
hedging intellectual property rights with public interest privileges. Therefore,
we believe that the current antitrust investigation launched by the DOJ
(focused on the market structure of the music industry) should be
agreed, however, on the vitality of the doctrine that copyright misuse is bound together with
antitrust principles. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law
Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 868-69 (2000); David Scher, Note, The Viability ofthe Copyright
Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 102-3 (1992); Richard Stitt, Comment,
Copyright Self-Help Protection as Copyright Misuse: Finally the Other Shoe Drops, 57
UMKC L. REv. 899, 899 (1989); Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role
ofAntitrust Standards and FirstAmendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1991)

(arguing that, in addition to instances of antitrust violations, "courts should also uphold
misuse defenses when the plaintiffs conduct threatens to undermine the fundamental
copyright goal, rooted in the first amendment, of promoting the dissemination of ideas and
information").
446

See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur,53 VAND. L.

REv. 2041,2057 (2000).
447 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY (Hill and Wang 1994).
448 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the JurisprudenceofSelf-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089, 1137-42 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Thenm, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 178 (1997); see
also Boyle, The FirstAmendment and Cyberspace, supra note 250, at 344. Cohen argues

that:
The FTC and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division proved rather more skeptical
about the unvarying menu of intellectual property expansion. Both political appointees
and civil servants outside the PTO saw the danger of anti-competitive effects, costs to
consumers and market concentration, particularly in the context of computer networks,
where concern about "lock-in" effects and path dependency were being popularized by
the Microsoft case. To some extent, these countervailing forces prevented the
Administration's Internet strategy from being completely dominated by an agenda of
intellectual property maximalism.
ld.
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complemented by an investigation by the FTC (focused on the consumer
protection concerns raised by DRM). Although most FTC investigations are
private in order to "protect both the investigation and the company," a public
investigation can provide the agency with significant leverage.
Since both the DOJ Sand
450 FTC have extracted concessions from companies
that need merger review,
both can offer the suspension of the investigation
as a "carrot" to induce industry compliance with standards of fair use
protection. 45 1 Preliminary stages of the investigation should allow the agency
to develop a better sense of whether anti-competitive licensing practices are
likely. The agency would only suspend the investigation
if the companies
45 2
agreed to the following, or substantially similar, measures:
Terms of the Proposed Consent Order:
CONSENT ORDER

The following consent order is to be entered between Universal,
Warner, Sony, EMI, and BMG [hereinafter "the companies"] and the
FTC [hereinafter "the agency"].
Aware of significant potential
anticompetitive effects of the companies' decision to consolidate digital
licensing procedures into the MusicNet and Pressplay services, the
agency initiated an antitrust investigation into the potential coordination
of the companies. In exchange for the agency's suspension of this
investigation, the companies agree to the following measures. The
measures are to be interpreted in light of the intent of this agreement: to
preserve customary fair use privileges, as a method of advancing the
449 See FTC, How the FTC Brings an Action .
at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/action.htm
(last visited May 31, 2002).
450 Markets may punish allegations of collusion more efficiently than judicial procedures.

For example, if the FTC indicates that a merger is likely to go ahead, stock prices rise; if
not, they fall. By the same token, by indicating that it may eventually "undo" deals, it
substantially decreases the value of those deals to stock buyers.
451See Brad King, Music Rights Battle Spins On, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 17, 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,47632,00.html (last visited May
31, 2002) (noting that the government works out a settlement with digital distributors in 70
percent of cases); Hetcher, supra note 446, at 2047 (stating the FTC threatened to propose
privacy legislation unless substantial new self-regulation occurred).
452 The use of antitrust law proposed moves beyond the traditional bounds of antitrust
law. The protection of free speech and encouragement of creative interaction clearly fall
outside the typical sphere of antitrust. But antitrust and fair competition consent orders have
long attempted to improve corporate practices in ways that go beyond mere promotion of
economic efficiency. We follow this tradition by using the apparatus of antitrust to effect
the broader goals of copyright policy. Such aims are consonant with the larger goals of
antitrust law, since the protection of fair use may have pro-competitive consequences.
Furthermore, the mechanisms established in antitrust law are peculiarly capable of
forwarding these aims.

2002]

USING ANTITRUSTLA IVTOADVANCE AND ENHANCE ONLINE Music DISTRIBUTION

553

constitutional values and public policy behind statutory copyright
protections.
Immunizing Virtual Private Networks
The companies agree not to suppress peer-to-peer networks with
substantial non-infringing uses. The companies agree not to initiate (or
support) legal action against virtual private networks with less than
ten E3 users. This section shall not preclude the companies' efforts to
monitor such networks within the limits of existing and future laws,
including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, to ensure that they are
actually private on-line communities. But such monitoring is subject to
limits enumerated in Parts III and IV of this agreement.
Opening Up Standard-Setting Bodies
The companies agree not to participate in any standard-setting
bodies without public interest representation. Standard-setting bodies
shall include formal industry groups and discussion forums, as well as
inter-industry groups and more formal standards setting organizations
with responsibility for approving or recommending standards for
adoption in both hardware and software If the standard-setting bodies
are consensual, at least one member of a 501(c)(3) organization must
be appointed for every thirty industry representatives. If the standardsettings body makes decisions on a majoritarian or staked basis (where
stakes are based on the amount invested in or contributed to the
organization), public interest representation must be at one-half the
level needed to effectively block action.
Publicly Disclosing Digital Rights Management Methods
The companies agree to disclose fully all DRM techniques to
potential consumers before purchase. Such techniques must also be
filed with the FTC at the time they are implemented. DRM techniques
include but are not limited to TCPA, CPRM, watermarking, worms, and
susceptibility to degrading aspects of operating systems and hardware.
Any computer-user monitored by TCPA or worms used by the
companies has the right to demand full disclosure of the uses to which
this information is put.
453 Note that it is necessary, to some extent, to "pluck a number out of the air." The
number ten seeks to reflect to some extent the basis on which we are recommending this
exemption: namely, the desire to preserve personal uses, and the kinds of uses generally
enabled under previous analogue technology, without allowing the network to grow to such
an extent that it truly represents a public, rather than a private distribution.
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Limiting Digital Rights Management
No DRM technique shall unreasonably invade a consumer's privacy.
Consumers have the right to demand any records of use compiled by
the companies.
Rights management agencies employed by the
companies shall process disputes in a timely manner, following
procedures
analogous to those included in the Fair Credit Reporting
4 54
Act.

An obvious question arises: Who will be responsible for monitoring and
enforcing this consent order? Having translated our policy goals into legal
rules in this section, we explore institutions for monitoring and enforcing the
rules in Section IV. Real reform must be situated in appropriate policy-making
and policy-applying bodies. Striking a proper balance between administrative
agencies and courts depends on (1) examining their relative institutional
competencies, (2) reflecting on the types of balances that have been struck in
the past, and (3) projecting the types of disputes likely to arise under the
language proposed above. We undertake each task below, and conclude
with
455
process.
enforcement
and
monitoring
fine-grained
a
of
proposal
the
IV. POLICY APPLICATION

Introduction

We conclude by comparing methods of applying the policies recommended
above. 4 56 If these policies were made law, both courts and administrative
agencies would need to implement them flexibly and creatively. In an era of
rapid technological and economic change, in which the practices of copyright
exploitation and the means for consuming copyright works are not stable,
ongoing enforcement and monitoring is a crucial part of protecting both
competition and user interests. After an agency has promulgated rules,
whether in the form of regulation, or via a consent order, both courts and
administrative agencies will need to implement it. A good deal of legal
scholarship has focused on the appropriate division of power between these
two policy-applying entities. 457 After briefly reviewing this literature, and the
particular challenges inherent in applying policy in this particular environment,
we consider how the general strengths and weaknesses of courts and
4-4 See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright PreemptionAfter the ProCD Case: A
Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 83-87 (1997) (offering qualified
support for a rule requiring conspicuous disclosure of contract terms that diverge from
copyright).
411 See infra Part IV.
456 See supra Part III.
457
See infra Part IV.A.
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administrative bodies relate to the particular problems they are most likely to
face in the process of applying the proposed reforms to copyright law and
policy.
Since we are primarily concerned with the maintenance of user privileges,
these problems fall into two categories: a) monitoring the relevant companies'
legal and business initiatives and b) regulating the anti-circumvention
technology used to protect their intellectual property. The rest of this section
systematically compares courts' and administrative agencies' capacities to
apply each policy. After considering the general strengths and weaknesses of
judges and bureaucrats, we focus on the particular history and current status of
copyright/antitrust and copyright/consumer protection conflicts. Finally, this
article recommends a larger role for administrative agencies than they have
previously enjoyed in this realm.
A.

Reflections on the Relative InstitutionalCompetence ofAdnzinistrative
Agencies and Courts

Both courts and administrative agencies have traditionally enforced the
antitrust laws, and both would have an important role in implementing the
proposed policies on digital distribution of music. Existing scholarship
examining the appropriate division of power between these two entities,
complemented by the comparative institutional analysis pioneered by Neil
Komesar, should provide some preliminary intuitions about the roper roles of
judges and administrators in implementing policy in this arena.
1.

Adjudication vs. Rulemaking

The difference between policy-making and policy-application is not always
clear. The formal distinction between statutes and their interpretation obscures
the diverse ways in which statutes can be applied. Administrative law scholars
have ordered this diversity by distinguishing between rulemaking and
adjudication. The bureaucratic rulemaking process is designed to serve large
numbers of parties affected by an ambiguous statute, while adjudication is
appro riate for a small number of parties disputing the possible violation of a
law.
The rulemaking process is often slower than individual adjudication,

458 Komesar examines methods of allocating authority between bureaucracies,
legislatures, courts, and markets. KOMESAR, supra note 341, at 3.
459 See Peter Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the
Formulationof Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, in THE LIMITS OF THE LAW

(Westview Press 2000), 139, 153 (distinguishing the courts and administrative agencies on
the basis of their institutional purpose, typical rules, and decision procedures). But see
Owen Fiss, hljunctions and The Forms of Justice, 98 HARv. L. RFv. 1 (1978) (challenging
traditional distinctions between judicial and executive functions in the context of
desegregation actions requiring complex and continuing administrative interventions by
courts).
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but is sometimes faster than the development of6udge-made doctrine, which
requires a series of cases raising pertinent issues.
Both courts and administrative bodies have had an important role in the
application of copyright policy.4 6 Widespread media attention to the Napster
case may give the impression that judges are the key actors in the field of
music copyright. But the quiet, largely behind-the-scenes work of the
Copyright Office has influenced the level of remuneration for copyrightholders - and the practical effect of new legislation, like the DMCA.'
As
more music moves online, politicians will need to decide to what extent
statutory interpretation should be the final result of a formal rulemaking
process versus the piecemeal aggregation of court decisions. To what extent
should we put specific disputes in front of specialist tribunals, as has been done
by conferring power on the Copyright Office's experts in the context of anticircumvention rulemaking, or in front of generalist judges?
As the chart above suggests, each policy-applying entity has unique
competencies and liabilities. To put the problem schematically, we might restyle the questions above in more general terms. How do we ensure that the
rulings generated by courts continue doing justice in particular cases, yet do
not interfere with the development of stable entitlements and expectations?
How do we keep the principles assuring the "local maxima" of fair4 64
rulings
from ossifying into barriers of "global maxima" sought by rulemakers?
Perhaps the most important recent contribution to this venerable debate has
been made by advocates of comparative institutional analysis. Neil Komesar
reminds us to aim for arrangements which enable participation while tapping
the unique competencies of current institutions.
These concerns roughly

460

See Peter Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Lail in an Executive

Department: Reflections on the InteriorDepartment'sAdministration of the Mining Law, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1245 (1974) (stating that the rulemaking process is clogged with

obstacles).
461 Although agencies can both adjudicate and make rules, this article focuses on the
latter.
462 As in, for example, the recent Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel determination on
Webcasting royalties. See Report of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel, Rates and
Term.s for Statutory License For Eligible Nonsubscription Services to Perform Sound
Recordings Publicly by Means of DigitalAudio Transmissions ("Webcasting') and to Make
Ephemeral Recordings of Sound Recordings, Feb. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-rates.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
463 For example, through the first rulemaking on exceptions to 17 U.S.C. § 1201. See
Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 37 C.F.R. § 201 (2000).
46 For a discussion of local and global maxima in policymaking, See JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (Cambridge University Press 2nd ed. 1984).
465 As Komesar observes, "variation in the performance of an institution is tied to the
participation of important institutional actors .... As such, I emphasize the activities of

consumers, producers, voters, lobbyists, and litigants.... In this sense, the adjudicative and

2002]

USING ANTITRuSTLAWVTOADVANCEAND

ENHANCE ONLINE MusICDISTRIBUTION

557

map to classic administrative balancing between democracy and efficiency.
But they may be specified still further in our context. Proper monitoring and
regulation can only occur when those who are applying policy have confronted
the problems of capture and opportunism, differing political values, and
bounded rationality.
Gerald Brock describes the solutions to these problems in
466
more detail:
1. Opportunism: Controlling power to be certain it is used only in the
public interest;
2. Differing Political Values: Defining the public interest on issues for
which any decision helps some people but hurts others, and for which there are
differing political views among those who are not personally affected by the
issue;
3. Bounded Rationality: Guarding against errors caused by the policy
maker's lack of expertise or inability to fully utilize the available information
to devise policies that accomplish given policy goals.
We can compare potential institutional arrangements with reference to these
values. A forum enables democratic participation if it publicly resolves
conflicts over political values after giving each relevant perspective some
chance to be heard. An efficient and competent institution minimizes
opportunism and bounded rationality. Both legitimacy and expertise are
important. 4 67 Both are factors in the following analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of courts and agencies in the context of antitrust regulation of
online music distribution.
2. General Institutional Advantages of the Courts
As Tocqueville has noted, sooner or later, nearly every great American
political dispute is converted into a court case. 468 In an exceptionally diverse
and pluralistic nation, the judiciary stands as the last bastion of rationality in a
maelstrom of incommensurable rhetorical appeals. Courts force litigants to
translate their dispute into the language of law. In the realm of copyright,
vague claims of property, justice and "incentives and rewards" are, for
example, matched up to decades of doctrine defining fair use and "effects on
the market" in concrete cases. In the area of antitrust, broad statutory

political processes are like the market, with its myriad of buyers and sellers." KOMESAR,
supra note 331, at 7.
466 See GERALD BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE: FROM
MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 7 (Harvard University Press 1994).
467 See PETER SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

47-48 (Westview Press 2000) (arguing that democratic values like participation and
transparency are important, but must be balanced by the ability of institutions to process
information).
468 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George

Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969).
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mandates of such legislation as the Sherman Act are translated 4 to
reflect
69
economic understandings and the purposes of furthering competition.
The impartial language of courts is, in part, a by-product of the neutrality of
their personnel. Article III federal judges have life tenure (during good
behavior) and are largely protected from political pressure. 470 The process of
appointment has become increasingly partisan, but judges are uniquely capable
of resisting the interest group and fund-raising pressures that afflict elected (or
high-ranking appointed) members of the federal government. 47 1 The key
advantage of the courts in the context of copyright law therefore is that they
are far less likely than the legislature (and arguably the executive branch) to be
captured by the interests of copyright owners or any particularly concentrated
group of interested parties (as discussed in Part III above).
While Congress usually legislates with an eye to the future, courts must deal
with the past. Before a suit can be filed, the circumstances to be considered
must have crystallized into some concrete "case or controversy." New
technology can be judged in terms of its actual operation. In an area of rapid
and unpredictable development, this is a considerable advantage over both
legislators and rulemaking bureaucrats who must try to deal in advance with
possible future developments. Past legislative efforts to prognosticate in
copyright law do not inspire confidence. In general, copyright legislation tends
to focus on the particular interests at play on the day the law is drafted rather
than the interests of future, unknown, unknowable developers of new
technologies. 472 Despite the length of time they take to make decisions, courts
nevertheless have certain advantages in uncharted areas of law relating to the
Intemet, because they will encourage both sides on an issue to cooperate in
identifying problems and, owing to the nature of common law development
through incremental addition of cases, will take on an "informative," almost
investigative role, creating a body of legal principle. 473
Courts are able to take a piecemeal, case-by-case approach.4 74 Legislatures
must state principles of general application, whereas courts can decide
469

See generally McGowan, supra note 428, at 741, 752 (2001) (describing antitrust law

as "an interesting mixture of statutory interpretation and common-law decision-making,"
starting from the "open-ended language of [the] statute" and noting that the courts have been
left to articulate just what behavior is "bad" by antitrust standards).
470
See U.S. CONST.art. III.
471See J. MASHAW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 768 (West Group, 4th ed. 1998) at 35

(stating that approximately the top 3,000 appointments in the executive branch are political).
472 On the process of legislating in the copyright arena, and the tendency of legislation to
reflect a compromise between competing interests, See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright
Legislation and the Technological Age, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).

473 See Thomas K Richards, Note, The Internet and Decisional Institutions: The
Structural Advantages of Online Common Law Regulation, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT.

474 See

L.J. 731, 736-37 (2000).
supra note 467, at 155 (explaining that "most court adjudication ...

SCHUCK,
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individual cases based on the facts (confined, of course, by precedent). By

encouraging the use of "muddy" standards rather than absolute rules, this
feature causes uncertainty on both sides. 4 75 But courts do not need to engage
in future-oriented speculation and may encourage parties to deal rather than go
to court. 476 Of course, when likely plaintiffs (the copyright industry) have
significant resources available to them for litigation, they are capable of
"holding out" against settlement of litigation and so achieving a more
favorable settlement than their upstart litigation targets.47 7
Lawyers may automatically turn to the courts as a favored institution.
However, in summary, the above impartial analysis reveals the contributions
courts can make in enforcing the consent order. First, courts are generally
independent and insulated from outside lobbying pressures. Of course, it is
naive to believe that courts are immune to outside interests. However, the
pressures are more pronounced within the realm of certain political issues,
such as affirmative action, abortion, and federalism. The realm of intellectual
property is relatively free of such political considerations. Second, courts
participate in organic common law adjudication. This incrementalism allows
for informed gradual developments of legal rules that are grounded in the
particular factual circumstances of individual litigants.
3. General Institutional Disadvantages of the Courts
On the other side of the equation, courts are limited to considering the
disputes that come before them. Despite the significant advantages already
outlined above, adjudication may also leave many important disputes
unresolved. An individual adversely affected by an unacceptable restriction on
the use of digital content may not have the knowledge, time, or resources to
bring forth a claim in a court of law. In addition, court rulings apply only to
the parties involved in the specific litigation. Stare decisis provides incentives
for similarly situated actors to conform to the ruling, lest they be dragged into
court, but such incentives are inadequate. Furthermore, courts can only
structured to focus attention narrowly upon the claims of individual litigants rather than
upon a decision's larger social consequences").
475 The potential developer of new technology may want to know where he or she stands
before investing his or her time and effort (or the venture capitalist's funds) in a new
technology or distribution business. There are three responses to this: (1)a risk-averse
party can at least try to know where he or she stands by negotiating prior to development;
(2) if flexibility is introduced into the legal doctrines, potential developers can then Seek to
maximize their opportunities within the "loopholes" left in the law; (3) courts can and
should attempt to develop legal doctrine consistently, so as to develop a stable overall
framework of principles. Certainty, then, is not a fatal factor rendering the courts totally
unsuitable.
476 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578-80
(1988); see also Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. Rnv. 121
(1999).
477 See Rose, supranote 478, at 608-09; Burk, supra note 478, at 121.
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penalize litigants who run afoul of the rules; they cannot provide incentives or
rewards for those who promote fair competition and fair use.
Unfortunately, it usually takes a great deal of money to reach the federal
justice system. As a result, the court system is perhaps the least "democratic"
(in the sense of enabling participation) of our three possible law and policymakers. While a large, diffuse interest may be able to vote into power
lawmakers sympathetic with their aims, it rarely can overcome the
coordination problems and costs of collective action involved in making a case
in court. Meanwhile, bureaucratic rulemaking processes are, in principle, open
to everyone. In practice, well-established groups are usually granted more
access, but these usually include public interest groups.
A further problem with relying on the courts is that, as Charles Taylor and
Mary Ann Glendon have observed, "rights talk" threatens to convert ordinary
judicial disputes into epochal battles of principle. 478 In court, the recording
industry speaks of absolute property rights in recordings, while file-sharers tout
an equal absolute right to use technology as they wish in the service of free
speech. Both overstate their case. In the U.S., copyright is not based on a
notion of "natural rights" of ownership by copyright-holder; rather, it is a
bundle of entitlements conditioned on the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts. '479 The copyright system includes both property and liability rules, and
policymakers choose the proper balance between the two. 4 8 Innovations like
radio, videorecording, and cable television have required an adjustment in the
balance of entitlements of content producers and suppliers.
This system,
however, does not grant innovators the right to set the balance themselves.
File sharers have sometimes argued that, because code trumps law they should
have a right to do whatever they wish with intellectual property.4 2 Although
it is rhetorically easy to convert this kind of "info-anarchy" position into the
478 See MARY ELLEN GLENDON,

RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL

DISCOURSE 12-14 (Free Press 1991) (comparing "rights talk" in the U.S. and Canada and
critiquing this development in the U.S.).
479 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
'The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings ...
but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of
science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the
exclusive rights to their writings.' H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public
welfare and not necessarily so as to maximize an author's control over his or her
product.
Id. at 580.
480 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL

ERA 350 (2000).
481 See Ginsburg, Copyright and Control,supra note 77. at 1614.
482
See Laurence Pulgram, Napster's Side of the Stor.,
http://www.cnn.com/law/columns/napster.05.19/index.html

(May 19, 2000).
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rhetoric of free speech, such "rights talk" in fact obscures the balancing of
interests necessitated by innovation.
The flip side of the court's capacity to do justice in particular cases is a
vulnerability to setting doctrine on the basis of unusual cases. Although the
common law system is premised on the incremental development of doctrine
through a series of cases, 4 83 discontinuities result when particularly "hard"
cases appear in the system. Sometimes for better, but often for worse, the
same seems to be true in copyright law. The popular image of Napster-users
has been of college students unfairly taking advantage of free broadband
access to "rip-off' songs by ripping CDs. The result may have been different
if the case reached the courts when P2P technologies and broadband access
had roughly the same rate of penetration as VCRs did in 1984 when the Sony
case vindicated consumers' rights.4 84 The result may well have been more
measured.
Observing these shortcomings of courts in the realm of liability of Internet
service providers ("ISP's") for copyright infringements committed using their
networks, Timothy Skelton criticizes the courts as a forum for decision-making
that is:
* Unable to articulate consistent rules in the area of contributory and
vicarious liability;
* Confused about fact patterns in an unfamiliar and complex domain;
* Unwilling to grapple with the important social, economic, and
constitutional policy considerations raised by such cases; and
* Constrained by both statutory language and common law principles. 485
Such infirmities make it necessary for comparative institutional analysts to
examine administrative agencies as alternative sources of policy application.
4. The Advantages of Administrative Agencies
Administrative agencies have the distinct advantage of being able to take
into account broader conceptions of the public interest. As the Napster case
also demonstrates, doctrinal pigeonholes can impede the presentation of cases
in judicial forums. Some economists have charged that the recording
industry's maintenance
of a high-margin,
low-volume
business model depends
....
;486
.
.
on anti-competitive practices.
In a judicial forum, the doctrines of
"copyright misuse" cannot adequately reflect this sense. Courts are also

483See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW I (Harvard University
Press 1988) (explaining that the common law is established by courts).
44 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
485 See Timothy Skelton, Internet Copyright Infi-ingenzent and Service Providers: The
Casefor a Negotiated RulemakingAlternative, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 219, 223, 340 (1998).
486 See CAVES, supra n. 268, at 286-296; MARK ELIOT, ROCKONOMICs: THE MONEY
BEHIND THE Music 70-71 (1989); REEBEE GAROFALO, ROCK 'N' ROLL IsHERE TO PAY: THE
HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 45, 60-62 (1977); R. SERGE DENISON, SOLID
GOLD: THE POPULAR RECORD INDUSTRY 231 (1975).
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constrained in their decision-making process. Think, for instance, of the
American Geophysical decision, in which the judges had to frame a decision
that ultimately hinged on the desirability of creating a market like the
Copyright
• .. Clearance
. .,,487 Center, in terms that presumed an "effect on an already
existing market.
Less doctrinally bound tribunals, however, such as
adjudicatory panels within the FTC or Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels
within the Copyright Office can analyze economic data more flexibly.
Bureaucracies not only develop expertise within, but can also contract out
evaluations of complicated new economic problems. Many government
agencies and departments have "contracted out" for services by hiring private
companies to perform them for a set number of years. 489 At the end of the
contract, the services are again subject to a competitive bidding process.
The "contracting out" model works particularly well in the copyright regime
because the services are discrete and direct, and relevant experts are
accustomed to doing contractual work. The same professionals who handle
valuation problems for ASCAP and other Collective Rights Organizations are
likely available for consulting positions at the Copyright Office. Intellectual
property experts may review the broad contours of discussion.4 90 This
institutional solution would also assure the permeability of the Copyright
Office to outside expertise.
While notice-and-comment rulemaking is
designed to assure institutional openness to diverse perspectives, putting such
"outsiders" on the inside of the agency may be a particularly effective way of
refreshing and balancing an agency's perspective.
Administrative agencies have a marked advantage over courts in the
processing of information relating to valuation. Professional economists can
487 American

Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994).

488For a discussion of the adjudicatory panels of the FTC, See Jeffrey Katzmann, Federal
Trade Commission, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 152, 177 (James Q. Wilson ed., Basic
Books 1980).

For a discussion of CARP's, See http://www.loc.gov/copyright/carp (last

visited May 31, 2002). Judges have been reluctant to intervene in their proceedings. See
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Congress, 146 F.3d 907, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(describing the "exceptionally deferential" standard of review under which the court may set
aside the order of the Librarian of Congress in adopting the recommendation of a CARP).
489 See, e.g., Christopher J. Dorobek, GSA: Contract out IT work ifit makes sense,
GOVERNMENT NEWS, Mar. 16, 1998, available at http://www.gcn.com/archives/gcn/
1998/marchl6/newsl.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) (stating that agency managers are
contracting out IT services); DoD Panel: Contract Out More, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1996, available at http://www.govexec.com/reinvent/downsize/
1030bl.htm (last visited May 31, 2002) (explaining that the Department of Defense might

contract out support services).
490 Courts, on the other hand, may be subject to the "battle of the experts."

491Of course, anti-circumvention rules are more complex and iterative than valuations
and generate a foundation of precedent. Rulemakers develop an expertise in their projects.
Therefore, if it continues to play a role in this field, the Copyright Office would probably do
well to follow the example of the FTC in cognate consumer protection fields and establish a
permanent committee assigned to this project.
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sift through competing expert reports in order to show the concrete economic
effects of regulations and infringements. Economists can give voice to the
interests of dispersed individuals unable to advocate for their own interests.
Using technical tools, economists can investigate hidden aggregate
consequences of regulations pushed by isolated interests. Often trusted as
"neutral experts," economists can also devise clear performance standards for
their employers. Some advocates of incommensurability might argue that
economistic calculations cannot factor in the diverse, noncommercial values
implicit in the present copyright regime.
However, the participation of
academic economists opens the door for other experts (like political scientists
and ethicists) to contribute to the application of policy.
They also promise
to bring methodological rigor to governmental decisionmaking processes
clouded by vague legal mandates.
Administrative agencies are also better than courts at proactively seeking out
those who violate rules and monitoring their behavior. Furthermore, where
Congress is largely confined to legislative hearings, administrative agencies
can take more active measures, depending on the authority they are allocated.
Combining executive, legislative, and judicial powers, administrative agencies
are more flexible than legislatures or courts. Furthermore, many agencies (like
the FTC) have boards with a rough partisan balance, assuring some diversity of
perspective in their leaders.
5. The Disadvantages of Administrative Agencies
Unfortunately, because administrative agencies have expertise, they are also
likely to be staffed by persons who have worked or plan to work for the very
entities and individuals they are to regulate.4 94 While Congress is subject to
rent-seeking by powerful interests, agencies are subject to capture. For
example, bureaucrats within the Copyright Office are liable to specialize in a
very narrow area and may want to parlay that specialization into a lucrative
private practice. There are few better ways to curry favor with affected
interests than to set rules they endorse.
Bureaucracies also face ossification of personnel due to life tenure. Most
4 95
federal bureaucrats may only be terminated after a long series of procedures.
And while whole agencies can in theory be eliminated by an act of
Congress, 4 96 in practice their entrenched constituencies are almost always
powerful enough to control one of the "veto points" capable of stopping this
process.

492

See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Free Expression, in CONTESTED COMMODITIES 165

(Harvard University Press 1996).
493 The World Bank, for instance, has begun hiring political scientists and anthropologists
to complement the work of economists who have hitherto dominated the agency.
494 See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

491 See id. at

142-45.
496 See id. at 65.

10 (3d ed. 1998).
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6. The Indeterminacy of Abstract Institutional Analysis
As the reflections above demonstrate, comparative institutional analysis is
indeterminate in the abstract. Administrative agencies may be more efficient
than••497
courts at processing information, but they are also vulnerable to tunnel
vision.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking may in principle be more
permeable to participation than litigation, but agencies are far more likely to be
"captured" than judges. In the field of comparative institutional analysis,
context is everything. The diversity of policy problems demands diverse
institutional responses. Final institutional choice should rest on a considered
analysis of past interventions in the relevant policy area.
Judicial interventions in the current battles over digital copyright have not
been promising. Defenders of the judiciary might claim that judges are at a
relative disadvantage in this field simply because they have not had the
opportunity to respond to the problems raised over a long enough period of
time. They may simply urge that doctrine be given more time to settle so that
we can take advantage of common law regulation of the online
environment.49 8 However, history demonstrates that such a step would be
unwise. Courts have had an extensive role in applying antitrust policy in the
context of musical copyright in the past. Their past failure to regulate
mechanical licensing in a timely and efficient fashion - a problem
we discuss
499
further below - should warn us against resorting to them now.
B.

A FailedBalance of the Past: Courts as CentralRulemakers and
CollateralInvolvement ofAdministrativeAgencies in the case of BMI and
ASCAP

Antitrust law has been applied in many creative industries, including concert
booking, movie production and distribution, book distribution, and music
publishing. 5 0 The copyright collectives or performing rights organizations
known as the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music Inc. ("BMI") license the right to publicly
perform musical works and lyrics.
They have drawn sixty years of antitrust
497 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE (Harvard University
Press
1993).
498 Thomas K Richards, Note, The Internet and Decisional Institutions: The Stnctural

Advantages of Online Conmnon Law Regulation, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 731, 734-735 (2000) (arguing that Congress passed legislation regarding ISP liability
for copyright infringement was passed too early because common law had not yet
established principles that could have provided guidance in drafting the legislation).
499Mechanical rights include "the right to reproduce copyrightable musical compositions
on phonograph records and tapes, as well as the additional right to distribute them to the
public." KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 51, at 232.
500

See

RICHARD

CAVES,

CREATIVE

INDUSTRIES:

CONTRACTS

BETWEEN

COMMERCE, 93-95, 157, 307-08 (2000).
501 See About ASCAP, at http://www.ascap.com/lpabout-ascap.html

ART

AND

(last accessed
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scrutiny from antitrust regulators. 5 0 2 Strangely, no commentator appears to
have applied the lessons of the big two copyright collectives (ASCAP and
BMI) to the big five labels in the recording industry. However, now that the
Internet music licensing ventures Pressplay and MusicNet threaten to reduce
an oligopoly to effective duopoly, the connection appears obvious.
ASCAP and BI have both been praised for providing blanket licensing
that allows royalty collection of what would otherwise be hopelessly
fractionated micropayments. 50 3 They are now seen as an efficient use of
contract to aid consumers and artists?"0 4 However, few of these collectives'
contemporary admirers adequately acknowledge the role of sixty years of
antitrust regulation in making these organizations fair and efficient. 5 5 Brief
examination of antitrust regulation of leading performing rights organizations
starkly illuminates the disadvantages of judicial domination of antitrust
enforcement.
1.

Antitrust on a Continuum Between Law Enforcement and Regulation

The prototypical antitrust enforcement scheme involves an administrative
agency policing business practices according to rules promulgated by common
law methods of adjudication. 5 0 6 If the agency's charge against a business is
challenged, a court settles the dispute and in the process builds on the existing
body of law. 50 7 Because of this dialectical process, "[t]he conventional

March 29, 2002); About BMI, at http://www.bmi.com/about/index.asp (last visited May 31,
2002).
502 For a brief historical discussion, See Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law,
Address Before the American Intellectual Property Law Association (May 2, 1997),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1 123.htm (last visited May 31, 2002).
5 03
See, e.g., BMI v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979); Robert
Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note 322.
504 See MICHELLE BURTIs & BRUCE KOBAYASHI,

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

AND

ANTITRUST LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACT 17-20 (George Mason Univ. School of Law, Law
2000),
available
at
Economics
Working
Paper
No.
00-06,
and
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstractid=210088 (last visited May 31, 2002); see also
MICHELLE M. BURTIS & BRUCE H. KOBAYASHI, WHY AN ORIGINAL CAN BE BETTER THAN A

ISO ANTITRUST
LITIGATION 17-20, (George Mason Univ. School of Law, Law & Economics Working Paper
No. 01-02 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=259297 (last
visited May 31, 2002). Although the authors find that there is no reported case in
COPY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE ANTITRUST REFUSAL TO DEAL, AND

which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or
license a patent or copyright, they ignore the recent uptick in copyright misuse
findings.
505 For a rare exception, See CAvES, supra note 500, at 297-313.
506
See SULLIVAN & HOvENKAMP, supra note 434, at 69-76.
507 See id.
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wisdom is that the antitrust laws are the antithesis of pervasive regulation of
the economy." 50 8 As Justice Stephen Breyer has explained,
[T]he antitrust laws differ from classical regulation both in their aims and
in their methods .... [T]hey act negatively, through a few highly general
provisions prohibiting certain forms of private conduct. They do not
affirmatively order firms to behave in specified ways; for the most part,
they tell private firms what not to do .... Only rarely do the antitrust
enforcement agencies create the detailed web5 9 of affirmative legal
obligations that characterizes classical regulation. 0
In some respects this "enforcement" model is an ideal form of antitrust that
runs along a continuum.5 10
The other side of the continuum is classical
regulation. Some have argued that contemporary antitrust law tends toward
the regulatory end of the continuum.5 1 1 Douglas Melamed, a former DOJ
official and present antitrust partner at the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
argues that an important factor in this trend is the use of consent orders. 512 A
continuum of regulatory and enforcement approaches gives antitrust authorities
some discretion, potentially increasing the effectiveness of antitrust in
achieving competition policy goals.
2.

Antitrust in the Context of Music: The ASCAP Precedent
The use of antitrust law to regulate the music industry is not unprecedented.
ASCAP was formed in 1914 as a cost spreading organization for copyright
litigation. 5 13 Justice White provided a succinct explanation of the society's
genesis in Columbia BroadcastingSys. v. ASCAP:
Since 1897, the copyright laws have vested in the owner of a copyrighted
musical composition the exclusive right to perform the work publicly for
profit, but the legal right is not self-enforcing. In 1914, Victor Herbert
and a handful of other composers organized ASCAP because those who
performed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous and
widespread, and most performances so fleeting, that as a practical matter
it was impossible for many individual copyright owners
5 14 to negotiate with
and license the users and to detect unauthorized uses.

508 Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecutionby Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (1998).
509 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 156-57 (Harvard University Press
1982).
510 See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13 (1995)

(describing "two paradigms," the law enforcement model and the regulatory model, and the
shift of antitrust law in recent years from the former to the latter).
511See id.

5 12

See id. at 13-15.
513 See Merges, supra note 322, at 1340.
514 BMI v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1978).
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ASCAP grew tremendously as a collective rights organization as radio
gained prominence in the 1920s. This new medium represented both an
immense risk of "piracy" and a great opportunity for developing royalty
revenue. From its beginning, ASCAP has licensed its members' performing
rights collectively by way of a "blanket license." 5 15 Under such a license, the
licensee can use any of the songs in the ASCAP catalogue as many times as
she likes. 5 16 Two aspects of ASCAP's licensing practices brought on the
scrutiny of antitrust authorities: (1) ASCAP obtained exclusive rights from its
members, forbidding them to work out individual deals with its members and
(2) there was "no legal
restraint on ASCAP's ability to fix any license fee it
'
deemed appropriate. , 17
The government first brought suit in 1934 and then again in 1941, at which
point a consent order was first entered. 5 18 The first decree was modified in
1950,519 at which point it contained eighteen sections, twelve procedural and
six substantive. 52 Two of its most prominent provisions established the
following: (1) the establishment of a U.S. district court in the Southern District
of New York as an arbiter to settle disputes between ASCAP and users over
what constitutes a "reasonable rate" and (2) non-exclusive licenses. 52 1 The
consent order has been subsequently amended at various points in the
intervening years, most recently in 2000.522
3. Criticism of ASCAP Antitrust Enforcement
Critics of antitrust actions against ASCAP largely object to the central role
that the judiciary has played in these developments. ASCAP antitrust
enforcement has
two spheres: (1) private litigation and (2)
• fallen largely within
523
the crafting of consent decrees.
The courts dominate the first sphere, while
the latter bargaining only occurs in their shadow. Private litigation involves
licensees who object to the practices of ASCAP, particularly the practice of
issuing blanket fee licenses, and who respond by initiating lawsuits. Jay
Fujitani has identified three limitations of these lawsuits. First, their expense

515

See Simon H. Rifkind, Music Copyrights and Antitrust: A Turbulent Courtship, 4

CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (1985).
516 See id.
517
1d.
51
S See Noel L. Hillman, IntractableConsent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of the
Aging Consent Decrees In United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 733, 743 (1998).
519
See id. at 744.
520 See id.
521See id. at 745-46.
522 See U.S. v. ASCAP, No. 64 Civ. 3787, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2872 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,

2000).

523 See Jay M. Fujitani, Controllingthe Market Power ofPerfonningRights Societies: An

AdministrativeSubstituteforAntitrustRegulation, 72 CAL. L. REv. 103, 103 (1984).
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5 24
515 them.
526
means there are few users who can afford
The litigation. is dominated
525
by motion picture exhibitors,
local television broadcasters,
radio
broadcasters, 527 and television networks. 8 Second, such litigation results in
inconsistent application by different courts. 5 2 9 As a result of the suits involving
the four aforementioned litigants, radio broadcasters and television networks
are subject to blanket licenses, while motion picture exhibitors and local
television broadcasters are not)' 30 Third, the judiciary is unable to frame
appropriate remedies. 53 1 Two remedies are typical: Either ASCAP 532
is
prevented or allowed to issue blanket licensees to a group of licensees.
Parties who want a blanket license but simply object to5the
3 terms imposed by
ASCAP have no adequate remedy in the judicial system.
The application of consent decrees also draws criticism. Fujitani argues that
the time and expense involved in adjudicating disputes in the rate court set up
in the Southern District of New York to resolve individual disputes between
ASCAP and licensees is just as prohibitive to potential litigants as private
litigation. 534 This may be a reason why the rate court has seen few disputes.
As Merges explains,
The imposition of a 'rate court' of appeals to be administered by a federal
judge in the Southern District of New York may appear a significant
change. In fact, it merely formalized long standing ASCAP procedures
for resolving member licensing disputes. Until 1981, the assigned rate
court was never called on to resolve a fee-setting dispute .... Even now
resort to the judge is rare.535
Given that the consent decrees have only been renegotiated three times over
the past sixty years, they are unable to respond to ongoing developments,
particularly rapid technological change: "Inflexible consent decrees are
inherently flawed as a tool for
resolving antitrust enforcement disputes
5 6
regarding intellectual property." 3

524

See id. at 121.
525See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
526 See Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
527 See K-91 Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967).
128 See CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd sub nor. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
529
See Fujitani, supra note 523, at 122.
.3 See id.at 116.
531 See id. at 122.
532 See id.
533See id.

114
See id. at 122-23.
535Merges, supra note 322, at 1340.
536 Hillman, supra note 518, at 734.
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4. How Administrative Agencies Might Have Helped
These criticisms of the ASCAP antitrust enforcement model point toward a
regime that relies more heavily on the involvement of administrative agencies.
First, proceedings might have been less costly in the administrative arena.
Second, the remedies would have been more effective since they would have
been monitored on a more regular basis and devised by administrators with
greater expertise. Third, agencies like the FTC and DOJ could have
coordinated regulatory actions to assure consistent application of the devised
policy across different jurisdictions and among likely situated parties.
These comparative advantages of agencies not only might have improved
(and might still improve) antitrust regulation of Performing Rights
Organizations ("PROs") but are also relevant to the present. Since RLAA
members sued Napster, application of copyright policy in the realm of digital
distribution has been synonymous with court decisions. 537 Just as judicial
responses to PROs' antitrust violations were unsatisfactory, current court
domination of the copyright policy application field has distorted the policy
landscape in several important ways.
C.

The FailingBalance of the Present: Courts' DominantRole in Present
Policy Application
Over the past few years, copyright policymakers have, by default, consigned
most disputes over policy interpretation to court-based resolution. As already
identified in Part I above, there are two key areas of copyright law that are
crucially relevant to the extent of control which can be exerted by copyright
owners over the development and use of distribution technologies: (a) anticircumvention measures and (b) the judge-made doctrines of contributory and
vicarious liability. Courts are now addressing these crucial "gray areas" of the
law. 53 8 We should only leave the fate of P2P technologies to the courts if we
believe that they can develop a nuanced concept of responsibility sensitive to
the needs of consumers, producers, and distributors of content. Unfortunately,
such confidence would be naive. When they have been called upon to address
both anti-circumvention doctrine and vicarious liability cases in the digital
context, courts have been slow to recognize the crucial importance of
developing doctrine to reflect new economic and technological realities.
1. Anti-Circumvention Doctrine
We have argued above that the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA
are, as presently drafted, insufficiently flexible: They consist of broad
prohibitions and narrowly drawn, inconsistent exceptions. Fair use has not
succeeded as a defense to breach of the anti-circumvention provisions (both
537 See the discussion of the various decisions supra Part I.
538 Including forms of more private sharing and the degree of responsibility that suppliers
of software different from that supplied by Napster.
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access and device provisions) of § 1201 of the DMCA. 53 9 The perfunctory
analysis of fair use privileges in the DeCSS case bodes ill for future efforts to
defend legitimate circumvention in court.54 °
2.

Contributory and Vicarious Liability

The holdings of the Napster court in relation to secondary bases of liability
for copyright infringement have been discussed more extensively above. As
noted, the Ninth Circuit in Napster, in both its initial appeal judgment and in
the recent judgment upholding Judge Patel's modified preliminary injunction,
has taken a broad view of vicarious and contributory infringement and a
narrow view of the Sony defense, which would be sufficient to render liable
many P2P and other networks and likely preclude new technological
developments. Even if one agrees with the Napster decision's "effect on the
market analysis," the court's elliptical and antiquated economic reasoning
scarcely justifies this result.
However, courts historically have differed on the scope of vicarious and
contributory liability. In the analogous though not identical area of ISP
liability for copyright infringement, prior to the enactment of the DMCA (Title
I1541 of which provides safe harbors for ISPs), courts were criticized by some
for giving inconsistent answers on the question of the scope of responsibility
for others' copyright infringements.54 2 Despite this, even those critics have
tended to prefer the court-developed doctrines of responsibility to the sweeping
immunities enacted (or liabilities suggested) by Congress. The legal doctrine
in this area, though imperfect, is at least well established (given respected
principles such as enterprise liability). 543 Nevertheless, all of the advantages
courts have in this area could be matched (if not trumped) by agency
Agency rulemaking could codify a body of law rarely
interventions.
predictable in outcome, and while court-based rules are frozen into precedent,
agencies have a freer hand to adopt rules to technological change.

539 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331-32 (2000).
540 See Declarationof Jon Bingfor defendants in DVD CAA v. McLaughlin, Bunner, et
al.,

available

at

http://www.eff.org/pub/lntellectual-propertyVideo/DVDCCAcase/

20000118_bing-norwayjlaw decl.html (last visited May 31, 2002) (critiquing the district
court decision in this case).
541 Otherwise known as the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act or
"OCILLA." 17 U.S.C..§ 512.
542 See Skelton, supra note 485, at 223 (arguing for negotiated rule making in the context
of ISP liability); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service ProviderLiabilityfor Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1854
(2000) (discussing ISP liability).

543 See Yen, supra note 542, at 1856 (arguing that though enterprise liability too easily
becomes liability without limit, courts nevertheless have shown themselves capable of
engaging in line-drawing).

2002]

UsING ANTITRUSTLA IVTO ADVANCEAND ENHANCE ONLiNE Music DISTRIBUTION

571

D.

A New Balancefor the Future:Increasing the Role ofAdnzinistrative
Agencies
Either courts or administrative agencies will need to take a dominant role in
applying the policies we have recommended. In our view courts have proven
unreliable in this area. While generalist judges and clerks may lack the
expertise necessary to understand the complex economic and technological
issues surrounding digital distribution of music, administrative agencies may
hire staff better able to build on extant expertise in the area. For example, the
Copyright Office and the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels it appoints
have long used economic analysis to calculate compulsory license rates in the
realm of television broadcast retransmission and are presently involved in
regulating Webcasting. 544 They have also participated in rulemaking on
exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.5 45 Since these
administrative offices may be captured by affected industries judicial
supervision (as provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act .6) should
provide a check on their authority. Courts, however, should be deferential
toward these administrators' expertise.
The types of expert analyses that eluded the competence of courts
attempting to administer the ASCAP consent order and to apply "fair use"
doctrine to P2P technologies are only likely to proliferate given the policies we
propose. An administrative agency with ongoing enforcement authority would
be necessary in order to coherently regulate these situations. Administrative
agencies can set policy and regulations in a forward-looking manner not
tailored only to past disputes but also to future problems. They can build on
principles already set by courts (and our consent decree) to mold them to
particular technologies - without having to litigate each form of new
technology to see how it fits within the broader principles developed by the
court. That is, they can engage in more general translation of the underlying
legal principles to a changing technological context. Courts are confined to
broad principle and specific application; administrative agencies can tailor
compromises that fall somewhere in between. When an administrative agency
sets some parameters for appropriate conduct, using the fair use principles
developed by the courts over time, but trying to translate them in a way that
deals with particular conduct we see as dangerous, they can promote an
ongoing supervisory process. Such a coherent process of regulation is

544 See Report of the Copyright ArbitrationRoyalty Panel,Rates and Terns for Statutory
License For Eligible Nonsubscription Services to Perform Sound Recordings Publicly by
Means of DigitalAudio Transmissions ("Webcasting') and to Make Ephemeral Recordings
of Sound Recordings, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/
webcastingrates.html (last visited May 31, 2002).
5 See Oversight Hearing on the United States Copyright Office: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of Marybeth Peters).
546 15 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2000).
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particularly important given the ways in which court-based antitrust regulation
of the music industry has failed in the past.
V.

CONCLUSION

Digital music distribution has changed dramatically over the past three
years, but its progress is still frustratingly slow. In this environment, the
formation of policy is a serious challenge. To preserve the historic balance of
copyright law between providing incentives for creators and ensuring
maximum use of and access to copyright works, we need to craft flexible rules
and institutions.
This article began with a question that plagues policymakers and lawmakers
today: How can we continue to enjoy the benefits of peer-to-peer technology
while simultaneously ensuring a proper balance of compensation and
incentives to creators of musical works? Any concrete solutions raise a
complicated set of substantive policy concerns. Provisional compromises are
inevitable since no one institution or set of rules can provide a permanent
resolution. Nevertheless, real reform must address two closely related
problems:
1) How to ensure competition and diversity in commercial, public
distribution of copyrighted content online; and
2) How to maintain fair use and a robust public domain.
We have demonstrated that the present "wait and see" approach adopted by
the political branches of the United States government is not an adequate
response. It is likely to lead either to an ongoing "technological arms race"
between content owners and those seeking to defeat their technologies of
control, or, more likely, to increasingly tight control by copyright owners over
content at the cost of user access and fair use. Neither info-anarchy nor perfect
control is acceptable. In light of the current upheavals in the music industry,
we have suggested that, at this stage, a more proactive approach is necessary.
To promote fair competition and robust public distribution, we propose
ongoing investigation and monitoring of commercial developments by antitrust
authorities but no direct intervention. On the other hand, we believe that in
light of present developments of DRM technology, fair use can only be
preserved if policymaking institutions more actively protect these rights. To
this end, we have proposed four mininum advances of copyright policy (in
addition to antitrust investigation). Those minimum policy advances include:
* A temporary moratorium on infringement lawsuits against virtual
private networks of less than twenty members;
" Disclosure of all DRM techniques
* Limits on DRM to ensure the protection of the privacy of individual
users; and
* Public interest representation on industry-dominated DRM standardsetting bodies.
In keeping with our acknowledgment that these are issues which will require
ongoing adjustment in light of changing circumstances, we have offered a
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framework that should guide both institutional choice and the development of
law and policy by relevant institutions. First, we set out five substantive
principles that are relevant in assessing particular suggested reforms and
institutional choices:
1) To enable diverse business practices and wide availability of content;
2) To maximize the development of new technologies for distribution and
use;
3) To preserve space for individual use and maximize consumer welfare in
the broadest possible terms;
4) To ensure the welfare of other stakeholders, in particular artists; and
5) To tailor distribution rights in the public interest and to limit
technologies of control.
In Part HI, we assessed a range of policies designed to advance these goals.
We ranked them according to their plausibility and comprehensiveness. Given
the existing institutional environment, the more comprehensive the solution,
the less plausible it becomes. Our approach has been to strike a balance
between comprehensiveness and plausibility. Part I also considered the
advantages of moving beyond institutions and laws historically associated with
copyright. We have discerned limits to copyright's expansionary tendencies in
antitrust and consumer protection legislation and have called for more
aggressive application of those laws in the digital music context.
Finally, in Part IV, we examined the relative institutional competencies of
courts and administrative agencies in conducting ongoing supervision and
application of our recommended policies. We recommend that administrative
agencies be given a more active role in this area. Courts have generally failed
to use antitrust law effectively in the music field, and they presently are doing
little to promote the few extant elements of copyright law that protect
consumer interests. Specialized agencies are better equipped to process
information and are likely to be more flexible and more generally competent
than generalist courts to address the complex policy and economic issues
involved.
Peer-to-peer technologies represent a remarkable innovation and
opportunity. While digital rights management could domesticate P2P by
stifling its illegal uses, it now threatens to strangle innovation if left
unchecked. Limits on DRM are necessary to fair competition and fair use in
online music distribution. Flexible policies and innovative institutional
arrangements can help achieve a continuing balance between the interests of all
stakeholders involved.

